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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D., 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE, 
Respondent. 
• I 
Supreme Court Case No. 43125 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the J?istrict Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
JOSEPH D. McCOLLUM, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
JEAN URANGA 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 6/11/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 10:57 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-OC-2014-04321 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine 
Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine 
Date Code User Judge 
3/4/2014 NGOC CCSWEECE New Case Filed - Other Claims Michael McLaughlin 
PETN CCSWEECE Petition for Judicial Review Michael McLaughlin 
3/18/2014 STMT · CCSCOTDL Statement of Issues for Judical Review Michael McLaughlin 
3/19/2014 ORDR TCEDWAAM Order Governing Judicial Review Michael McLaughlin 
HRSC TCEDWAAM Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Michael McLaughlin 
08/14/2014 02:00 PM) 
4/14/2014 NOTC TCLAFFSD Notice Of Lodging Michael McLaughlin 
4/28/2014 NOTC ,· TCLAFFSD Notice Of Filing Record On Appeal Michael McLaughlin 
MISC TCLAFFSD Certification Michael McLaughlin 
5/19/2014 BREF TCLAFFSD Petitioner's Opening Brief On Judicial Review Michael McLaughlin 
6/24/2014 NOTR CCNELSRF Notice Of Reassignment Gerald Schroeder 
6/25/2014 CONT CCNELSRF Continued (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
08/14/2014 03:00 PM) 
CCNELSRF Amended Notice of Hearing 08/14/14@ 3 pm Gerald Schroeder 
6/30/2014 BREF CCRADTER Respondent's Brief Gerald Schroeder 
7/17/2014 ORDR DCABBOSM Order for Rebriefing Gerald Schroeder 
7/21/2014 HRVC CCNELSRF Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
. 
scheduled on 08/14/2014 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated · 
7/25/2014 BREF. CCMCLAPM Petitioners Amended OPening Brief on Judicial Gerald Schroeder 
Review 
7/31/2014 MOTN CCMARTJD Motion For Extension Of Time Gerald Schroeder 
AFFD. CCMARTJD Affidavit Of Jean R. Uranga In Support Of Motion Gerald Schroeder 
For Extension Of Time 
8/1/2014 MOTN· CCMCLAPM Motion for Extention of Time Gerald Schroeder 
AFSM CCMCLAPM Affidavit of Jean R Uranga In Support Of Motion Gerald Schroeder 
for Extention of Time 
8/4/2014 ORDG CCNELSRF Order Granting Extension of Time (8/22/14) Gerald Schroeder 
8/20/2014 BREF: CCMCLAPM Respondents Amended Brief Gerald Schroeder 
9/11/2014 RPLY CCHEATJL Petitioner's Reply Brief On Judicial Review Gerald Schroeder 
10/9/2014 HRSC. CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
11/06/2014 01 :30 PM) 
CCNELSRF Notice of Hearing Gerald Schroeder 
11/6/2014 DCHH' CCNELSRF Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
scheduled on 11/06/2014 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: t. fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 5000 
2/12/2015 DEOP. DCABBOSM Opinion on Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
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Date: 6/11/2015 
Time: 10:57 AM 
Page 2 of 2 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2014-04321 Current Judge: Gerald Schroeder 
Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Robert Michael Mena MD vs. Idaho State Board Of Medicine 
Date Code User Judge 
2/12/2015 CDIS CCNELSRF Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Board Of Gerald Schroeder 
Medicine,, Defendant; Mena, Robert Michael MD, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 2/12/2015 
STAT CCNELSRF STATUS CHANGED: Closed Gerald Schroeder 
3/25/2015 NOTA. CCJOHNLE NOTICE OF APPEAL Gerald Schroeder 
APSC CCJOHNLE Appealed To The Supreme Court - Gerald Schroeder 
MOTN CCJOHNLE Motion to Stay Pen~ing Appeal Gerald Schroeder 
MEMO CCJOHNLE Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Gerald Schroeder 
Pending Appeal 
4/3/2015 BREF CCHOLDKJ Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Gerald Schroeder 
Stay Pending Appeal 
6/11/2015 NOTc· TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Gerald Schroeder 
43125 
000004
Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
e 
!/~? .. ._ __ ,=--~~--
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
MlCkAEI .. Mct~UGHUN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 











Case No. CV O C 1 4 0 4 3 21 ' 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Filing Fee: $96.00 
TO: THE IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE AND ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Professional licensee, Robert Michael Mena, M.D .. 
("Petitioner"), petitions the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho for judicial 
review of the "Final Order" ("Order") entered by the Idaho State Board of Medicine ("IBOM"), 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1 
45966.0001.6441208.1 
000005
in Case No. 2007-BOM-5888. The IBOM's Order from which this Petition for Review is taken 
was served by facsimile February 5, 2014. 
2. Petitioner represents that this IBOM action was brought in completing a statutory 
process identified and well known as the Disabled Physician Act (DPA), I.C. 54-1831 through 
1839, Idaho Code. Petitioner had been requested by the IBOM, through its counsel, to undergo 
an examination by an Examining Committee of Idaho licensed physicians. J.C. 54-1833. He 
complied with the Committee's requests and the Examining Committee issued its report to the 
IBOM. I.C. 54-1834 and 1836. Following its receipt of the Examining Committee's report, the 
IBOM purportedly initiated this proceeding under I.C. 54-1836 (c) and J.C. 54-1837. 
3. Petitioner has a right to seek relief from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of Idaho, and the Order described in paragraph 1 above is a reviewable Order ripe for 
review under and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters of law and fact. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5249, the IBOM should have the following records 
in its Case No. 207-BOM-5888: 
(a) all notices of proceedings, pleadings, motions, briefs, petitions, and 
intermediate rulings; 
(b) evidence received, excluded or considered; 
(c) a statement of matters officially noticed; 
(d) offers of proof and objections and rulings thereon; 
( e) the record prepared by the presiding officer under the provisions of 
Section 67-5242, Idaho Code, together with any transcript of that record; 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
45966.0001.6441208.1 
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(f) staff memoranda or data submitted to the presiding officer or the agency 
head in connection with the consideration of the proceeding; and 
(g) any recommended order, preliminary order, final order, and order on 
reconsideration. 
6. A hearing was held in August 2013 before a hearing officer designated by the 
IBOM. That hearing was reported by a court reporter. Insofar as Petitioner knows, the transcript 
of the hearing and the full case record in its Case No. 2007-BOM-5888 is in the possession thte 
IBOM. 
7. Statement of the issues on Judicial Review: Judicial Review is requested pursuant 
to I.C. 67-5279, and particularly subsections (2) (a) through (d), inclusive, and (3) (a) through 
(e), inclusive. Petitioner also specifically represents that the IBOM's action herein substantially 
prejudice his substantial rights, thereby complying with the statutory requirements of I.C. 67-
5279 (4). 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d)(5), Petitioner advises the Court that he 
will file separately the required list of issues for judicial review. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Request for Judicial Review is being served on the 
reporter who transcribed the hearing. 
(b) That the clerk of the administrative agency has been requested to provide a 
fee estimate for the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's 
transcript pursuant to Rule 84(n). 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
45966.0001.6441208.1 
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(c) That the estimated fee, if any, for preparation of the agency's record will 
be paid upon receipt of the agency's notifications of the estimated amount. 
( d) That the District Court's filing fee applicable to petitions for review of 
final decision from administrative agencies has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 84(e). 
9. Additionally, by way of notice, Petitioner tentatively asserts that he is considering 
requesting the Court's permission for leave to present additional evidence pursuant to I.C. 67-
5276 (1). Preceding any such request to the Court, Petitioner currently expects to communicate 
with the agency, the IBOM in this case, concerning actions permitted under I.C. 67-5276 (2), and 
would foresee doing so prior to the time the agency would be required to prepare and submit the 
agency record pursuant to I.C. 67-5275. 
DATED THIS~ day of March, 2014. 
No. 1299 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 
45966. 0 1.6441208.1 
000008
• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .1!:Fday of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Jean Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, ID 83701-1678 
Nancy Kerr, Executive Director 
Idaho State Board of Medicine 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0058 
Cathleen M. Morgan 
Idaho State Board of Medicine 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0058 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5 
rnlu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
D Telecopy 
@'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
u2f Telecopy 
[y'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 





Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 




Attorneys for Petitioner 
e 
NO·----. ... -~ ..... ~~i:::::...-
llM. ::: ::::: :st. vies-( 
MAR 1 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 










Case No. CV OC 1404321 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Robert M. Mena, M.D ., referred to herein as "Petitioner", through his counsel of record, 
and pursuant to Rule 84(d)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby states the issues he now 
anticipants raising on Judicial Review: 
A. The Idaho Board of Medicine ("IBOM") has violated substantial rights of 
Petitioner to his legal detriment and prejudice. 




B. The IBOM has violated Section 67-5279(2)(a)- (d), Idaho Code, inclusive, and, 
in particular: 
1. This case was initiated by the IBOM by filing a Notice of Hearing 
pursuant to the Disabled Physician Act ("DPA") and, specifically, Sections 54-1836(c) and 54-
1837, Idaho Code. Prior to seeking a hearing, the IBOM in communications with Respondent 
asserted that Respondent "may have psychiatric issues which impact his ability to practice with 
reasonable skill and safety"; the IBOM sought an Examining Committee evaluation with which 
Respondent cooperated and in which he participated; after seeking a hearing, the IBOM filed the 
Examining Committee Report, which stated, among other supportive provisions that: (a) "We do 
not find that requiring a formal Psychiatric evaluation at this time would be helpful", and (b) 
"The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena can continue his present practice 
of medicine with reasonable skill and safety" with continuing medical management 
recommendations, with all of which Respondent agreed. Did the IBOM exceed its statutory 
authority in utilizing the DPA for the purpose of addressing and considering sanctions and/or 
license limitations outside the DP A or not limited to its referral under DP A auspices. 
2. Given its Examining Committee's findings, did the IBOM err in: 
a. Going outside the parameters of the DP A to impose disciplinary 
licensure restrictions, denominated as permanent in duration; 
b. Going outside the parameters of the DP A and prior Stipulations 
between Respondent and the Board to increase the duration of license restrictions previously 
entered into from voluntarily between the parties to permanent restrictions neither agreed to 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
45996.0001.6471052.l 
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previously, litigated in a disciplinary proceeding nor addressed within the noticed scope for this 
DP A-based examination, report and purported enforcement action; 
c. Not only finding licensing restrictions based on Medical Practice 
Act ("MP A") statutes not found within the DP A, but reporting those restrictions as new 
restrictions imposed in this DPA action to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB"), a 
mandatory national registry for disciplinary actions taken by state licensing boards; and reporting 
them to the Idaho Board of Pharmacy ("IBOP") which automatically restricted Respondent's 
controlled substance registration prescription rights (see, I.C. 37-2718(g)(l) and (2); and 
reporting them indirectly to the American Board of Family Medicine ("ABFM"), the specialty 
board by which Respondent was previously licensed but from which recertification was being 
precluded, Respondent had been informed, by the IBOM's actions; and by transmitting its 
decision to all other states in which Respondent was concurrently licensed. 
d. Even seeking a hearing against Respondent under LC. Section 54-
1837(a) in the absence of an Examining Committee "diagnosis" addressing or otherwise 
supporting other or further practice restrictions associated with the statutory bases for invoking 
DP A jurisdiction; 
e. Ordering permanent license restrictions in the face of the 
Examining Committee's recommendations by asserting, without disclosed investigation or 
notice, that Respondent has "some level of impairment", adopting language from an attorney 
hearing officer, not apparently related to the Examining Committee's Report and only apparently 
consistent with the exercise of IBOM discretion extending beyond the parameters of the DPA 
under which the case was brought against Respondent; 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
45996. 00 l.6471052.l 
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e 
f. Referring Respondent to its designated Examining Committee 
under the DPA, invoking jurisdictional grounds limited to those found in I.C. Section 54-
1852(a) - (c), while imposing permanent license restrictions on other, including disciplinary 
and/or other unrelated grounds. 
C. The IBOM has violated Section 67-5279(3)(a)- (e), Idaho Code, inclusive, and, 
in particular: 
1. If this court should find that the IBOM was required to issue an order 
under the DP A, or the MP A, by reason of its referral of Respondent to its statutorily authorized 
Examining Committee, then Respondent reincorporates the issues, general and specific, raised 
under Section B.1. of this Statement. 
2. Given its Examining Committee's findings, did the IBOM err in: 
a. Taking those actions, making those decisions and addressing those 
issues, general and specific, raised above under Section B.2. of this Statement. 
D. In conducting its prosecution of this claim pursuant to the DPA, the IBOM, 
through its hearing officer, inappropriately precluded Respondent from introducing testimonial 
and documentary evidence addressing his ability to practice with skill and safety, by upholding 
the IBOM's assertion of an independent right as a licensing agency to rely on Idaho's Peer 
Review statute to preclude such documents and proffered testimony to be considered in 
Respondent's case; moreover, in the IBOM's rebuttal case, the hearing officer allowed 
evaluation and monitoring documents arising out of the continuation of that same prior hospital-
based review and evaluation process to be admitted in evidence against Respondent. The 
differentiation, it seems, is that the documents the IBOM was allowed introduce, in rebuttal, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 
45996.0001.6471052. l 
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were those submitted to the IBOM by Respondent before this DPA case was initiated and in 
response to the IBOM's specific request to him, as his governmental licensor, and in its 
regulatory capacity, to address the events behind a particular patient's care. Respondent 
respectfully suggests that the IBOM, through its appointed hearing officer erred in his 
pervasively exclusionary interpretation of Idaho's Peer Review statutes toward Respondent's 
proffered evidence and differentiating interpretation of those statutory guidelines in admitting the 
IBOM' s submissions in rebuttal. The Board affirmed its hearing officer's evidentiary rulings. 
E. The IBOM has treated this case since the hearing as a MPA disciplinary case 
rather than or in addition to a DP A disability evaluation case, as further evidenced by the 
IBOM's "Final Order" enumerated provisions, including sub-parts 5, 7, 8 and 12, particularly the 
latter in which the IBOM designated its "Final Order" to be a "public record". This treatment of 
issues, under these circumstances, Respondent cites as error constituting an abuse of discretion. 
F. Irrespective of the status of the IBOM' s Orders under Sections B and C above, 
did the IBOM exceed its statutory authority under the DPA statutory provisions and described 
process by expanding and imposing a license restriction earlier addressed by the parties in an 
MP A case. In the prior instance, the parties had negotiated a stipulation several years before, 
and later partially rescinded it at Respondent's request, only to have the IBOM re-imposed the 
practice restriction in this DP A case by order and make it a permanent Idaho medical license 
restriction on Respondent's license albeit arising out of the narrow purview of a DPA action, as 
if a disciplinary case, and as to which no notice was provided Respondent of the Board's 
regulatory direction. Respondent respectfully suggests that the IBOM erred in its handling of 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5 
45996.0 01.6471052.1 
000014
this DPA filing and prosecution under the standards of sub-sections (a) - (e), inclusive, of 
Section 67-5279(3), and as referred to in Section C. above. 
CONCLUSION 
In setting out his issues for anticipated judicial review, Respondent is stating them above 
in the context of the scope of review in such matters pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act. For his requested relief, Respondent suggests that the Findings and Final Order 
of the IBOM be reversed and the disciplinary provisions of the Board's order, particularly sub-
paragraphs 5 and 12, substantively, be deleted as inappropriately ordered in a DPA statutory 
proceeding, that the IBOM be instructed to issue a new order without such sub-parts, and that 
Respondent not be required to comply with sub-part 8 of its order in view of the IBOM' s 
improvident imposition of restrictions and penalties as if the case below were a disciplinary case 
under the broader MPA and not a more narrowly designated and limited DPA statutory action. 
1'1 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J.I ~ay of March, 2014. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
0. 1299 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J.tU:y of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Jean Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, ID 83701-1678 
Nancy Kerr, Executive Director 
Idaho State Board of Medicine 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0058 
Cathleen M. Morgan 
Idaho State Board of Medicine 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0058 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 7 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
0 Telecopy 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
0 Telecopy 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 





Jean R. Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (2 08) 342 -8 931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
Idaho State Bar No. 1763 
Attorneys for Respondent 
e 
:~=======Fl=LE~,_--M--t-12.:--+-,-,it't'>'l~f-
APR 2 B 2014 
CHRISTOPHER O. AICH, Clerk 
By STACEY LAFFERTY 
oePVTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,) 
) 
Respondent. ) ________________ ) 
Case No. CV OC 2014 04321 
NOTICE OF FILING RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-5275, the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine, by and through its attorney of record, Jean R. Uranga, 
hereby certifies that a certified copy of the agency record in the 
above-entitled action has been transmitted to the Court on April 
28, 2014. The record includes: 
1. Volume I of the transcripts of the administrative hearing 
conducted August 12, 2013; 
2. All pleadings set forth in the Docket of Pleadings 
attached hereto as Exhibit A; and 
NOTICE OF FILING RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
000017
3. All exhibits set forth in the Exhibit List attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
DATED This~ day of April, 2014. 
URANGA & URANGA 
~d~~~ 
JEAN R. URANGA, OftheFir 
Attorneys for the Board 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ;;;;/~ day of April, 2014, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING 
RECORD ON APPEAL by depositing a copy thereof in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to: 
Joseph D. Mccollum, Jr. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
NOTICE OF FILING RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 
000018
Jean R. Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
e 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-8931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
Idaho State Bar No. 1763 
Attorneys for Respondent 
e 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




Case No. CV oc 2014-04321 
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS 
-vs- ) 
) 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,) 
) 
Respondent. ) _______________ ) 
DATE PLEADING 
July 23, 2009 Stipulation and Order 
July 27, 2009 Certificate of Service 
September 26, 2011 Order Terminating Stipulation and Order 
September 27, 2011 Certificate of Service 
May 15, 2012 Order Appointing Examining Committee 
May 15, 2012 Order for Examination 
May 15, 2012 Certificate of Service 
July 3, 2012 Certificate of Service 
May 21, 2013 Notice of Filing Examining Committee Report 
May 21, 2013 Order Appointing Hearing Officer 
EXHIBIT 
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS - 1 -f\ 
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May 21, 2013 
May 21, 2013 
June 7, 2013 
July 9, 2013 
July 9, 2013 
August 6, 2013 
August 19, 2013 
August 2 6, 2013 
August 26, 2013 
Notice of Hearing. 
Certificate of Service 
Notice of Representation 
Notice of Hearing 
Certificate of Service 
Board's Disclosure of Witnesses and 
Exhibits 
Scheduling Order 
Motion Predicated on Review of Idaho's Peer 
Review Statute to: (1) Reconsider and 
Reverse Admission of Certain Board Exhibits 
(#8, #11, #12, and #13), Particularly if 
Hearing Officer Continues to Deny Admission 
of Respondent's Exhibit #108; (2) 
Reconsider and Reverse the Exclusion of 
Certain of Respondent's Exhibits (#101, 
#102 and #103) and Admit Those Exhibits as 
Not Falling Within the Classification of 
Peer Review Records; (3) Allow Richard 
Lally, M.D. to be Recalled to Testify Con-
cerning Documents not Presented as a Part 
of the Hospital Peer Review in Which he 
Participated in October, 2007; to Address 
Respondent's Exhibits #101-103, Inclusive, 
Previously Excluded; and to Discuss, if 
Permitted, the Failure of the Hospital's 
Peer Review Process to Comply with Bylaw 
Standards 
Memorandum Review of Idaho's Peer Review 
Statute and Privilege, and Supporting: (1) 
Respondent's Objection to Admissibility of 
Board Exhibits 11, 12 & 13; (2) Respondent's 
Motion and Request for Reconsideration of 
Admission/Rejection Rulings on Exhibits Based 
on Hearing Officer's Broad Application of the 
Exclusionary Breadth of the Privilege; (3) 
Respondent's Motion to Reconsider the 
Proffered Testimony of Dr. Richard Lally, 
Excluded Under Peer Review Objections or, if 
Denied, an Offer of Proof of Dr. Lally' s 
Excluded Testimony; and (4) Respondent's 
Motion to Recall Dr. Mena to Testify 
Concerning the Scope of the Board's Exhibit 
4, and as to his Personal Conditions and/or 
Professional Practices and Decisions not 
Excluded From Testimony by a Narrower Appli-
cation of the Privilege 
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS - 2 
000020
August 2 9 t 2013 Board's Reply Brief 
September 11, 2013 Order Denying Evidentiary Motions of 
Respondent 
September 16, 2013 Board's Closing Argument and Brief 
October 17, 2013 Respondent's Closing Argument and Brief and 
Request to Recommend Dismissal of Proceed-
ing Under I.C. Section 54-4837(3) 
October 21, 2013 Board's Reply to Respondent's Closing Brief 
November 18, 2013 Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law 
January 7, 2014 Final Order 
January 22, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration 
January 27, 2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration 
January 31, 2014 Board's Brief in Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration 
February 5, 2014 Order on Motion for Reconsideration of 
Final Order 
February 6, 2014 Respondent's Reply to Board's Brief in Op-
position to Motion for Reconsideration 
DOCKET OF PLEADINGS - 3 
000021
Jean R. Uranga 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-8931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
Idaho State Bar No. 1763 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 








IDAHO STATE BOARD OF MEDICINE,) 
) 
Respondent. ) ________________ ) 
BOARD OF MEDICINE'S EXHIBITS 
No. Description Admitted 
1 Letter dated September 26, 2011 
from St. Benedicts Family Medical X 
Center to Idaho State Board of 
Medicine 
2 Letter dated October 11, 2011 X 
from Idaho State Board of 
Medicine to Dr. Mena 
3 Letter dated October 13, 2011 X 
from Jean R. Uranga to Dr. Mena 






No. Description Admitted Admitted 
4 Reply explanation and X 
accompanying documentation 
regarding a final, adverse action 
recommendation on staff 
membership by St. Lukes Hospital 
Jerome 
5 Email dated November 15, 2011 X 
from Dr. Mena to Beverly Kendrick 
6 Email dated December 29, 2011 X 
from Dr. Mena to Jean Uranga 
7 Letter dated February 29, 2012 X 
from Dr. Mena to Jean Uranga 
8 Examination Committee's Report of X 
Findings and Recommendations 
9 Dr. Craig Beaver's X 
Neuropsychological Examination of 
Dr. Mena 
10 American Board of Family Medicine X 
examination dates 
11 Colorado Physician Health Program X 
and Betty Ford Center Evaluations 
12 PACE Evaluation X 
13 CPEP Evaluation X 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS 
Not 
No. Description Admitted Admitted 
100 Letter from Tina England to X 
Robert Mena - Re: Reappointment -
Dated 12/11/2006 
104 Letter from St. Benedicts Family X 
Medical Center to Robert Mena -
Re: Suspension for Reasons of 
Patient Safety - Dated 02/22/2007 
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Not 
No. Description Admitted Admitted 
105 Letter from St. Benedicts Family X 
Medical Center to Robert Mena -
Re: Privilege Suspension - Dated 
03/20/2007 
107 Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D. X 
Neuropsychological Evaluation -
Report Date 09/14/2007 
110 Letter from Peter Doble to Robert X 
Mena - Re: Appointment 2009-2010 
111 Letter from Peter Doble to Robert X 
Mena - Re: Board Certification -
Dated 01/21/2010 
113 Letter from Jean R. Uranga to J. X 
Kevin West - Re: R. Michael Mena, 
M.D. - Dated 01/12/2009 with 
attached Stipulation and Order 
114 Letter from Jean R. Uranga to J. X 
Kevin West - Re: R. Michael Mena, 
M.D. - Dated 06/19/2009 
115 Adverse Action Report - Process X 
Date 07/28/2009 
116 Adverse Action Report - Process X 
Date 10/26/11 
118 Letter from Jean R. Uranga to X 
Robert M. Mena - Re: Personal 
Appearance Before Committee -
Dated 11/26/12 
119 Email from Shannon Bailey to X 
Jlene Mena - Re: prior suspension 
- Mena 082825 - Dated 07/08/13 
120 University of California, San X 
Diego School of Medicine 
Physician Certificate of Credit 
121 University of California, San X 
Diego - Certification of 
Completion - Physician Assessment 
and Clinical Evaluation Program 
122 Letter from Dr. Jonathan Housley X 
M.D. to Idaho Board of Medicine, 
Attn: Dr. Leo Harf 




No. Description Admitted Admitted 
123 Letter from Lorraine Tangen M.D. X 
to Idaho Board of Medicine, Attn: 
Dr. David McCluskey 
124 Letter from Scott Albright DO to X 
Dr. Leo Harf, Chairman Idaho 
State Board of Medicine 
125 Letter from Dr. Scott M. Albright X 
to Idaho Board of Medicine, 
Doctors Berland and Gabica -
Dated 06/14/12 
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URANGA & URANGA 
714 North 5th Street 
P.O. Box 1678 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-8931 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5686 
Idaho State Bar No. 1763 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Case No. CV OC 1404321 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
This case arises under the "Disabled Physician Act" (hereafter sometimes "DP A"), a 
1976 addition to the Idaho Code, S.L. 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Sections 54-1831 to 54-1838 
and Section 54-1840. The codification remains little changed in almost 38 years and less 
discussed in reported decisions. Through these nine sections, the Idaho Board of Medicine 
(hereafter sometimes "IBOM" or "Board") is empowered to assess a physician licensee's 
"(a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "(c) excessive use or abuse of drugs, including 




alcohol". I.C. Section 54-1832. If the Board, has "reasonable cause to believe" that a licensed 
physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients because of a 
condition described in section 54-1832," it "shall" cause a committee to examine the physician. 
I.C. Section 54-1833. Thereafter, in the usual case, the Board will receive the Examining 
Committee's "report and diagnosis," make a "determination of the merits," and assess one of 
three specified orders to address the physician's "impairment". I.C. Section 54-1837(c). 
In concept, therefore, the DPA sets out a process by which the Board may evaluate a 
physician licensee's "inability" caused by the cited illnesses, mental or physical, or addictive 
processes. Put differently, the Board is charged with an examination obligation to ascertain 
physician disability (a state of being "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and 
safety to patients") when that condition is found to be caused by any one or more of the three 
cited conditions. 
In this case the Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness" 
prong, I.C. Section 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That 
occurred mid-June, 2012 and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's 
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by I.C. Section 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject 
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20). 
The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to 
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients" 
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the 
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation", which the statute allow them to 
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. The parties essentially agree that the 
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DP A provisions through the Examining Committee process and its report to the Board 
appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily outlined. 
II. 
ESSENCE OF PARTIES' SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE: 
The parties are in disagreement not with respect to the preliminary DPA process, but with 
the Board's unrestrained interpretation of its statutory powers once it received, as illustrated in 
this case, the report of its selected Examining Committee. The Board's compliance monitor 
testified, for example, that the Board "accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations 
at its September 2012 board meeting, but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25). 
Instead, the Board had its counsel prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician 
licensee to sign it; and if he would not, the process was that "we had to proceed with this 
hearing." (Tr. p. 37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23). 
On Judicial Review, we are favored with no exhibits proffered by the Board of 
documents it drafted as proposed stipulations it pushed on Petitioner and that Petitioner declined 
to sign after September 2011, but its staff monitor apparently accepted as routine, and heard 
"often", that physicians who had a license "restriction" or "who are being monitored," her staff 
role, "were unable to become board certified." (Tr. p. 38, LL. 5-10). What is disturbing, in this 
context, is that neither the Board nor its staff appear to differentiate between disciplinary cases 
sometimes resulting in licensing restrictions as sanctions and DPA cases in which restrictions, if 
any, must be related to a licensee's inability/disability from specific disease/impairment causes 
that impede/obstruct/prevent the physician licensee from practicing with "reasonable skill and 
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safety to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease or aging processes. LC. 
Section 54-1832. It's all "discipline" in the Board's mind's eye, and through its staff. 
The Board seems to believe that once a physician comes to their attention, irrespective of 
the statutory process, he's fair game for imposed "sanctions." That, in essence, is Petitioner's 
concern and was his fate in this case. That which was administratively opened as a DPA case, 
and went through the Examining Committee process, became on referral back to the Board with 
recommendations of fitness to practice no more than another disciplinary opportunity against 
someone who would not sign that which the Board told him to sign. From a legal perspective, 
the obvious illustration of this Board's pervasive concept that everything is discipline, and all 
deserved, is found in the Board's Final Order that does not once refer to the DPA, speaks in 
terms of imposing "sanctions" as "necessary upon Respondent's (Dr. Mena's) license to fulfil its 
statutory duty" and cites the "purposes" clause of the MPA as the authority for its actions in this, 
a clear DPA case. 
A. The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings under the DPA and Petitioner's 
Principled Objections to the Board's Post-Examining Committee Report Process: 
This DPA case was commenced by the Board on or about May 21, 2012, almost 11 
months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the Board. At that time 
Respondent filed and served a Notice of Hearing, attached a copy of the Examining Committee's 
report and cited I.C. Subsection 54-1837(a). For substantive support, the Board cited LC. 
Subsection 54-1836(c) and LC. Section 54-1837, both DPA statutory provisions. Petitioner 
believes the Board, in acting to notice this matter for hearing, in then prosecuting its DPA case 
against Petitioner, and in formulating the restrictive sanctions set forth in its final order exceeded 




its statutory authority under the DP A as outlined by Petitioner in his Statement of Issues on 
Judicial Review and in the following sections of his Opening Brief. 
In overview, this case on Judicial Review raises fundamental issues of the relationship 
and interaction between the structure and functioning of the DPA and its co-interaction, if at all, 
with the "Medical Practice Act" (sometimes hereafter referred to the "MPA"). Both these 
statutory schemes are administered by and enforced, when needed, through the IBOM, an agency 
of the State of Idaho from whose decision Judicial Review is applicable. In its handling of the 
matter, Petitioner suggests to this judicial reviewer, the Board violated his substantial rights to 
his legal detriment and prejudice in ignoring or deviating from statutory guidelines in 
prosecuting the claim below against him and, in particular, imposing "sanctions" against him 
inconsistent with the DPA's statutory scheme and outlined process. 
III. 
FACTS UNDERLYING THE BOARD'S ORDERING A DPA COMMITTEE 
EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION: 
Historically, the DPA statute has provided a process by which a physician's "inability" 
by reason of disability under defined circumstances is assessed for the purposes of protecting 
patients. The factual circumstances are unusual in this case, but nonetheless clear in their 
presentation to the Board. In early October 2011, the Board received a letter report on hospital 
stationery addressed to the Board stating that over five months before Petitioner's hospital 
clinical privileges "had been forfeited by him" because he had not completed "required medical 
training." (Hearing Ex. 1). Treating this letter as an "adverse clinical action" report, mandating 
investigation, the Board asked Petitioner by letter dated October 11 for a "written personal 
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response," a "copy of pertinent records" and copies of continuing education credits. (Board's 
Ex. 2). Petitioner was given a response deadline of November 8, 2011. 
Nearing the response deadline, in part for reasons described below, Petitioner was 
scrambling to pull together his written response to the Board's request for data concerning the 
alleged "adverse clinical privilege action for not completing required educational training," as 
the Board's staff characterized the report it had received. Several unexplained factual gaps 
impede cogent analysis of these events preceding the Board's appointment of and referral of 
Petitioner to an examining committee authorized by the DP A: 
1. No evidence was presented that the Board had received anything other than the 
single page letter, either contemporaneously with it or later, concerning the Jerome hospital's 
taking the reported adverse action in April 2011, over 5 months before the IBOM was notified; 
nothing besides the single letter was forwarded to Petitioner by the board staff in requesting his 
written response and supporting documentation (Tr. p. 109, LL. 14-20; p.22, LC. 10-22). 
2. At the time Petitioner received a copy of the hospital letter report in October 
2011, he had not known of the reported adverse action taken the preceding April; moreover, he 
did not believe that he even had hospital privileges at that time against which the reported action 
against him could have been taken (Tr. p. 109, LL. 20-22) since he had resigned hospital 
employment in 2008 (Tr. p. 122, LL. 1-6), had last had a "Courtesy Staff' appointment in 
September 2009 on provisional status covering adult admissions (Hearing Ex. 110), and 
subsequently, on the expiration of his national board certification in family medicine in late 
2009, he lost his eligibility for staff privileges as he was formally notified in January 2010 
(Hearing Ex. 111), 21 months before he received the Board's inquiry letter. 
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3. No independent investigative or testimonial evidence was proffered by the Board, 
or public record presented by it, that the Jerome hospital had actually taken an adverse clinical 
action against Petitioner in 2011, as reporting of that action would have been required, under 
federal law, to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB") within a few weeks of becoming 
final. The only testimonial evidence addressing this point was that of Dr. Jonathan Housley, 
formerly a resident Jerome physician staff member and, during the time in question, was first a 
CPEP "mentor" of Petitioner, then a member on the Jerome hospital's Medical Executive 
Committee (MEC) and later an advocate for Petitioner in seeking an unrestricted license. Dr. 
Housley also testified both that hospitals are required to report adverse actions to the NPDB and 
that he was not aware of any such action or report against Petitioner for the noncompletion of 
CPEP educational monitoring, the program specifically mentioned in Ex. 111, concerning which 
he had previously been a Petitioner's voluntary mentor. 
4. No evidence was presented that Petitioner had prior knowledge of the reported 
adverse clinical action report in April 2011 or between then and October. Nor would it have 
made much sense for Petitioner to ask the Board to lift the 2009 two year stipulation in 
September 2011 if he knew an adverse action report had been taken against him and would be 
submitted to the IBOM in October; more significantly, the Board either found nothing to 
substantiate the Jerome letter report, or made no attempt to do as it had no record that it even 
contacted the letter's author or the hospital that was reported to have taken the adverse clinical 
action (TR. p. 21, LL. 1-13) many months before for which there was also no NPDB 
documentation to which the Board as the state licensing agency has preferential access and 
through upon NPDB reports are transmitted. 




5. Thus, by October 2011, some 21 months after his eligibility for staff privileges 
had terminated by reason of the expiration of his board certification, Petitioner was being asked 
by the Board's staff to access and produce for Board review a confidential patient chart and/or 
related historical records pertaining to the reported clinical course and physician action toward a 
patient whose care appeared to be of interest to the Board. Almost five years had elapsed from 
the December 2006 delivery that gave rise, eventually, to educational recommendations, the 
asserted non-completion of one of which was cited as triggering the letter interpreted by the 
Board's staff as an adverse action report requiring of Petitioner a written response he was 
obviously struggling to create. His wife testified concerning significant family medical issues 
with which they were then dealing (Tr. p. 72 - 73) while Petitioner was "trying to meet a 
deadline" to submit his written response to the Board; she thought a draft product was 
"inadvertently" delivered to the Board. (Tr. p. 73. L. 23 - p. 24, L. 25). The delivered form 
reflected assistance from her sister who helped Petitioner pull his notes from her computer as the 
deadline approached and he appeared to be under pressure. 
Petitioner's delivered response to the Board was typed and contained attachments, but 
only the response itself, and a supplemental conclusion, the Board elected to include as proffered 
exhibits at hearing. (Hearing Ex. 4, 5). No Board members were called to testify about their 
reaction to Petitioner's required response to his licensing agency, but its counsel's representation 
at hearing suggested that the letter's form and/or organization "generated a great deal of 
concern ... about his mental capacity" and "generated the creation of the examining committee ... " 
(Tr., p.6, LL. 4-7;). The board staff investigator (and only witness called to testify by the Board 
at hearings) also agreed with the Board's counsel in characterizing the Board as having 




significant concerns at its December 2011 meeting about what Petitioner's written response 
"might reflect about his mental health." (Tr. p. 16, LL. 9-11). 
However, no testimony was presented by the Board or its staff that the substance of the 
requested written response pertaining to clinical events almost five years earlier in Petitioner's 
practice involving a particular patient about which the Board had inquired had anything to do 
with its subsequent examining committee referral under the DPA. In other words, the Board's 
reported reaction to the form of Petitioner's submission was the clear focus, while their 
substantive comments about patient care issues, if any at all, were never related by witnesses. 
Indeed, when the Board later appointed its DPA Examining Committee, as explained by the staff 
compliance employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was 
predominately a mental health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). 
Nor was there any other evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining 
Committee was made under any statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong 
of the DPA, J.C. Section 54-1832 (c). 
The single staff witness and the Board's counsel in her opening remarks at hearing 
addressed the form, organization and presentation of Petitions better response to the exclusion of 
any clinical observations about the 2006 clinical events or 2007 post-event hospital-based 
activities associated with educational suggestions/recommendations for Petitioner about which 
the Board requested Petitioner to respond in writing. Indeed, as addressed below, The Board, 
through counsel not only objected on relevancy grounds to almost every attempt by Petitioner to 
bring in background data and clinical history the Board has asked him to respond to in writing, 
but also went further in asserting a broad statutory peer review privilege to preclude Petitioner 




and his witnesses from discussing hospital-related educational programs and monitoring arising 
out of the 2006 clinical history that precipitated an event chain leading to Petitioner's submission 
of his November 2011 written response to the Jerome hospital's letter report. 
IV. 
EXAMINING COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND REPORT: 
The written response by Petitioner to his licensing board, including all attachments, was 
submitted to the Board's selected Examining Committee comprised of one family practice 
physician and two psychiatrists. In its report, that Committee identified it as Petitioner's 
"Undated response to the Board with attachments," one of eleven documents presented to the 
Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) and a part of the information reviewed by the 
Committee. Only one of the reviewed documents, the June 14, 2012, letter of Scott Albright, 
M.D., Petitioner's treating physician, was submitted at the request of Petitioner. 
Although identified as prospective Board witnesses, none of the three Examining 
Committee members appointed under DP A auspices and scope testified at Hearing. Nor did 
neuropsychologist Craig Beaver whose examination of Petitioner, ordered by or on behalf of the 
Examining Committee, testify at Hearing. Thus, the record of the process is supplied by the 
Examining Committee's report, dated June 29, 2012 (Hearing Ex. 8). Dr. Albright, was called to 
testify by Petitioner. All five of the individuals just mentioned, four of whom were mental health 
specialists, found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective after 
reviewing and focusing on Petitioner's written response to the Board, the triggering DPA referral 
factor, interviewing him about it and examining him. All five were unanimous in finding him fit 
for the practice he had been performing, and none voiced concerns for patient safety. The panel 




also noted the absence of a pattern of patient complaints. (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 2). Petitioner 
acknowledged good patient relations and related his 20 year career history of having no 
malpractice claims filed against him. 
What, then, did the Examining Committee do in discharging its duties? Clearly, it found 
Petitioner "fit" to practice. Secondly, it reviewed and discussed with him his medical history, 
considered that history in light of the "mental illness" referral for committee review and found 
no reason to express any patient safety concerns associated with Petitioner's practice. 
Additionally, it reviewed his treatment and medications for pre-existing conditions not the focus 
of the Board's referral. More specifically, it found his use of one prescriptive anxiety 
medication, Lexapro, and a sleep aid, CP AP therapy for use during sleep, both appropriate and 
well managed by Dr. Albright, Petitioner's treating psychiatrist of several years; significantly, it 
drew no causal relationship between the management of these routine medical management 
issues and any mental health concerns under the DP A. Committee members and Petitioner 
agreed that the medical management of the anxiety and sleep apnea symptoms should continue 
and Petitioner represented that he intended to do so, and had done so for several years to his 
betterment. Finally, it told the Board that it did not have recommendations concerning 
Petitioner's OB care, and did not mention caring for chronic pain management patients, topics of 
review not assigned, directly or implicitly, to the Committee by the Board. There has never been 
a dispute about the Examining Committee doing its duty and filing its report. 
We know from the Board's one witness, confirmed by the Board's attorney, that it 
accepted the recommendations of its appointed Examining Committee. In view of that 
administrative fact, and the fact the Board in its Final Order "acted to adopt the Recommended 




Findings in toto" (Final Order, p. 1), reviewing some of the hearing officer's findings is both 
illustrative and telling concerning the Board's view of its statutory role. 
The hearing officer below misperceived Petitioner's argument. Petitioner is not 
suggesting that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed 
issue ... before the Board can take action." (Recommended Findings, p. 9). Rather, concerning 
those pre-existing conditions for which Petitioner was then, and before and after, being treated, 
there was nothing giving rise to a fitness impairment caused by mental health issues on which the 
Examining Committee was tasked to focus. Or, in the language of the statute, the Examining 
Committee could not say it was "because of a condition", addressing Petitioner's pre-existing 
medical conditions, that he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to 
patients." (LC. Section 54-1833). Only if it had fist found that Petitioner were "unfit", would it 
have been required to more narrowly bring its findings within DP A statutory parameters by next 
tying that finding of unfitness to be "because of', in this case, "mental illness" (LC. Section 54-
1832). There was no need to reach that step. 
The hearing officer also perceived Petitioner to be arguing that the Examining Committee 
findings "preclude a hearing,"; he found to the contrary, asserting the appropriateness of Board 
action prior to the DP A referral. Again, the hearing officer does not display an appreciation of 
the statutory niche filled by the DPA; nor, we submit, does the Board itself as illustrated in its 
approach to every case as if each is a matter of discipline even if by fact and process the case is a 
matter of disability. 
Under the DPA, the Examining Committee plays a significant role, and mandatory one at 
that, in the evaluation process. This is particularly true, Petitioner respectfully submits, in 
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addressing Board referrals involving mental health/illness issues which usually require special 
expertise to appropriately evaluate. The Board initially recognized that in placing two 
psychiatrists on its three physician Examining Committee to address its mental health concerns 
triggered by its members visceral reaction to the form and organization of Petitioner's November 
2011 written response to the Board's request for clinical information and documentation. Upon 
later receiving its Examining Committee's advisory report, the Board had the right to "accept or 
reject the recommendation" of it, Examining Committee "to permit a physician to continue to 
practice with or without any restriction on his license to practice medicine." (I.C. Section 54-
1836(b)). Here the Board accepted the report, or so we're told. 
Yet the Committee recommended no "restriction" on Petitioner's license as it confirmed 
his fitness to practice. Had it found a causal fitness issue, particularly if tied to a factor falling 
within its mental health expertise, it was authorized to recommend a license restriction, if not 
suspension during the period of impairment, or even license revocation. The Examining 
Committee did not find a "fitness to practice" issue of import and recommended none of the 
available license-restricting actions suggesting a need to protect patients from a risk associated 
with Petitioner's mental fitness to practice. Rather, the Examining Committee reviewed the 
panoply of data available to it, felt comfortable with the prior diagnoses and ongoing treatment 
Petitioner was undertaking and recommended that his current care continue, adding only a 
reevaluation in two years. 





EVALUATION OF THE BOARD'S ADJUDICATIVE ROLE IN THIS DPA CASE: 
It would appear the Board Improperly used the report and failed to continue the DPA 
process. Its single live witness suggested that it did not share the report with Petitioner. Rather, 
it put together a proposed stipulation to monitor his conduct which he preferred not signing. 
When he declined to sign it, they invited him to appear before the Board to tell it why he 
wouldn't sign the Board's stipulation. He did so. The Board sent him yet another stipulation 
which he declined to sign. So, as the witness explained, the Board brought this case as a 
compliance matter. And, in its Final Order after a hearing, the Board "deemed sanctions were 
necessary upon Respondent's License to fulfill its statutory duties." (Final Order, p. 3). One of 
those "sanctions" then imposed was a standard of practice restriction: "5. Respondent shall 
permanently cease from practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management." (Final Order, p. 3). 
The Board cited the MPA's enforcement powers to "protect Idaho's public health, safety and 
welfare" through licensing, regulation and enforcement of standards of physicians. In short, the 
Board put on its disciplinary hat and imposed its disciplinary will, sanctioning Petitioner, it 
would appear, for not accepting whatever the board had wanted to impose, of whatever duration, 
and for whatever unstated reason outside DPA parameters. 
Focusing back on the DPA's provisions, and its 38 year history, it seems reasonable to 
assume that there has been little controversy raised by referring a physician with "inability ... to 
practice medicine" (I.C. Section 54-1832) due to illness, mental or physical, or deterioration by 
aging or drug/alcohol use and impairment In such instances the Board must only have a 
"reasonable cause to believe" that an Idaho licensed physician is "unable" to practice for these 
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reasons to warrant the mandatory examination. (LC. Section 54-1833. And in the usual case, a 
physician, in facing such a referral, may "request a restriction of his license to practice medicine 
(I.C. Section 54-1835) to avoid the hearing while still qualifying for the reinstatement process 
"under this act," referring to the DPA. (I.C. Section 54-1838). 
But this is not the usual case. Petitioner was referred to the Examining Panel not because 
his medical history or a clinical report but because of something he wrote, purportedly in draft 
form, but then submitted to the Board in response to meeting his licensing agency's imposed 
submission deadline. And, probably unlike most of the obvious cases, the Examining Committee 
found no reason for disqualification by reason of "fitness" to practice. After all, Petitioner 
essentially agreed with the Committee that he was "fit" to practice as he had been doing, and 
agreed with the continuing care he had been obtaining from his attending psychiatrist. What it 
appears the Board did for several months after its Committee's report was delivered was to 
attempt to persuade or coerce Petitioner to voluntarily accept a license restriction as part of a 
monitoring/disciplinary process. Unfortunately, we don't know what it was thinking or what 
proposed stipulations it presented to Petitioner because it neither tendered any into evidence nor 
offered any transparency by producing Board witnesses or executive staff to explain its interval 
actions. 
What we do know is that the Board's counsel asserted, its only witness supported, the 
· hearing officer bought and the Board then affirmed by Final Order a process whereby the Board, 
in a pure DPA case, may "accept" but still ignore its Examining Committee's recommendations; 
and, in switching to its disciplinary role, the Board approved its right to demand Petitioner's 
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compliance, or else, as if the case were a disciplinary matter from the inception, and as to which 
it asserted entitlement to apply disciplinary sanctions. 
And so it did. The DP A is integrated as a distinct act for considering and resolving 
situations arising from the "disability" rather than the "disciplinary" side of the Board's 
regulatory responsibilities. Petitioner is not suggesting that the Board was bound to what its 
Examining Committee recommended; rather the Board may not ignore the constraints of the 
DP A and transmute a case following Examining Committee review to a purely disciplinary one. 
In particular, the Examining Committee is charged with reporting the physician's fitness 
"by reason of' the Section 54-1832 factors. As to any related impairment, the Examining 
Committee "shall report" to the Board "as to the fitness of the physician to engage in the practice 
of medicine ... , either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management the committee 
may recommend." (I.C. Section 54-1836(a). The Board's statutory role is somewhat different. 
In addition to addressing a "restriction" or not under the statutory parameters, the Board may 
also impose the more severe sanctions of suspension or revocation, but not as a disciplinary 
sanction. With respect to its authority to "suspend" or "restrict" a license under the DP A, the 
Board may only do so "for the duration of his impairment" (LC. Section 54-1837(c)(2) within 
the statutory parameters of the DP A. 
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability 
or impairment. There is nothing in the DPA that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that 
last "permanently," or for life or for any extended duration beyond a licensee's "duration of 
impairment". As pointed out above, there is also nothing in the DP A that authorizes the Board to 
impose restrictions for conditions not causally related to those categories specified in the DPA. 
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Moreover, there is nothing in either the language, the history, the concept or the spirit of the 
DP A that the Board has the authority in a DP A case to impose restrictions for typical standard of 
care violations, practice deviations or disciplinary transgressions. Finally, there is no authority 
granted or implied in the DPA for the imposition of permanent restrictions on practice, of "OB 
and chronic pain management" which were not referred to the Examining Committee under the 
DPA referral standards, were not addressed by the Examining Committee as relevant to their 
review. Nor could such a restriction have been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria 
and on which the Board did not submit evidence at hearing while precluding Petitioner from 
doing so. 
VI. 
THE BOARD'S RULING HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 
The Board's sole witness testified that a license "restriction" imposition by the Board 
would prevent a licensee to qualify for specialty board certification (Tr. p. LL. 4 - 12). 
Petitioner first took and passed his specialty board in 1996 in family practice medicine. The 
certificate was issued by the American Board of Family Medicine (ABFM), certifying his having 
achieved a standard of knowledge and experience of professional and personal importance. He 
also recertified on his first examination. (Tr. p. 95). He moved to Idaho and received his Idaho 
medical license in 2002 (tr. p. 94- 95). As mentioned previously, the Jerome hospital bylaws 
required physician staff members to be board certified to retain staff privileges. Although not 
directly at issue in this DPA case, hanging over Petitioner is the shadowy prospect of reclaiming 
eligibility for specialty board diplomat status. An abbreviated summary is found in an exchange 
of emails between Petitioner and the ABFM representative (Hearing Ex. 119, p. 1). By a two 
year monitoring stipulation he signed in early 2009, his license was restricted, and, as a result, 
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Petitioner was unable to sit again for recertification in late 2009, leading to his exclusion from 
the Jerome hospital medical staff in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111). 
In seeking to regain his eligibility to recertify in his practice specialty, Petitioner, when 
the two year 2009 stipulation had reached its stated duration, he asked the Board that it be 
administratively terminated, and the Board did so, replacing it with another that, in the language 
of the ABFM credential coordinator, "it appeared that you were released from any and all terms 
of that prior agreement, thus reinstating your medical license to a full and unrestricted status". 
He was delighted and, indeed, applied to sit for the examination, paid his fees, and took the 
examine in the spring of 2012. However, the ABFM, in reviewing his status found that the Idaho 
Board's replacement stipulation referred to one paragraph of the prior agreement between the 
Board and its licensee that had not been terminated; therefore, the ABFM concluded that his 
state-imposed "restriction" remained, avoiding his efforts, but leaving him still board eligible. 
As the ABFM representative summarized, choosing to not perform OB, or not treat pain patients 
was not disqualifying, but having those restrictions/conditions placed on a medical license, his in 
this case, made him ineligible to sit for a recertification examination. The IBOM uses the 
leverage of "restriction" with its monitoring (Hearing Ex. 3), even if practicing clinicians most 
familiar with the licensee may think a license restriction may not be clinically warranted 
(Hearing Ex. 122, 123). As Dr. Lorraine Tangen testified, she, too, has quit doing obstetrics, she 
was aware of Petitioner's several educational courses, believes him to be a much better 
physician, improving his fitness to practice since completing them, once treated him for CP AP, 
treated his family and, significantly, opined in November 2011 that Petitioner ought not have an 
imposed license restriction (Tr. pp. 100 - 104). 
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What is somewhat mysterious is that from the Board's staff monitor, testimony was 
elicited that at its September 2012 board meeting, not only did the Board "accept" the Examining 
Committee's recommendations, but also offered Petitioner a "voluntary stipulation to 
incorporate" the recommendations of the Examining Committee (Tr. p. 19, LL. 11-14, 15 - 20). 
Then, in asking Respondent to appear before the Board, the witness was asked and agreed that 
the Board did "still vote to ask him to voluntarily restrict his practice" which he refused (Tr. p. 
20, LL. 4 - 9). If, indeed, the Board was giving Petitioner the right to free himself from the 2009 
restriction by agreeing to a no strings attached recommendation consistent with the Examining 
Committee's recommendation, why didn't the Board offer into evidence those proposals made to 
Petitioner while he was not represented by counsel? And how does that contrast to the Board's 
objecting and successfully keeping out Petitioner's offer of its marked hearing exhibit 117 
conveying a to his former counsel a very restrictive stipulation proposal? And why would 
counsel press, unsuccessfully, in November 2012 an unrepresented Petitioner to sign an early 
Board stipulation (Hearing Ex. 118, letter only) when Petitioner had been looking for the 
opportunity to voluntarily withdraw from certain aspects of his earlier practice for personal 
reasons unrestrained by state-based but ABFM accepted non-eligibility restrictions? 
While there may be circumstances when, for disciplinary reason, a physician should be 
precluded from attaining additional educational experiences or specialty certifications, even 
though I personally, and Petitioner, may find that hard to understand. In even fewer cases, it 
would seem, a license restriction should be imposed in a disability case unless the reason for the 
disability raises safety and/or fitness issues. No such restrictions were recommended by the 
Examining Committee. The Board, for reasons unexplained but perhaps based on an unknown 
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history with Petitioner's serial requests for its lifting an earlier restriction, the Board has now 
specifically and purposefully imposed "permanent" practice restrictions as "sanctions", cited a 
statute not a part of the DPA as authority and ensured that this physician would have a license 
restriction of record purportedly arising out of a disability act application. 
Additionally, there is one matter not covered by the record of this case below but 
followed shortly thereafter and prejudices Petitioner. This court is referred to the Idaho Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(g) which allows the Idaho Board of Pharmacy to 
issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled substance 
registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner represents 
that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe to OB 
patients or chronic pain patients. Thus, if covering in a rural hospital ER or an urgent care clinic 
situation, a patient should present who happens to be injured, but is also pregnant and/or has 
chronic pain issues, Petitioner may be constrained in appropriately treating that patient on an 
emergent basis by reason of the IBOM's permanently imposed restriction and that Final Order's 
impact on Petitioner's controlled substance license. And, for reasons unknown, the IBOM 
waited until 2014 to notify the IBOP under a 1971 law of his now imposed "permanent" license 
restrictions as "sanctions" automatically carrying over to his controlled substance registration. 
VII. 
THE HEARING BELOW WAS CLOUDED BY THE BOARD'S PERVASIVE 
ASSERTION OF IDAHO'S PEER REVIEW STATUTE 
As related above in more detail, in response to a purported "adverse clinical action" taken 
by the Jerome hospital in April 2011, but not received by the Board until October, the Board 
asked Petitioner for clinical records and his written explanation of what occurred. At hearing, 




Petitioner was prepared to produce documents and call witnesses to address the events about 
which he was asked. In summary, much of his proposed testimony through Drs. Lally, Tangen, 
Housley and himself was prepared to describe the underlying clinical events of December 2006, 
an early 2007 hospital Fair Review Panel hearing, and later educational/training courses and 
related activities. A substantial component of this planned and/or proffered evidence was 
excluded by the hearing officer in upholding the Board's comprehensive assertion of Idaho's 
Peer Review privilege. Petitioner was narrowly permitted to show that after the obstetrical event 
in question, his hospital privileges were suspended for 60 days on 2/22/2007 (Hearing Ex. 104) 
but reinstated less than a month later on 3/20/2007 (Hearing Ex. 105). He was also allowed to 
submit a neuropsychological report by Dr. Beaver to the hospital that Petitioner underwent on 
8/8/2007 as the hospital's request (Hearing Ex. 107) which provided a nice baseline for the 
Beaver evaluation five years later and available to the Board's Examining Committee (Hearing 
Ex. 9). 
We will not here repeat the extensive briefing previously filed with the hearing officer. 
In essence, after a substantial portion of Petitioner's potential documentary case and much of his 
prospective witnesses testimony was excluded, the Board, on rebuttal, moved for admission of 
three stacks of documents as "rebuttal" records, several of which appeared to be some of those 
which Petitioner had attached to his written response, denuded of which had been previously 
admitted (Hearing Ex. 4). What was sauce for the goose (in keeping out Petitioner's records on 
peer review grounds) apparently wasn't good enough for the gander (in admitting similar time-
lined documents by the Board as rebuttal). The difference, that Petitioner gave most of them to 
the Board and were thus fair game, sounded hollow in view of the compulsion and deadline the 




Board had imposed on him to get to it "pertinent records" of the clinical events of almost five 
years before, and those of subsequent in-hospital educational monitoring and related 
developments. Recognizing the breadth of Idaho's peer view statute, the concept of some equal-
handedness in its application seemed reasonable in a case in which the Board did absolutely 
nothing to obtain hospital records and/or otherwise learn the facts about the circumstances under 
which, in the end, it saw fit to impose permanent restrictions on Petitioner's license as an 
disciplinary sanction arising out of events it in large part refused to consider or allow the hearing 
officer to review. 
For purposes of making a record, Petitioner hereby incorporates his arguments filed in a 
Memorandum dated August 22, 2013, particularly pages 8-16, concerning the request of 
Petitioner to have his submissions and those of the Boards be judged by similarly fair standards 
in applying Idaho's complex, and broad, statutory peer review concepts. In that context, 
Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer, and the confirming Board, erred in sustaining the 
Board's peer review privilege claims against Petitioner's proffered exhibits and testimony and in 
admitting the Board's rebuttal exhibits. In retrospect, however, the narrowed review serves to 
emphasize that this case was a DPA matter, not a disciplinary review of a reported "adverse 
clinical action" either in 2011 or in 2006. And the focus of this case, in view of the subsequent 
Final Order, is on the Board's exercise and abuse of the DPA in its imposition of permanent 
"sanctions" against Petitioner to his significant professional detriment. 






For the reasons discussed above, and consistent with the statutory guidelines governing 
Judicial Review, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's imposition of 
sanctions against Petitioner under the Disabled Physician Act, and particularly the sanction of 
license restriction, item 5 in its enumerated Final Order. Moreover, the Board should be 
instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings per the last cited alternative stated in I.C. 54-1837(b) 
due to grounds for the other alternative findings not found to exist. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ~ay of May, 2014. 
EY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal of a Final Order issued by the Idaho State Board of Medicine 
placing restrictions on Dr. Mena's license and awarding costs and attorney's fees. 
Course of the Proceedings 
By Order dated May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted proceedings 
involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining Committee met with Dr. 
Mena on June 13, 2012. The Examining Committee issued a report June 29, 2012, which was 
accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Since Dr. Mena was unwilling to 
stipulate to voluntary restrictions, he was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013, 
Board meeting, which Dr. Mena personally attended with his attorney. The Board again voted to 
accept the Examining Committee report. Dr. Mena was still unwilling to voluntarily agree to 
follow the recommendations and a hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2013. Following the 
hearing, the Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 14, 2013. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014. 
Statement of Facts 
Dr. Mena is a family practice physician who was first licensed by the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine on September 13, 2003. He practices in Jerome, Idaho. 
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In 2007 and 2008, Dr. Mena went through various evaluations due to problems which 
arose at St. Benedict's Hospital in Jerome, Idaho and which were also reviewed by the Board of 
Medicine. 
Dr. Mena was evaluated at the Betty Ford Center from February 28, 2007 to March 1, 
2007. The Betty Ford records are included in Exhibit 11, pp. 12-106. Concerns regarding Dr. 
Mena related to slurred speech, tired or depressed affect, inattentiveness and complaints about 
inadequate record keeping, late dictations and possible inadequate medical care. (Exhibit 11, p. 
12.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena conceded that he had "difficulties with 
authorities" which had precipitated moves from prior positions in Provo, Utah; Washington 
State; and Vermont. (Exhibit 11, p. 28.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, they did a complete 
evaluation of Dr. Mena' s cognitive capabilities through use of a MicroCog Assessment. The 
entire results of that assessment are found at Exhibit 11, pp. 58-106. The psychologist 
administering the MicroCog Assessment of Cognitive Functioning noted that Dr. Mena took an 
unusually long period of time to complete the tests and many of his scores fell in the low range. 
The evaluator stated: "Using norms for licensed professionals with this instrument, Dr. Mena's 
scores show significantly compromised cognitive functioning and further testing is indicated". 
(Exhibit 11, p. 42.) Another evaluator noted: 
Using norms established for licensed professionals, Dr. 
Mena's scores indicate that he is currently functioning 
significantly below professional standards and further 




In the final Integrated Clinical Summary, while Betty Ford found no substance abuse 
problems, they did diagnose Dr. Mena with obsessive compulsive disorder, a nonspecific 
personality disorder with negativistic, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic traits. (Exhibit 11, 
p. 56.) At the time of the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena had no ongoing psychotherapy or 
psychiatric care. The Betty Ford Center expressed the following opinion: 
In the opinion of the CDE Team, Robert M. Mena, M.D., is 
not currently fit to practice medicine. His suitability for 
returning to work should not be reassessed until after he has, 
(1) completed residential treatment as outlined above, (2) 
been discharged with staff approval, (3) is currently 
functioning cognitively within professional standards, ( 4) 
enrolled in therapeutic monitoring programs directed by the 
Idaho Medical Board Physician Recovery Network. (Exhibit 
11, p. 57.) 
On August 1, 2007, the Colorado Physician Health Program referred Dr. Mena to Dr. 
Craig Beaver in Boise for neuropsychological testing. The case summary from CPHP is found in 
Exhibit 11, pp. 3-11. The CPHP evaluation notes the concerns raised by the MicroCog 
Assessment of Cognitive Functioning. (Exhibit 11, p. 4.) That same page notes that Dr. Mena 
had a history of depressive disorder and he had recently begun treatment for anxiety disorder as 
well as sleep disorder. It was noted Dr. Mena did meet diagnostic criteria for depressive 
disorder. (Exhibit 11, p. 5.) The report supported Dr. Mena's return to work in a clinic-based 
setting with a caveat that his work be supervised in some way and with a recommendation that 
Dr. Mena refrain from hospital work. (Exhibit 11, p. 6.) 
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In order to evaluate clinical skills, Dr. Mena submitted to a Physician Assessment and 
Clinical Education Program (PACE), with those evaluations occurring December 20-21, 2007 
and February 4-8, 2008. The PACE evaluation results are included as Exhibit 12. On Page 3 of 
Exhibit 12, PACE again noted Dr. Mena' s below average performance on processing speed, 
general cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general 
cognitive functioning. PACE reported that they did not observe any behaviors indicating 
cognitive impairment. The evaluation noted relative weakness on the use of opioids. (Exhibit 
12, p. 4.) The oral obstetrics examination found numerous deficiencies in Dr. Mena's knowledge 
base and approach to treatment. (Exhibit 12, p. 7.) The conclusion found adequate performance 
in family practice, but stated: 
The oral exam administered by Dr. Gin revealed significant 
deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to the 
deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his 
involvement in obstetrics or pursue an intensive hands-on 
training course or a fellowship program as a means to update 
his knowledge base. (Exhibit 12, p. 8.) 
Dr. Mena apparently attempted to question the recommendations of the PACE Program and sent 
a series of emails to the PACE Program. In a letter dated October 3, 2008, the PACE Program 
notified Dr. Mena that they would not accept any more emails, faxes, letters or phone calls from 
him and that his file would be closed. (Exhibit 12, pp. 9-10.) 
Finally, Dr. Mena completed a Center for Personalized Education for Physician 
Evaluation at CPEP in Denver, Colorado. (Exhibit 13.) The Assessment was done November 
10-11, 2008. (Exhibit 13, p. 5.) The CPEP Assessment Summary begins in Exhibit 13 at Page 
-4-
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32. With respect to medical knowledge, the report found Dr. Mena demonstrated medical 
knowledge that varied from adequate to poor and his knowledge of obstetrical topics lacked 
adequate depth overall. (Exhibit 13, p. 33.) The CPEP evaluation found his knowledge was 
adequate in family medicine, but in obstetrics, his clinical judgment and reasoning overall was 
varied and concerning. (Exhibit 13, p. 36.) CPEP recommended: 
Should Dr. Mena return to obstetrical care, he should 
participate in a clinical experience to provide the necessary 
supervision required as he addresses the areas of 
demonstrated need for obstetrical care. Dr. Mena should 
initially have 100% direct supervision in the inpatient 
obstetrical care setting as well as retrospective chart review 
in the last trimester to determine relevant issues related to 
delivery. (Exhibit 13, p. 38.) 
On June 23, 2009, Dr. Mena signed a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine 
related to Dr. Mena' s training and ability to perform certain medical procedures, including 
obstetrics and treat chronic pain. (Paragraph II.) In Paragraphs VI(b) and VII of the Stipulation 
and Order, Dr. Mena stipulated to a permanent restriction on performing obstetrics and treating 
chronic pain patients. He also agreed to limit his work hours and continue in treatment with a 
Board approved counselor and psychiatrist and agreed to follow their recommendations. 
On September 26, 2011, an Order Terminating Stipulation and Order was signed by the 
Board chair. That Order was mailed to Dr. Mena on September 27, 2011. On October 13, 2011, 
a letter was sent to Dr. Mena reminding him of the permanent restriction on obstetrics. (Exhibit 
3.) The letter did not refer to the permanent restriction on chronic pain treatment but that is 
included in Dr. Mena's Stipulation and agreement with the Board. 
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Within a few days of termination of the Stipulation and Order, on October 3, 2011, the 
Board received a notice from St. Benedicts Family Medical Center that they had taken an adverse 
clinical privilege action involving Dr. Mena. Pursuant to Idaho Code §39-1393, hospitals are 
required to report adverse actions to the Board of Medicine. That letter was admitted as Exhibit 
1 and notes that Dr. Mena had agreed to obtain additional training before he exercised any 
privileges and he failed to receive the training so his medical staff membership was forfeited. 
There is no explanation for why the hospital delayed reporting the adverse action which was 
taken April 15, 2011. 
Upon receipt of that letter from the hospital, the Board staff initiated an investigation and 
wrote to Dr. Mena for an explanation. (Exhibit 2.) The letter noted that the adverse clinical 
privilege action indicated he had not completed required educational training. 
The Board staff received an undated written response from Dr. Mena which was admitted 
as Exhibit 4. A review of that letter indicates that it is disjointed, tangential and irrational. 
During the hearing, Dr. Mena admitted that the letter was concerning and tried to explain that it 
should have never been sent. (Tr., p. 137, ls. 2-18 and p. 138, ls. 14-25.) He acknowledged 
staying up all night to polish the drafts. (Tr., p. 138, ls. 19-20.) 
However, in an email sent later on November 15, 2011, Dr. Mena provided the Board 
investigator with a one page Conclusion to be annexed to his prior response. (Exhibit 5.) That 
Conclusion is still as disjointed, tangential and irrational as Exhibit 4. 
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The Board reviewed Dr. Mena's responses at the December, 2011 Board meeting. Given 
Dr. Mena' s psychiatric history and cognitive difficulties as noted in the prior evaluations, the 
Board was particularly disturbed by and concerned about Dr. Mena' s responses. The Board 
instructed the staff to institute Disabled Physician Act proceedings to review Dr. Mena's ability 
to practice with reasonable skill and safety. 
In an email dated December 29, 2011, Dr. Mena advised the Board attorney that he would 
never be allowed to be Board certified in family practice because of the fact that he agreed to 
permanently restrict obstetrics in 2009. (Exhibit 6.) At the hearing, Dr. Mena testified that the 
American Board of Family Practice mistakenly allowed him to take the Board certification exam 
in April, 2013 and he failed that exam by a very large margin. (Tr., p. 150, ls. 10-19; p. 65, ls. 
21-25; and p. 96, ls. 5-22.) 
In Orders dated May 14, 2012, the Board created an Examining Committee pursuant to 
the Disabled Physician Act and ordered Dr. Mena to appear for an examination. That 
Examination Committee consisted of Dr. Jeffrey Berlant, a psychiatrist; Dr. Martin Gabica, a 
family practice physician; and Dr. Ronald Larsen, a psychiatrist. The Examining Committee 
met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012. 
They issued their report June 29, 2012 which was admitted as Exhibit 8. That report lists 
the records that the Examining Committee reviewed, including Exhibits 11, 12 and 13. The 
report indicates that the Examining Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012 for 90 
minutes. The report states: 
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Dr. Mena provided a verbal summary of the events that led to 
Board's involvement. He revealed that he has benefitted 
from treatment for Depression and Anxiety. He stated that 
he is under Psychiatric care and plans to continue with that 
care. Treatment for Sleep Apnea has also addressed past 
concerns about "slurred speech" and "tiredness". 
A review of prior examinations revealed that Robert has been 
found to have Obsessive - Compulsive and Narcissistic 
personality traits. There is also evidence for deficits in 
Cognitive processing speed demonstrated on 
Neuropsychological testing. The PACE evaluation revealed 
deficits in Obstetrics knowledge. These findings, as well as 
past concerns about chart completion, were discussed with 
Dr. Mena. He admitted that he signed and submitted a 
version of the "Undated response to the Board" without 
reading its contents. 
Based upon their review of the reports and their meeting with Dr. Mena, the Examining 
Committee issued the following recommendation: 
The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena 
can continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable 
skill and safety, with required management including: 
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver 
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care 
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board 
oversight 
Consistent with the recommendation of the Examining Committee, on September 10, 
2012, Dr. Mena completed a neuropsychological examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. A detailed 
report prepared by Dr. Beaver was admitted as Exhibit 9. Dr. Beaver conducted a variety of 
psychological tests. His report reviewed the prior Betty Ford evaluation, PACE evaluation and 
CPEP evaluation. Dr. Beaver reported that Dr. Mena was currently on Lexapro and was 
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continuing in counseling. (Exhibit 9, p. 5.) On Page 7 of his report, Dr. Beaver noted that Dr. 
Mena's memory functioning had significantly dropped from Dr. Beaver's prior testing. (Exhibit 
9, pp. 7 and 8.) Dr. Beaver confirmed the obsessive compulsive disorder and continuing 
narcissistic personality traits together with sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver made the following 
recommendations: 
2. In considering further care and treatment, I would recommend the 
following: 
a. Dr. Mena continues to need to follow medical 
recommendations with regard to his sleep apnea. For 
example, continued use of the CP AP machine if 
indicated. 
b. Dr. Mena is currently on a low dose of Lexapro 
which his psychotherapist and he have noted to be 
beneficial. I would defer to Dr. Albright as to his 
continuing need for medication. 
c. Dr. Mena reports his psychotherapy experiences have 
been positive, and he is dealing well with his 
stressors and has learned much from his experience. 
This occurs within the context of him having a 
significantly reduced level of practice for a variety of 
reasons. I still have concern that if Dr. Mena enters a 
fast-paced clinical practice, for example in a move to 
Kellogg, some of the issues or concerns previously 
involving Dr. Mena could potentially arise again. 
Therefore, I would recommend if Dr. Mena is transfe-
rring to a new work situation, such as the clinic in 
Kellogg, he be required to be involved with 
individual psychotherapy on a regular basis during 
the first six months of entry into that job 
circumstance. Further, that there be good 
communication between prior mental health 
evaluators or treatment professionals that have been 
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involved with Dr. Mena and whoever provides those 
services to him. This would allow continued 
monitoring and support for Dr. Mena as it relates to 
some of the interpersonal and personality dynamics 
that appear to have contributing to his prior 
difficulties. 
3. In regards to fitness-for-duty issues as a family practice physician, I 
would note the following: 
a. Dr. Mena has undergone a substantial amount of 
additional evaluation and other supportive 
interventions with regard to his clinical skills. He is 
currently not allowed to return to his hospital-based 
practice in the Jerome area, and it has been 
specifically recommended that he not engage in OB 
practice. I would defer to the Board of Medicine as 
to the necessity of continuing restrictions in those 
areas. 
b. From a neurocognitive perspective, I did not observe 
any neurocognitive deficits that would interfere with 
his capacity to engage in clinical practice as a family 
practice physician. 
c. Given his prior history and concerns, I would 
recommend he engage in the individual counseling, 
as I described above, to ensure that some of his 
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for 
him. 
At the Board meeting m September, 2012, the Board reviewed the Examining 
Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations and, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836, 
accepted the recommendations of those evaluators. A draft Stipulation and Order consistent with 




Consequently, Dr. Mena and his attorney were scheduled for and attended a personal 
appearance with the Board on March 1, 2013. The Board reaffirmed their acceptance of the 
Examining Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations. When Dr. Mena still 
refused to voluntarily agree to follow those recommendations, a hearing was scheduled. 
The Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 14, 2013. The Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and issued a Final Order on January 7, 2014. The Board's Final Order allowed Dr. Mena 
to continue practicing family practice with the following monitoring and restrictions: 
1. Respondent shall continue in treatment and on medication 
and comply with the recommendations of his treating 
psychiatrist and psychologist and authorize them to provide 
quarterly status reports. 
2. Dr. Mena shall not change his current psychiatrist or 
psychologist without Board approval. 
3. Respondent's psychiatrist and psychologist must 
immediately report to the Board any concerns about Dr. 
Mena's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill 
and safety. 
4. Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea with 
quarterly reports by his treating physician to the Board. 
5. Dr. Mena shall permanently cease practicing obstetrics and 
chronic pain. 
6. Dr. Beaver shall do a complete reevaluation in two (2) 
years. 
7. Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of 




8. Dr. Mena to reimburse the Board for costs and fees. 
Additional Issues on Appeal 
The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
Standard of Review 
The Court's review of the Board's action is governed by Idaho Code §67-5279(3) which 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter 
or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall 
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; 
or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole 
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
It is well established law that the District Court will defer to an agency's findings of fact 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous and as to the weight of the evidence, the District Court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of any agency. Idaho Code §67-5279(1); Woodfield v. 
Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Wheeler 




Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by substantial evidence, even though 
conflicting evidence exists. Riverside Development Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 
1271 (S.Ct. 2002). A court shall affirm an agency action "unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code §67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 
575, 577, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996); Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 
147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009). On questions of law, the Court exercises free 
review. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (S.Ct. 2008); 
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (S.Ct. 2002). 
Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown by an appellant. 
State v. Crawford, 104 Idaho 840, 841, 663 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App. 1983). An appellate court will 
not search a record for unspecified and unsupported errors. State v. Crawford, supra; Drake v. 
Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App. 1983-84); Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764,620 
P.2d 798 (1980); Idaho Appellate Rules 34 and 35. 
In Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (S.Ct. 2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the well established rule that issues on appeal are waived unless supported with 
relevant argument and authority. The Supreme Court stated: 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with 
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, 
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the 
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). 
A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is 
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 
445 263 Pl2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the 
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record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof/ Discipline, 
138 Idaho 397,400, 64 P.3d 323,326 (2003). Consequently, to the 
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R. it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. 
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 148 at 790. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bach was recently reaffirmed in Bettwieser v. New York 
Irrigation Distric!, 154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (S.Ct. February 22, 2013.) 
Idaho Code §54-1833 allows the Board of Medicine to create an Examining Committee if 
there are concerns about a physician's ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to 
mental illness, physical illness or excessive use or abuse of drugs, including alcohol. Idaho Code 
§54-1834 provides that the Examining Committee will personally meet with the physician. The 
Examining Committee then submits a report to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836. 
That recommendation can include a recommendation on whether the physician is fit to practice 
medicine, either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee 
may recommend. That recommendation is merely advisory. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836(b ), the Board may accept or reject the recommendation 
of the Examining Committee. Idaho Code §54-1836( c) provides that if a physician is unwilling 
to execute a voluntary agreement on any restrictions, the physician is entitled to a hearing and 
formal proceedings before the Board and a determination on the evidence as to whether 
restrictions should be imposed. Following the conclusion of the hearing, Idaho Code §54-
1837(c), provides: 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall make a 
determination of the merits and if grounds therefor are found 
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to exist, may issue an order imposing one or more of the 
following: 
(1) Make a recommendation that the physician submit to 
the care, counseling, or treatment by physicians 
acceptable to the board; or 
(2) Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to 
practice medicine for the duration of his impairment; 
or 
(3) Revoke the license of the physician to practice 
medicine; and if grounds are not found to exist, the 
board shall enter its order so stating, shall dismiss the 
proceedings and shall provide the respondent a true 
copy thereof. 
The Board fully complied with all of the statutory requirements and procedures. 
II 
Dr. Mena's Brief Fails To Identify and Support Issues On Appeal 
Rule 84(b), I.R.C.P., requires that Briefs shall be in the form and arrangement provided 
for appeals to the Supreme Court. Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R., requires that issues presented on appeal 
must be identified in Appellant's Brief in a separate section entitled Issues on Appeal. That rule 
states that: "The issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review". Issues on appeal are not 
simple factual statements as Dr. Mena has done in his various subsections, but must identify 
clear error by the Board. Dr. Mena's Brief completely fails to comply with this Rule. The Rule 
clearly distinguishes argument from issues presented on appeal. Consequently, the issues argued 
in Dr. Mena's Brief should not be considered. 
In the case of Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1166 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court 
reviewed the requirements of Rule 35(a)(4), I.A.R. and stated: "Failure of the appellant to include 
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an issue in the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that 
issue on appeal". [ Citations omitted.] 119 at 691. 
In reviewing Dr. Mena's Brief, it is interesting that there is virtually no reference to the 
transcript or record on appeal and no citation to a single case showing any legal or factual error 
by the Board. The subsections within Dr. Mena's Brief are merely a summary of evidence 
presented. Dr. Mena has not established a single legal or factual error in the Board's Final Order 
and its proceedings. 
In an effort to respond to Dr. Mena's unsupported arguments, the Board will utilize the 
subsection headings utilized by Dr. Mena even though those subsection headings do not meet the 
requirements of the appellate rules for issues on appeal. 
III 
Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute 
Beginning on Page 3 of Petitioner's Opening Brief, Dr. Mena has a subheading entitled 
"Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute". Dr. Mena refers to the Board's compliance monitor's 
testimony that the Board accepted the Examining Committee's recommendations at its 
September, 2012, Board meeting and then Dr. Mena erroneously states that the Board did not tell 
Dr. Mena. In fact, in the very next sentence of his Brief, Dr. Mena concedes the Board counsel 
did notify him of the Board's determination and asked Dr. Mena to voluntarily agree to comply 
with the recommendations. 
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On Page 3, Dr. Mena complains that none of the proposed Stipulations the Board 
"pushed" on Dr. Mena were admitted as exhibits. Since none of the Stipulations were accepted 
or signed by Dr. Mena, their admission would be improper in any event. Further, there were no 
restrictions on Dr. Mena's ability to offer those as exhibits if he felt they were relevant, which he 
completely failed to do so. 
Dr. Mena then argues without any factual support that the Board staff does not 
differentiate between disciplinary cases and Disabled Physician Act cases. That is absolutely 
incorrect and not supported by the record. The pleadings of record clearly indicate that this entire 
process was conducted under the statutory mandates and in compliance with the Disabled 
Physician Act. Dr. Mena has not pointed to one single place in the record that establishes that 
the Board did not comply with and follow the statutory mandates of the Disabled Physician Act. 
The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings Under the DPA 
and Petitioner's Objections to the Board's Post-Examining 
Committee Report Process 
Beginning on Page 4, Dr. Mena erroneously states the DP A case was commenced May 
21, 2012, "almost 11 months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the 
Board". In fact, the Examining Committee Report was issued June 29, 2012. (Exhibit 8.) Dr. 
Mena's factual statement is absolutely incorrect. 
Dr. Mena then makes a bald and unsupported statement that the Board exceeded its 
statutory authority under the Disabled Physician Act, but cites no reference to the record or 
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procedure of the Board which in any way violated the Act. In fact, the Board fully complied with 
all of the requirements of the Disabled Physician Act. 
IV 
Facts Underlying The Board's Ordering a DPA Committee 
Examination and Evaluation 
In this subsection, Dr. Mena makes extensive argument that when the Board reopened an 
investigation of him based upon an adverse action report by the hospital, at the time of the 
hearing, the Board presented no testimony regarding the basis for the hospital action. Dr. Mena's 
argument was correctly overruled by the Hearing Officer. The unrefuted testimony establishes 
that the Disabled Physician Act proceeding was based upon Dr. Mena's prior history with the 
Board, including multiple concerning evaluations, and his disjointed, tangential and irrational 
response to the Board's request for information. (Exhibit 4.) (Tr., p. 15, ls.11-25; p. 16, ls. 1-25; 
p. 17, ls. 1-3.) This action was not based upon anything occurring at the hospital and 
consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were irrelevant and immaterial. In 
this section of his Brief, Dr. Mena makes multiple factual statements which have absolutely no 
reference or citation to the administrative record and must be rejected and not considered. In 
particular, on Page 8, Dr. Mena argues that the Board staff asked him to produce a confidential 
patient chart for care occurring December, 2006. That is absolutely incorrect and unsupported. 
On Page 8, Dr. Mena complains that the Board did not offer certain exhibits at the 
hearing and failed to call Board members to testify. Again, there was no restriction on Dr. 




do so. The Board staff investigator testified and did testify that the Board had significant 
concerns at its December, 2011, meeting about Petitioner's written response. (Tr., p. 16, ls. 9-
11.) 
On Page 9, Dr. Mena erroneously argues, without any reference to the transcript or 
record, that the Board was asking him to provide a response to care for a particular patient 
occurring five years earlier. That is not correct. 
V 
Examining Committee Activity and Report 
On Pages 10 and 11, Dr. Mena erroneously argues that the Examining Committee and Dr. 
Beaver all found him fit for practice. In fact, the Examining Committee and Dr. Beaver clearly 
reported that Dr. Mena was safe to practice if he was monitored, continued with psychiatric care 
and was re-evaluated in two years. 
In its Final Order, the Board did adopt the Recommended Findings of Fact of the Hearing 
Officer. (Final Order, p. 1.) Dr. Mena argues the Hearing Officer misperceived Dr. Mena's 
argument. The Hearing Officer did not misperceive the argument. In fact, Dr. Mena did argue 
that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed issue ... before the Board 
can take action". (Recommended Findings, p. 9.) Dr. Mena's argument also completely ignores 
his prior history of mental health issues with the Board and his disjointed, tangential and 
irrational response to the Board. 
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On Page 12, Dr. Mena again, without any legal or factual support, erroneously contends 
that the Board processed this case as a disciplinary case rather than a Disabled Physician Act 
case. That is absolutely incorrect. 
On Page 13, Dr. Mena again erroneously argues that the Examining Committee 
recommended no restrictions on Dr. Mena's license. In fact, the Examining Committee did 
recommend that Dr. Mena have required management, including repeat neuropsychological 
testing by Dr. Craig Beaver, continued outpatient psychiatric care, and a re-evaluation in two 
years with continuing Board oversight. 
VI 
Evaluation of the Board's Adjudicative Role in this DPA Case 
On Page 14, Dr. Mena erroneously states the Board did not share the Examining 
Committee Report with Dr. Mena. That is absolutely incorrect. In fact, it was provided to him 
on various occasions, including when it was issued, before his personal appearance before the 
Board and was also served upon him May 21, 2013 as evidenced by the Notice of Filing 
Examining Committee Report. 
Dr. Mena refers to the provision of the Final Order that he permanently cease practice 
obstetrics and chronic pain management. The PACE and CPEP evaluations clearly establish that 
due to deficiencies in clinical judgment and reasonings, Dr. Mena cannot practice obstetrics with 
reasonable skill and safety. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) Further, the July 23, 2009 initial Stipulation 
and Order included a permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain. In fact, Dr. Mena lost 
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his family practice Board certification because of that permanent restriction on obstetrics, not 
because of these further proceedings. (Exhibit 6.) The evidence presented at the hearing 
supports that permanent and continuing restriction. 
On Page 15, Dr. Mena erroneously argues he was referred to the Examining Committee 
"not because [sic] his medical history or a clinical report", but because of something he wrote. 
This argument ignores Dr. Mena's extensive prior history with the Board and the numerous, 
extensive prior evaluations which led to the prior Stipulation and Order for similar problems. 
There concerns were supported by multiple examinations and consultations which were obtained 
on Dr. Mena in 2006 or 2007. (See Exhibits 9 through 13.) 
Dr. Mena concedes on Page 16, that the Examining Committee shall report to the Board 
on the fitness of a physician to practice "either on a restricted or unrestricted basis and any 
management the committee may recommend." That is exactly what the Examining Committee 
did and those restrictions were adopted and imposed by the Board in its Final Order. 
VII 
The Board's Ruling Has Not Violated Petitioner's Substantial 
In this section of his Brief, beginning on Page 17, Dr. Mena makes many unsupported 
factual arguments and statements regarding his Board certification. In fact, the record clearly 
establishes that this proceedings had nothing to do with his loss of his Board certification. He 
lost his Board certification when he signed the Board Stipulation and Order in 2009 because of 
the permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain management. (Exhibit 6.) 
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On Page 20, Dr. Mena refers to an Idaho Board of Pharmacy statute, Idaho Code §37-
2718(g). That statute has never cited or relied upon by the Board and is not part of this current 
proceeding. 
VIII 
The Hearing Below Was Not Clouded by the Board's Pervasive 
Assertion of Idaho's Peer Review Statute 
Beginning on Page 20 of his Brief, again, virtually all of Dr. Mena's factual arguments 
and statements are unsupported by any reference to the record. Dr. Mena complains that because 
of the peer review privilege he was not entitled to present peer review evidence regarding the 
clinical events of December, 2006 and early 2007. The Hearing Officer correctly ruled that those 
proceedings were subject to the peer review privilege. Idaho Code §39-1392(b). They were also 
irrelevant. 
More significantly, those were events occurring before the first Stipulation and Order 
signed by Dr. Mena on July 23, 2009. (Stipulation and Order in pleadings.) 
On Page 21, Dr. Mena argues that after his proposed testimony was denied, the Board 
"moved for admission of three stacks of documents" as rebuttal records. Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 
were admitted after Dr. Mena incorrectly testified none of the prior evaluations found he was not 
fit to practice medicine. (Tr., p. 169, ls. 8-12.) These evaluations were reviewed by the 
Examining Committee so they were also relevant. 
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IX 
The Board is Entitled to Costs and Attorney's Fees 
The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena based upon his 
frivolous and unsupported appeal. Idaho Code § 12-117 provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, 
the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the 
proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 was most recently amended in 2012. Consequently, prior decisions which 
determined that attorney's fees could not be awarded on appeal are no longer in force and effect. 
In the case of Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (S.Ct. 2011), the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking 
attorney's fees against the entities to which it applies. 151 Idaho at 818. The Court noted that 
2010 amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 by the Idaho Legislature inadvertently prohibited 
awards of fees in petitions for review of administrative decisions. That ruling in Sopatyk has 
now been overturned by the further amendments to Idaho Code §12-117 occurring in 2012. 
The language of Idaho Code § 12-117 that attorney's fees are allowable on appeal where 
a non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis" in law or fact has not been changed by 
the most recent legislation. Consequently, prior cases on that language are applicable. 
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Fees can be awarded to the Board because Dr. Mena has filed an appeal and made 
arguments without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway 
District, 151 Idaho 196, 254 P.3d 497 (S.Ct. 2011). Attorney's fees are properly awarded under 
Idaho Code §12-117 when a party fails to provide any authority supporting its appeal and pursues 
an appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Bonner County v. Bonner County Sheriff 
Search and Rescue, Inc., 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (S.Ct. 2006); See also Castringo v. 
McOuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 419 (S.Ct. 2005); Daw v. School District 91 Board of 
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (S.Ct. 2001). 
In his Brief, Dr. Mena has completely failed to make any arguments supported by any 
legal authority or reference to the record which have established any error by the Board in these 
proceedings. The appeal has absolutely no basis in law or fact and the Board should be awarded 
costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests the District Court to deny Dr. 
Mena's appeal and to grant the Board costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED This 3bt:day of June, 2014. 
URANGA & URANGA 
~/cz~ 
JEAN R. URANGA, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for the Board 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this3':>~ay of June, 2014, I served true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by faxing copies thereof to: 
Joseph D. McCollum, Jr. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701 






OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF 
MEDICINE, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-OC-2014-04321 
ORDER FOR 
REBRIEFING 
The petitioner, Dr. Mena, has failed to submit a brief that conforms with the 
requirements of I.A.R. 35. It does not contain an issues section, nor does it clearly 
delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See I.R.C.P. 84(p) and I.AR. 
35(a)(4). See also Carle v. State, 2013 WL 5979202, *1 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35 requires that an appellant identify the specific issues to be considered 
on appeal and present arguments with citations to the record and transcript on which 
the arguments rely. I.A.R. 35(a)(4), (6). The failure of an appellant to include an issue in 
the statement of issues required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of the 
issue on appeal. This rule may be relaxed, however, where the issue is argued in the 
briefing.") (citing State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109,111,952 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1998)). 
The Court will afford Dr. Mena an opportunity to submit a conforming brief. Dr. 
Mena has 10 days from the date of this order to file and serve this brief. The 
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respondent's brief shall then be filed and served within 14 days after service of Dr. 
Mena's brief if a response is necessary. Dr. Mena's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and 
served within 10 days after service of the respondent's brief. 
The oral argument set for August 14, 2014 is hereby vacated. The parties will be 
advised, after receipt of this additional briefing, concerning the new oral argument 
hearing date. 
In the event that Dr. Mena does not submit a conforming brief, within the 
requisite time period, this appeal will be dismissed, for failure to comply with the 
applicable rules and the order of this court. 
IT IS SO ORD~ED. 
Dated this J1_ day of July 2014. 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The parties to this Judicial Review process are an Idaho licensed physician, Robert M. 
Mena, M.D., as "Petitioner," and his state licensing agency. The Idaho Board of Medicine is the 
"Agency" from which this matter has been brought to a reviewing court. The "Agency" is 
sometimes also referred to in this brief as the "IBOM" or "Board." 
The case arises under the "Disabled Physician Act" (hereafter sometimes "DPA"), a 1976 
addition to the Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Sections 54-1831 to 54-1838 
and I.C. Section 54-1840. The codification remains little changed in almost 38 years and less 
discussed in reported decisions. Through these nine sections, the Agency is empowered to assess 
a physician licensee's "(a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "(c) excessive use or 
abuse of drugs, including alcohol". I.C. Section 54-1832. If the Board, has "reasonable cause to 
believe" that a licensed physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety 
to patients because of a condition described in section 54-1832," it "shall" cause a committee to 
examine the physician. I.C. Section 54-1833. Thereafter, in the usual case, the Board will 
receive the Examining Committee's "report and diagnosis," make a "determination of the 
merits," and enter one of three specified orders to address the physician's "impairment". I.C. 
Section 54-1837(c). 
In concept, therefore, the DPA sets out a process by which the Board may evaluate a 
physician licensee's "inability" caused by the cited illnesses, mental or physical, or addictive 
processes. Put differently, the Board is charged with an examination obligation to ascertain 
physician "impairment" (a state of being "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and 




safety to patients") when that condition is found to be caused by any one or more of the three 
cited conditions. 
In this case the Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness" 
prong, I.C. Section 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That 
occurred mid-June, 2012 and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's 
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by I.C. Section 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject 
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20). 
The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to 
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients" 
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the 
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation", which the statute allows them to 
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. The parties essentially agree that the 
DPA provisions through the Examining Committee process and its report to the Board 
appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily outlined. 
In stating the issues below and discussing his contention, Petitioner differentiates the 
DPA from a broader and subsequently reenacted physician licensing statute, the "Medical 
Practice Act," hereinafter usually referred to as the "MPA." It is also found in Idaho Code, 
Chapter 18, Title 54. I.C. Section 54-1801-1821 (recodified Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1977, Ch. 
199, Section 2, p. 536). 




ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Agency exceed its statutory authority, or act in violation of statute, or use 
unlawful procedure in purporting to use the DP A physician examination referral process when its 
purpose was to impose on Petitioner permanent license restrictions outside the purview of the 
DPA? (See also Statement of Issues for Judicial Review, B 1-2, pages 2-4); 
2. Did the Agency err in issuing a Final Order imposing license restrictions on 
grounds beyond those permitted by the DPA (see LC. Section 54-1832) and/or in excess of its 
statutory authority? (See LC. Section 54-1837(c)(2)); 
3. Did the Agency err in extending and making permanent license restrictions in an 
earlier MPA stipulation and order after Petitioner was referred to a Physician Examining 
Committee for evaluation under the much narrower statutory provisions of the DPA? (See also 
Statement of Issues for Judicial Review, F., pages 5-6); 
4. Should the Agency's "Final Order" be vacated and the case dismissed because it 
is "not supported by substantial evidence on the records as a whole" under LC. Section 67-
5279(3)(d)? 
5. Did the Agency prejudice Petitioner's rights, and err, in initiating a DPA case 
based on Petitioner's invited communication, then prevent Petitioner from introducing evidence 
respecting his health and mental/psychological condition by successfully asserting Idaho's Peer 
Review statutes, while also persuading the hearing officer to admit on rebuttal, over objection, 
the Agency's similarly historic evidence arising out of the same peer review process? (See also 
State of.Issue for Judicial Review, D., pages 4-5). 
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III. 
PARTIES DISAGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF DPA 
A. No Definitive Idaho Case Law Informs Our Interpretation Of The DPA, Nor Of Its 
Interaction With The MP A. 
In scanning Idaho's reported cases, there is little mention of the DPA and no cases 
discussing the interaction between the DPA and MPA in the 37 years both regulatory acts have 
been together codified as companion parts of Idaho Code, Chapter 18, Title 54. Yet the principal 
issues for which review is sought are those of statutory interpretation, and the appropriate 
differentiation of the DP A process from others contained in the MP A. 
B. The Board Saw No Limitations In Its Discretion To Impose "Sanctions" And 
"Restrictions," As If The Case Were An MP A Disciplinary Matter; Petitioner Saw 
The Case As A Much Narrower One Distinctly Governed By The DPA Under 
Which It Was Brought. 
The parties are in disagreement not with respect to the preliminary DPA process, but with 
the Board's unrestrained interpretation of its statutory powers once it received the report of its 
selected Examining Committee. As discussed by the Board's compliance monitor, the Board 
"accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations at its September 2012 board meeting, 
but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25). Instead, the Board had its counsel 
prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician licensee to sign it; and if he would not, 
the process, a staff employee testified, was that "we had to proceed with this hearing." (Tr. p. 
37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23). As described, the Board handled this DPA case recommendation like a 
disciplinary matter: because Petitioner did not sign a stipulation, they took it to hearing. 
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In contrast, Petitioner understood he was being requested to appear before the Board-
selected Examining Committee to assess his present fitness to safely practice as a mental health 
referral to a physician committee to review his mental health. 
On Judicial Review, there are no exhibits proffered by the Board of documents it drafted 
as proposed stipulations it pushed on Petitioner and that Petitioner declined to sign after 
September 2011, but its staff monitor apparent! y accepted as routine, and heard "often", that 
physicians who had a license "restriction" or "who are being monitored" for MP A disciplinary 
issues "were unable to become board certified." (Tr. p. 38, LL. 5-11). Neither the Board nor its 
staff appear to differentiate between disciplinary cases sometimes resulting in licensing 
restrictions as sanctions and DPA cases in which restrictions, if any, must be related to a 
licensee's inability/disability from specific disease/impairment causes that 
impede/obstruct/prevent the physician licensee from practicing with "reasonable skill and safety 
to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease or aging processes. I.C. Section 
54-1832. 
From its Final Order language, the Board seems to believe that once a physician comes to 
its attention, irrespective of the statutory process, he's fair game for imposed "sanctions." That, 
in essence, is Petitioner's concern and, he believes, was his fate in this case. That which was 
administratively opened as a DP A case, and went through the Examining Committee process, 
became, despite a referral back to the Board with recommendations of fitness to practice, no 
more than another disciplinary opportunity against someone who would not sign that which the 
Board asked him to sign. From a legal perspective, the obvious confirmation of a Board's 
pervasive concept that everything is discipline, as Petitioner perceives, is found in the Board's 
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Final Order language that does not once refer to the DPA; indeed it specifically speaks in terms 
of imposing "sanctions" as "necessary upon Respondent's (Dr. Mena's) license to fulfil its 
statutory duty" and cites the "purposes" clause of the MPA as the authority for disciplinary 
restrictions in this, a clear DP A case. 
C. The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings under the DPA and Petitioner's 
Principled Objections to the Board's Post-Examining Committee Report Process 
This DPA case was commenced by the Board on or about May 21, 2012, almost 11 
months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the Board. At that time the 
Agency filed and served a Notice of Hearing, it attached a copy of its Examining Committee's 
report of the preceding year and cited LC. Section 54-1837(a). For substantive support, the 
Board cited LC. Section 54-1836(c) and LC. Section 54-1837, both DPA statutory provisions. 
Petitioner believes the Board, in noticing this matter for hearing as a DP A case against 
Petitioner, but later in formulating the restrictive sanctions set forth in its final order, exceeded 
its statutory authority under the DP A as outlined by Petitioner in his Statement of Issues on 
Judicial Review and in Section II of this Amended Opening Brief. 
In overview, this case on Judicial Review raises fundamental issues of the relationship 
and interaction between the structure and functioning of the DPA and its co-interaction, if at all, 
with the MP A. Both these statutory schemes are administered by and enforced, when needed, 
through the IBOM, an agency of the State of Idaho from whose decision Judicial Review is 
applical:,le. I.C. Section 54-1839 (added by Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1982, Ch. 323, Section 3, p. 
798). Petitioner asserts the Board violated his substantial rights to his legal detriment and 
prejudice in ignoring or deviating from statutory guidelines in prosecuting this case against him 




and, in particular, imposing "sanctions" and "permanent" license "restrictions" against him 
inconsistent with the DPA's statutory scheme and outlined process. 
The reviewing Justice is aware that the MPA, as a licensing and disciplinary statute, has 
been frequently adjudicated. In MPA cases, the IBOM's findings of fact are treated deferentially 
by the courts "unless those findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial 
evidence in the record." Cooper v. Bd. Of Prof' l Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. Of Med., 134 
Idaho 449,456, 4 P.3d 561, 568 (Idaho 2000) (emphasis added). "Evidence is substantial and 
competent only if a reasonable mind might accept such evidence as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Id. Accordingly, to establish that a decision is based upon substantial and 
competent evidence, the court must determine that "the agency's findings of fact are reasonable." 
Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (stating that a 
finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."). 
IV. 
FACTS UNDERLYING THE BOARD'S ORDERING A DPA COMMITTEE 
EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION 
Historically, the DPA statute has provided a process by which a physician's "inability" 
by reason of "illness" under defined circumstances is assessed for the purposes of protecting 
patients. The factual circumstances are unusual in this case, but nonetheless clear in their 
Board's perception. In early October 2011, the Board received a letter report on hospital 
stationery addressed to the Board stating that over five months before Petitioner's hospital 
clinical privileges "had been forfeited by him" because he had not completed "required medical 
training." (Hearing Ex. 1). Treating this letter as an "adverse clinical action" report, mandating 
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investigation, the Board asked Petitioner by letter dated October 11 for a "written personal 
response," a "copy of pertinent records" and copies of continuing education credits. (Board's 
Ex. 2). Petitioner was given a response deadline of November 8, 2011. 
Nearing the response deadline, in part for reasons described below. Petitioner was 
scrambling to pull together his written response to the Board's request for data concerning the 
alleged "adverse clinical privilege action for not completing required educational training," as 
the Board's staff characterized the report it had received. Several unexplained factual gaps 
impede cogent analysis of these events preceding the Board's referral of Petitioner to an 
appointed examining committee authorized by the DPA: 
1. No evidence was presented that the Board had received anything other than the 
single page letter, either contemporaneously with it or later, concerning the Jerome hospital's 
taking the reported adverse action in April 2011, over 5 months before the IBOM was notified; 
nothing besides the single letter was forwarded to Petitioner by the board staff in requesting his 
written response and supporting documentation (Tr. p. 109, LL. 14-20; p.22, LC. 10-22). 
2. At the time Petitioner received a copy of the hospital letter report in October 
2011, he had not known of the reported adverse action taken the preceding April; moreover, he 
did not believe that he even had hospital privileges at that time against which the reported action 
against him could have been taken (Tr. p. 109, LL. 20-22) since he had resigned hospital 
employment in 2008 (Tr. p. 122, LL. 1-6), had last had a "Courtesy Staff' appointment in 
September 2009 on provisional status covering adult admissions (Hearing Ex. 110); 
subsequently, on the durational expiration of his national board certification in family medicine 
without re-testing in late 2009, he lost his eligibility for staff privileges as he was formally 
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notified in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111), 21 months before he received the Board's inquiry 
letter. 
3. No independent investigative or testimonial evidence was proffered by the Board, 
or public record presented by it, that the Jerome hospital had actually taken an adverse clinical 
action against Petitioner in 2011, as reporting of that action would have been required, under 
federal law, to the National Practitioners Data Bank ("NPDB") within a few weeks of becoming 
final. The only testimonial evidence addressing this point was that of Dr. Jonathan Housley, 
formerly a resident Jerome physician staff member and, during the time in question, was first a 
CPEP "mentor" of Petitioner, then a member on the Jerome hospital's Medical Executive 
Committee (MEC) and later an advocate for Petitioner in seeking an unrestricted license 
(Hearing Ex. 122). Dr. Housley also testified both that hospitals are required to report adverse 
actions to the NPDB and that he was not aware of any such action or report against Petitioner for 
the noncompletion of CPEP educational monitoring (TR. p. 134, L. 20 - p. 135, L. 4), the 
program specifically mentioned in Ex. 111, concerning which he had previously been a 
Petitioner's voluntary mentor. 
4. No evidence was presented that Petitioner had prior knowledge of the reported 
adverse clinical action report in April 2011 or between then and October. Nor would it have 
made much sense for Petitioner to ask the Board to lift the 2009 two year stipulation in 
September 2011 if he knew an adverse action report had been taken against him and would be 
submitted to the IBOM in October; more significantly, the Board either found nothing to 
substantiate the Jerome letter report, or made no attempt to do as it had no record that it even 
contacted the letter's author or the hospital that was reported to have taken the adverse clinical 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED OPENING BRIEF ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - 9 
45996.0 01.6793833.1 
000098
action (TR. p. 21, LL. 1-13) many months before for which there was also no NPDB 
documentation to which the Board as the state licensing agency has preferential access and 
through upon NPDB reports are transmitted. 
5. Thus, by October 2011, some 21 months after his eligibility for staff privileges 
had terminated by reason of the expiration of his board certification, Petitioner was being asked 
by the Board's staff to access and produce for Board review a confidential patient chart and/or 
related historical records pertaining to the reported clinical course and physician action toward a 
patient whose care appeared to be of interest to the Board. Almost five years had elapsed from 
the December 2006 delivery that gave rise, eventually, to educational recommendations, the 
asserted non-completion of one of which was cited as triggering the letter interpreted by the 
Board's staff as an adverse action report requiring of Petitioner a written response he was 
obviously struggling to create. His wife testified concerning significant family medical issues 
with which they were then dealing (Tr. p. 72- 73) while Petitioner was "trying to meet a 
deadline" to submit his written response to the Board; she thought a draft product was 
"inadvertently" delivered to the Board. (Tr. p. 73. L. 23 - p. 24, L. 25). The delivered form 
reflected assistance from her sister who helped Petitioner pull his notes from her computer as the 
deadline approached and he appeared to be under pressure. 
Petitioner's delivered response to the Board was typed and contained attachments, but 
only the response itself, and a supplemental conclusion, the Board elected to include as proffered 
exhibits at hearing. (Hearing Ex. 4, 5). No Board members were called to testify about their 
reaction to Petitioner's required response to his licensing agency, but its counsel's representation 
at hearing suggested that the letter's form and/or organization "generated a great deal of 
PETITIONER'S AMENDED OPENING BRIEF ON JUDICIAL REVIEW - 10 
45996.0001.6793833.1 
000099
concern ... about his mental capacity" and "generated the creation of the examining committee ... " 
(Tr., p.6, LL. 4-7). The board staff investigator (and only witness called to testify by the Board 
at hearing) also agreed with the Board's counsel in characterizing the Board as having significant 
concerns at its December 2011 meeting about what Petitioner's written response "might reflect 
about his mental health." (Tr. p. 16, LL. 9-11). 
However, no testimony was presented by the Board or its staff that the substance of the 
requested written response pertaining to clinical events almost five years earlier in Petitioner's 
practice involving a particular patient about which the Board had inquired had anything to do 
with its subsequent examining committee referral under the DPA. In other words, the Board's 
reported reaction to the form of Petitioner's submission was the clear focus, while their 
substantive concerns about patient care issues, if any at all, were never related by witnesses. 
Indeed, when the Board later appointed its DPA Examining Committee, as explained by the staff 
compliance employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was 
predominately a mental health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). 
Nor was there any other evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining 
Committee was made under any statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong 
of the DPA, I.C. Section 54-1832 (c). 
The single staff witness and the Board's counsel in her opening remarks at hearing 
addressed the form, organization and presentation of Petitioner's letter response to the exclusion 
of any clinical observations about the 2006 clinical events or 2007 post-event hospital-based 
activities associated with educational suggestions/recommendations for Petitioner about which 
the Board requested Petitioner to respond in writing. Indeed, as addressed below, The Board, 
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through counsel, objected on relevancy grounds to almost every attempt by Petitioner to bring in 
background data and clinical history the Board has asked him to respond to in writing; indeed it 
also went further in asserting a broad statutory peer review privilege to preclude Petitioner and 
his witnesses from discussing hospital-related educational programs and clinical monitoring 
arising out of the 2006 clinical history that precipitated an event chain leading to Petitioner's 
submission of his November 2011 written response to the Jerome hospital's letter report to the 
Board, Petitioner's Idaho licensing agency. 
V. 
EXAMINING COMMITTEE ACTIVITY AND REPORT 
The written response by Petitioner to his licensing board, including all attachments, was 
submitted to the Board's selected Examining Committee comprised of one family practice 
physician and two psychiatrists. In its report, that Committee identified it as Petitioner's 
"Undated response to the Board with attachments," one of eleven documents presented to the 
Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) and a part of the information reviewed by the 
Committee. Only one of the reviewed documents, the June 14, 2012, letter of Scott Albright, 
M.D., Petitioner's treating physician, was submitted at the request of Petitioner. 
Although identified as prospective Board witnesses, none of the three Examining 
Committee members appointed under DPA auspices and scope testified at Hearing. Nor did 
neuropsychologist Craig Beaver, who examined Petitioner as ordered by or on behalf of the 
Examining Committee, testify at Hearing. Thus, the record of the process is supplied by the 
Examining Committee's report, dated June 29, 2012 (Hearing Ex. 8). Dr. Albright, was called to 
testify by Petitioner. All five of the individuals just mentioned, four of whom were mental health 
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specialists, found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective after 
reviewing and focusing on Petitioner's written response to the Board, the triggering DP A referral 
factor, interviewing him about it and examining him. All five were unanimous in finding him fit 
for the practice he had been performing, and none voiced concerns for patient safety. The panel 
also noted the absence of a pattern of patient complaints. (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 2). Petitioner 
acknowledged good patient relations and related his 20 year career history of having no 
malpractice claims filed against him. 
VI. 
THE AGENCY DID NOT RECOGNIZE OR APPRECIATE IS APPROPRIATE ROLE 
IN EVALUATIN AND DECIDING TIDS DPA CASE 
A. The Agency's Hearing Officer was Unfamiliar with DPA Cases, Misperceived 
Petitioner's Positions and Made Findings Perhaps Confusing to the Agency, But 
Accepted By It. 
What, then, did the Examining Committee do in discharging its duties? Clearly, it found 
Petitioner "fit" to practice. Secondly, it reviewed and discussed with him his medical history, 
considered that history in light of the statutory "mental illness" referral for committee review and 
found no reason to express any patient safety concerns associated with Petitioner's practice. 
Additionally, it reviewed his treatment and medications for pre-existing conditions not the focus 
of the Board's referral. More specifically, it found his use of one prescriptive anxiety 
medication, Lexapro, and a sleep aid, CP AP therapy for use during sleep, both appropriate and 
well managed by Dr. Albright, Petitioner's treating psychiatrist of several years; significantly, it 
drew nq causal relationship between the management of these routine medical management 
issues and any mental health concerns under the DP A. Committee members and Petitioner 
agreed that the medical management of the anxiety and sleep apnea symptoms should continue 
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and Petitioner represented that he intended to do so, and had done so for several years to his 
betterment. Finally, it told the Board that it did not have recommendations concerning 
Petitioner's OB care, and did not mention his caring for chronic pain management patients, 
topics of review not assigned, directly or implicitly, to the Committee by the Board. There has 
never been a dispute about the Examining Committee doing its duty and filing its report. 
We know from the Board's one witness, confirmed by the Board's attorney, that it 
accepted the recommendations of its appointed Examining Committee. In view of that 
administrative fact, and the fact the Board in its Final Order "acted to adopt the Recommended 
Findings in toto" (Final Order, p. 1), reviewing some of the hearing officer's findings is both 
illustrative and telling concerning the Board's view of its statutory role. 
The hearing officer below misperceived Petitioner's argument. Petitioner is not 
suggesting that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed 
issue ... before the Board can take action." (Recommended Findings, p. 9). Rather, concerning 
those pre-existing conditions for which Petitioner was then, and before and after, being treated, 
there was nothing giving rise to a fitness impairment caused by mental health issues on which the 
Examining Committee was tasked to focus. Or, in the language of the statute, the Examining 
Committee could not say it was "because of a condition", addressing Petitioner's pre-existing 
medical conditions, that he was "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to 
patients." (I.C. Section 54-1833). Only if it had first found that Petitioner were "unfit", would it 
have been required to more narrowly bring its findings within DPA statutory parameters by next 
tying that finding of unfitness to be "because of', in this case, "mental illness" (I.C. Section 54-
1832). There was no need to reach that step. 
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The hearing officer also perceived Petitioner to be arguing that the Examining Committee 
findings "preclude a hearing,"; he found to the contrary, asserting the appropriateness of Board 
action prior to the DPA referral. Again, the hearing officer does not display an appreciation of 
the statutory niche filled by the DPA; nor, we submit, does the Board itself as illustrated in its 
approach to this case as a disciplinary matter even if by fact and process the case was referred 
and processed as a matter of potential "mental illness", and related disability, to be evaluated by 
an expert professional committee. 
B. The Agency Appeared to Change Direction Upon Receiving Its Examining 
Committee's Report, Departing from DP A Processes. 
Under the DP A, the Examining Committee plays a significant role, and mandatory one at 
that, in the evaluation process. This is particularly true, Petitioner respectfully submits, in 
addressing Board referrals involving mental health/illness issues which usually require special 
expertis·e to appropriately evaluate. The Board initially recognized that in placing two 
psychiatrists on its three physician Examining Committee to address its mental health concerns 
triggered by its members visceral reaction to the form and organization of Petitioner's November 
2011 written response to the Board's request for historical clinical information and 
documentation. Upon later receiving its Examining Committee's advisory report, the Board had 
the right to "accept or reject the recommendation" of its Examining Committee "to permit a 
physician to continue to practice with or without any restriction on his license to practice 
medicine." (LC. Section 54-1836(b)). Here the Board accepted the report, or so the undisputed 
evidence indicates. 
Yet the Committee recommended no "restriction" either as the result of temporary 
"illness'.' or on Petitioner's license associated with "impairment" as it confirmed his fitness to 
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practice. Had it found a causal fitness issue, particularly if tied to a factor falling within its 
mental health expertise, it was authorized to recommend a license restriction, if not suspension, 
during the period of impairment, or even license revocation. The Examining Committee did not 
find a "fitness to practice" issue of import, nor "impairment" related to unfitness, and 
recommended none of the available license-restricting actions suggesting a need to protect 
patients from a risk associated with Petitioner's mental fitness to practice. Rather, the 
Examining Committee reviewed the panoply of data available to it, felt comfortable with the 
prior diagnoses and ongoing treatment Petitioner was undertaking and recommended that his 
current care continue, adding only a reevaluation in two years. 
VII. 
INITS ROLE AS A AGENCY REVEWING A CONTESTED MATTER, THE BOARD 
ESSENTIALLY IGNORED THE DPA STATUTORY PROCESS IN ADDRESSING ITS 
EXAMINING COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION AND EXERCISING ITS OWN 
STATUROY ADUCATIVE ROLE 
A. The Board Imposed Obstetric and Chronic Pain Practice Restrictions Without 
Supporting Evidence. 
From a evidentiary perspective, in summary, the Board: (1) did not receive chemical or 
evaluative data from the Jerome hospital; (2) did not make its DPA "mental health" referral 
based any clinical background Petitioner may have submitted with his response better; (3) raised 
relevancy and peer review objections to Petitioner's proffered attempts to present clinical records 
and physician testimony concerning the events the Board requested him to address in writing; (4) 
made no DPA referral concerning Petitioner's obstetrical or chronic pain management skills, nor 
tasked its Examining Committee examine skill-set competency issues as to which the Board had 
previously entered into stipulations and orders under MPA-grounded processes; (5) accepted its 
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Examining Committee's recommendation of Petitioner's fitness practice; (6) presented no 
evidence of terms of post-examination tendered stipulations consistent with the accepted 
recommendations; (7) presented no evidence of Agency process by which it had the authority to 
reject the Examining Committee's recommendations, presumably adopt alternative factual 
findings based on available evidence, or refer the DP A case back to its Examining Committee 
with instructions and/or additional evidence to review and consider. 
The Board's principal substantive action was to impose "sanctions to Petitioner's license 
to practice medicine ... ", including: 
5. Respondent shall permanently cease from practicing obstetrics 
and chronic pain management. (Final Order, p. 3, bottom line) 
Under the interpretive principles summarized above in Section III. B, the absence of 
evidence supporting a disciplinary restriction of Petitioner's OB and chronic pain practices meets 
the requisite insubstantiality test to reject the Board's quoted license restriction imposed by its 
Final Order. On the entire factual record, this reviewing court should be left with the "definite 
and firm conviction" that the Agency imposed a substantial license restriction without the 
requisite presentation of evidence. It committed a mistake that substantially penalized Petitioner, 
and should be vacated. (See Section II, Issues Presented on Appeal, 4). 
B. The Board Failed to Respect DPA Statutory Guidelines for Implementing Its 
Actions After Accepting the Examining Committee's Recommendations. 
It would appear the Board, after receiving the Committee recommendation, failed to 
continue the DPA process. Its single live witness suggested that it did not share the report with 
Petitioner. Rather, it put together a proposed stipulation to monitor his conduct which he 
preferred not signing. When he declined to sign it, they invited him to appear before the Board 
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to tell it why he wouldn't sign the Board's stipulation. He did so. The Board sent him yet 
another stipulation which he declined to sign. So, as the witness explained, the Board brought 
this case as a compliance matter. And, in its Final Order, the Board "deemed sanctions were 
necessary upon Respondent's License to fulfill its statutory duties." (Final Order, p. 3). One of 
those "sanctions" then imposed was the standard of practice restriction, previously quoted (Final 
Order, p. 3 bottom line). The Board cited the MPA's enforcement powers to "protect Idaho's 
public health, safety and welfare" through licensing, regulation and enforcement of standards of 
physicians. In short, the Board put on its disciplinary hat and imposed its disciplinary will, 
sanctioning Petitioner, it would appear, for not accepting whatever the board had wanted to 
impose, of whatever duration, and for whatever unstated reason outside DPA parameters. 
Focusing back on the DPA's provisions, and its 38 year history, it seems reasonable to 
assume that there has been little controversy raised by referring a physician with "inability ... to 
practice medicine" (LC. Section 54-1832) due to illness, mental or physical, or deterioration by 
aging or drug/alcohol use and impairment In such instances the Board must only have a 
"reasonable cause to believe" that an Idaho licensed physician is "unable" to practice for these 
reasons to warrant themandatory examination. (LC. Section 54-1833. And in the usual case, a 
physician, in facing such a referral, may "request a restriction of his license to practice medicine 
(LC. Section 54-1835) to avoid the hearing while still qualifying for the reinstatement process 
"under this act," referring to the DPA. (I.C. Section 54-1838). 
l3ut this is not the usual case. Petitioner was referred to the Examining Panel not because 
of his medical history or a clinical report but because of something he wrote, purportedly in draft 
form, but then submitted to the Board in response to meeting his licensing agency's imposed 
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submission deadline. And, probably unlike most of the obvious cases, the Examining Committee 
found no reason for disqualification by reason of "fitness" to practice. After all, Petitioner 
essentially agreed with the Committee that he was "fit" to practice as he had been doing, and 
agreed with the continuing care he had been obtaining from his attending psychiatrist. What it 
appears.the Board did for several months after its Committee's report was delivered was to 
attempt to persuade or coerce Petitioner to voluntarily accept a license restriction as part of a 
monitoring/disciplinary process. Unfortunately, we don't know what it was thinking or what 
proposed stipulations it presented to Petitioner because it neither tendered any into evidence nor 
offered any transparency by producing Board witnesses or executive staff to explain its interval 
actions. 
What we do know is that the Board's counsel asserted, its only witness supported, the 
hearing officer bought and the Board then affirmed by Final Order a process whereby the Board, 
in a pure DPA case, may "accept" but still ignore its Examining Committee's recommendations; 
and, in switching to its disciplinary role, the Board approved its right to demand Petitioner's 
compliance, or else, as if the case were a disciplinary matter from the inception, and as to which 
it asserted entitlement to apply disciplinary sanctions. 
And so it did. The DPA is integrated as a distinct act for considering and resolving 
situations arising from the "disability" rather than the "disciplinary" side of the Board's 
regulatory responsibilities. Petitioner is not suggesting that the Board was bound to what its 
Examining Committee recommended; rather the Board may not ignore the constraints of the 
DPA and transmute a case following Examining Committee review to a purely disciplinary one. 
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In particular, the Examining Committee is charged with reporting the physician's fitness 
"by reason of' the Section 54-1832 factors. As to any related impairment, the Examining 
Committee "shall report" to the Board "as to the fitness of the physician to engage in the practice 
of medicine ... , either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management the committee 
may recommend." (LC. Section 54-1836(a). The Board's statutory role is somewhat different. 
In addition to addressing a "restriction" or not under the statutory parameters, the Board may 
also impose the more severe sanctions of suspension or revocation, but not as a disciplinary 
sanction. With respect to its authority to "suspend" or "restrict" a license under the DP A, the 
Board may only do so "for the duration of his impairment" (I.C. Section 54-1837(c)(2) within 
the statutory parameters of the DP A. 
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability 
or impairment. There is nothing in the DP A that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that 
last "permanently," or for life or for any extended duration beyond a licensee's "duration of 
impairment". As pointed out above, there is also nothing in the DP A that authorizes the Board to 
impose restrictions for conditions not causally related to those categories specified in the DP A. 
Moreover, there is nothing in either the language, the history, the concept or the spirit of the 
DPA that the Board has the authority in a DP A case to impose restrictions for typical standard of 
care violations, practice deviations or disciplinary transgressions. Finally, there is no authority 
granted or implied in the DPA for the Agency's imposition of permanent restrictions on 
Petitioner's practice of "OB and chronic pain management" which were not referred to the 
Examining Committee under the DPA referral standards, and were not addressed by the 
Examining Committee as relevant to its delegated review. Nor could such a restriction have 
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been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria and on which the Board did not submit 
evidence at hearing. Therefore, no such evidence is before this Court on Judicial Review of any 
asserted Agency basis for imposing the permanent license restriction. 
VIII. 
THE BOARD'S RULING HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 
The Board's sole witness testified that a license "restriction" imposition by the Board 
would prevent a licensee to qualify for specialty board certification (TR. p. LL. 4 - 12). 
Petitioner first took and passed his specialty board in 1996 in family practice medicine. The 
certificate was issued by the American Board of Family Medicine (ABFM), certifying his having 
achieved a standard of knowledge and experience of professional and personal importance. He 
also recertified on his first examination. (TR. p. 95). He moved to Idaho and received his Idaho 
medical license in 2002 (TR. p. 94- 95). As mentioned previously, the Jerome hospital bylaws 
required physician staff members to be board certified to retain staff privileges. Although not 
directly at issue in this DP A case, hanging over Petitioner is the shadowy prospect of reclaiming 
eligibility for specialty board diplomat status. An abbreviated summary is found in an exchange 
of emails between Petitioner and the ABFM representative (Hearing Ex. 119, p. 1). By a two 
year monitoring stipulation he signed in early 2009, his license was restricted, and, as a result, 
Petitioner was unable to sit again for recertification in late 2009, leading to his exclusion from 
the Jerome hospital medical staff in January 2010 (Hearing Ex. 111 ). 
In seeking to regain his eligibility to recertify in his practice specialty, Petitioner, when 
the two year 2009 stipulation had reached its stated duration, asked the Board that it be 
administratively terminated, and the Board did so, replacing it with another that, in the language 




of the ABFM credential coordinator, "it appeared that you were released from any and all terms 
of that prior agreement, thus reinstating your medical license to a full and unrestricted status." 
He was delighted and, indeed, applied to sit for the examination, paid his fees, and took the 
examine in the spring of 2012. However, the ABFM, in reviewing his status found that the Idaho 
Board's replacement stipulation referred to one paragraph of the prior agreement between the 
Board and its licensee that had not been terminated; therefore, the ABFM concluded that his 
state-imposed "restriction" remained, avoiding his efforts, but leaving him still board eligible. 
As the ABFM representative summarized, choosing to not perform OB, or not treat pain patients 
was not disqualifying, but having those restrictions/conditions placed on a medical license, his in 
this case, made him ineligible to sit for a recertification examination. The IBOM uses the 
leverage of "restriction" with its monitoring (Hearing Ex. 3), even if practicing clinicians most 
familiar with the licensee may think a license restriction may not be clinically warranted 
(Hearing Ex. 122, 123). As Dr. Lorraine Tangen testified, she, too, has quit doing obstetrics, she 
was aware of Petitioner's several educational courses, believes him to be a much better 
physician, improving his fitness to practice since completing them, once treated him for CPAP, 
treated his family and, significantly, opined in November 2011 that Petitioner ought not have an 
imposed license restriction (Tr. pp. 100 - 104). 
What is somewhat mysterious is that from the Board's staff monitor, testimony was 
elicited that at its September 2012 board meeting, not only did the Board "accept" the Examining 
Committee's recommendations, but also offered Petitioner a "voluntary stipulation to 
incorporate" the recommendations of the Examining Committee (TR. p. 19, LL. 11-14, 15 -
20). Then, in asking Respondent to appear before the Board, the witness was asked and agreed 
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that the Board did "still vote to ask him to voluntarily restrict his practice" which he refused (TR. 
p. 20, LL. 4 - 9). If, indeed, the Board was giving Petitioner the right to free himself from the 
2009 restriction by agreeing to a no strings attached recommendation consistent with the 
Examining Committee's recommendation, why didn't the Board offer into evidence those 
proposals made to Petitioner while he was not represented by counsel? And how does that 
contrast to the Board's objecting and successfully keeping out Petitioner's offer of its marked 
hearing exhibit 117 conveying a to his former counsel a very restrictive stipulation proposal? 
And why would counsel press, unsuccessfully, in November 2012 an unrepresented Petitioner to 
sign an early Board stipulation (Hearing Ex. 118, letter only) when Petitioner had been looking 
for the opportunity to voluntarily withdraw from certain aspects of his earlier practice for 
personal reasons unrestrained by state-based but ABFM accepted non-eligibility restrictions? 
There may be a few circumstances when, for disciplinary reason, a physician should be 
precluded from attaining additional educational experiences or specialty certifications, even 
though Petitioner may find that hard to understand. In even fewer cases, it would seem, a license 
restriction should be imposed in a disability case unless the reason for the disability raises safety 
and/or fitness issues. No such restrictions were recommended by the Examining Committee. 
The Board, for reasons unexplained but perhaps based on an unknown history with Petitioner's 
serial requests for its lifting an earlier restriction, has now specifically and purposefully imposed 
"perm~ent" practice restrictions as "sanctions", cited a statute not a part of the DPA as its 
authority and ensured that this physician will have a license restriction of record purportedly 
arising out of a disability act application. 
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Additionally, there is one matter not covered by the record of this case below but 
followed shortly thereafter which prejudices Petitioner. This court is referred to the Idaho 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(g) which allows the Idaho Board of 
Pharmacy to issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled 
substance registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner 
represents that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe 
to OB patients or chronic pain patients. Thus, if covering in a rural hospital ER or an urgent care 
clinic situation, a patient should present who happens to be injured, but is also pregnant and/or 
has chronic pain issues, Petitioner may be constrained in appropriately treating that patient on an 
emergent basis by reason of the IBOM' s permanently imposed restriction and that Final Order's 
impact on Petitioner's Idaho controlled substance license. And, for reasons unknown, the IBOM 
waited until 2014 to notify the IBOP under a 1971 law of his now imposed "permanent" license 
restrictions as "sanctions" automatically carrying over to his controlled substance registration. 
IX. 
THE HEARING BELOW WAS CLOUDED BY THE BOARD'S PERVASIVE 
ASSERTION OF IDAHO'S PEER REVIEW STATUTE 
In response to a purported "adverse clinical action" taken by the Jerome hospital in April 
2011, but not received by the Board until October, the Board asked Petitioner for patient clinical 
records and his written explanation of what occurred. At hearing, Petitioner was prepared to 
produce documents and call witnesses to address the events about which he was asked. In 
summaty, much of his proposed testimony through Ors. Lally, Tangen, Housley and himself was 
prepared to describe the underlying clinical events of December 2006, an early 2007 hospital 
Fair Review Panel hearing, and later educational/training courses and related activities. A 
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substantial portion of this planned and/or proffered evidence was excluded by the hearing officer 
in upholding the Board's comprehensive assertion of Idaho's Peer Review privilege. Petitioner 
was narrowly permitted to show that after the obstetrical event in question, his hospital privileges 
were suspended for 60 days on 2/22/2007 (Hearing Ex. 104) but reinstated less than a month 
later on 3/20/2007 (Hearing Ex. 105). He was also allowed to submit a neuropsychological 
report by Dr. Beaver to the hospital that Petitioner underwent on 8/8/2007 at the hospital's 
request (Hearing Ex. 107) which provided a nice baseline for the Beaver evaluation five years 
later to the Board's Examining Committee (Hearing Ex. 9). 
Petitioner will not here repeat the extensive briefing previously filed with the hearing 
officer. In essence, after a substantial portion of Petitioner's potential documentary case and 
much of his prospective witnesses testimony was excluded, the Board, on rebuttal, moved for 
admission of three stacks of documents as "rebuttal" records, several of which appeared to be 
some of those which Petitioner had attached to his written response, denuded of which had been 
previously admitted (Hearing Ex. 4). The difference, that Petitioner gave most of them to the 
Board and were thus fair game on rebuttal, rings hollow in view of the compulsion and deadline 
the Board had imposed on him to get to it "pertinent records" of the clinical events of almost five 
years before, and those of subsequent in-hospital educational monitoring and related 
developments. Recognizing the breadth of Idaho's peer view statute, the concept of some equal-
handedness in its application seems reasonable in a case in which the Board did absolutely 
nothing to obtain hospital records and/or otherwise learn the facts about the circumstances under 
which, in the end, it saw fit to impose permanent restrictions on Petitioner's license as an 
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. , 
disciplinary sanction arising out of events it in large part refused to consider or allow its hearing 
officer to review. 
For purposes of making a record, Petitioner hereby incorporates his arguments filed in a 
Memorandum dated August 22, 2013, particularly pages 8 - 16, concerning the request of 
Petitioner to have his submissions and those of the Boards be judged by similarly fair standards 
in applying Idaho's complex, and broad, statutory peer review concepts. In that context, 
( 
Petitioner asserts that the hearing officer, and the confirming Board, erred in sustaining the 
Board's peer review privilege claims against Petitioner's proffered exhibits and testimony and in 
admitting the Board's rebuttal exhibits. In retrospect, however, the narrowed review serves to 
emphasize that this case was a DP A matter, not a disciplinary review of a reported "adverse 
clinical action" either in 2011 or in 2006. And the focus of this case, in view of the subsequent 
Final Order, is on the Board's exercise and abuse of the DPA in its imposition of permanent 
"sanctions" against Petitioner to his significant professional detriment. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, and consistent with the statutory guidelines governing 
Judicial Review, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's imposition of 
sanctions against Petitioner under the Disabled Physician Act, and particularly the sanction of 
license restriction, item 5 in its enumerated Final Order. Moreover, the Board should be 
instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings per the last cited alternative stated in I.C. Section 54-
1837(b) because grounds for the other alternative findings were not found to exist. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal of a Final Order issued by the Idaho State Board of Medicine 
placing restrictions on Dr. Mena's license and awarding costs and attorney's fees. 
Course of the Proceedings 
By Order dated May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted proceedings 
involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining Committee met with Dr. 
Mena on June 13, 2012. The Examining Committee issued a report June 29, 2012, which was 
accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Since Dr. Mena was unwilling to 
stipulate to voluntary restrictions, he was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013, 
Board meeting, which Dr. Mena personally attended with his attorney. The Board again voted to 
accept the Examining Committee report. Dr. Mena was still unwilling to voluntarily agree to 
follow the recommendations and a hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2013. Following the 
hearing, the Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 14, 2013. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014. 
Statement of Facts 
Dr. Mena is a family practice physician who was first licensed by the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine on September 13, 2003. He practices in Jerome, Idaho. 
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In 2007 and 2008, Dr. Mena went through various evaluations due to problems which 
arose at St. Benedict's Hospital in Jerome, Idaho and which were also reviewed by the Board of 
Medicine. 
Dr. Mena was evaluated at the Betty Ford Center from February 28, 2007 to March 1, 
2007. The Betty Ford records are included in Exhibit 11, pp. 12-106. Concerns regarding Dr. 
Mena related to slurred speech, tired or depressed affect, inattentiveness and complaints about 
inadequate record keeping, late dictations and possible inadequate medical care. (Exhibit 11, p. 
12.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena conceded that he had "difficulties with 
authorities" which had precipitated moves from prior positions in Provo, Utah; Washington 
State; and Vermont. (Exhibit 11, p. 28.) During the Betty Ford evaluation, they did a complete 
evaluation of Dr. Mena's cognitive capabilities through use of a MicroCog Assessment. The 
entire results of that assessment are found at Exhibit 11, pp. 58-106. The psychologist 
administering the MicroCog Assessment of Cognitive Functioning noted that Dr. Mena took an 
unusually long period of time to complete the tests and many of his scores fell in the low range. 
The evaluator stated: "Using norms for licensed professionals with this instrument, Dr. Mena's 
scores show significantly compromised cognitive functioning and further testing is indicated". 
(Exhibit 11, p. 42.) Another evaluator noted: 
Using norms established for licensed professionals, Dr. 
Mena's scores indicate that he is currently functioning 
significantly below professional standards and further 




In the final Integrated Clinical Summary, while Betty Ford found no substance abuse 
problems, they did diagnose Dr. Mena with obsessive compulsive disorder, a nonspecific 
personality disorder with negativistic, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic traits. (Exhibit 11, 
p. 56.) At the time of the Betty Ford evaluation, Dr. Mena had no ongoing psychotherapy or 
psychiatric care. The Betty Ford Center expressed the following opinion: 
In the opinion of the CDE Team, Robert M. Mena, M.D., is 
not currently fit to practice medicine. His suitability for 
returning to work should not be reassessed until after he has, 
(1) completed residential treatment as outlined above, (2) 
been discharged with staff approval, (3) is currently 
functioning cognitively within professional standards, ( 4) 
enrolled in therapeutic monitoring programs directed by the 
Idaho Medical Board Physician Recovery Network. (Exhibit 
11, p. 57.) 
On August 1, 2007, the Colorado Physician Health Program referred Dr. Mena to Dr. 
Craig Beaver in Boise for neuropsychological testing. The case summary from CPHP is found in 
Exhibit 11, pp. 3-11. The CPHP evaluation notes the concerns raised by the MicroCog 
Assessment of Cognitive Functioning. (Exhibit 11, p. 4.) That same page notes that Dr. Mena 
had a history of depressive disorder and he had recently begun treatment for anxiety disorder as 
well as sleep disorder. It was noted Dr. Mena did meet diagnostic criteria for depressive 
disorder. (Exhibit 11, p. 5.) The report supported Dr. Mena's return to work in a clinic-based 
setting with a caveat that his work be supervised in some way and with a recommendation that 
Dr. Mena refrain from hospital work. (Exhibit 11, p. 6.) 
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In order to evaluate clinical skills, Dr. Mena submitted to a Physician Assessment and 
Clinical Education Program (PACE), with those evaluations occurring December 20-21, 2007 
and February 4-8, 2008. The PACE evaluation results are included as Exhibit 12. On Page 3 of 
Exhibit 12, PACE again noted Dr. Mena's below average performance on processing speed, 
general cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general 
cognitive functioning. PACE reported that they did not observe any behaviors indicating 
cognitive impairment. The evaluation noted relative weakness on the use of opioids. (Exhibit 
12, p. 4.) The oral obstetrics examination found numerous deficiencies in Dr. Mena's knowledge 
base and approach to treatment. (Exhibit 12, p. 7.) The conclusion found adequate performance 
in family practice, but stated: 
The oral exam administered by Dr. Gin revealed significant 
deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to the 
deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his 
involvement in obstetrics or pursue an intensive hands-on 
training course or a fellowship program as a means to update 
his knowledge base. (Exhibit 12, p. 8.) 
Dr. Mena apparently attempted to question the recommendations of the PACE Program and sent 
a series of emails to the PACE Program. In a letter dated October 3, 2008, the PACE Program 
notified Dr. Mena that they would not accept any more emails, faxes, letters or phone calls from 
him and that his file would be closed. (Exhibit 12, pp. 9-10.) 
Finally, Dr. Mena completed a Center for Personalized Education for Physician 
Evaluation at CPEP in Denver, Colorado. (Exhibit 13.) The Assessment was done November 




32. With respect to medical knowledge, the report found Dr. Mena demonstrated medical 
knowledge that varied from adequate to poor and his knowledge of obstetrical topics lacked 
adequate depth overall. (Exhibit 13, p. 33.) The CPEP evaluation found his knowledge was 
adequate in family medicine, but in obstetrics, his clinical judgment and reasoning overall was 
varied and concerning. (Exhibit 13, p. 36.) CPEP recommended: 
Should Dr. Mena return to obstetrical care, he should 
participate in a clinical experience to provide the necessary 
supervision required as he addresses the areas of 
demonstrated need for obstetrical care. Dr. Mena should 
initially have 100% direct supervision in the inpatient 
obstetrical care setting as well as retrospective chart review 
in the last trimester to determine relevant issues related to 
delivery. (Exhibit 13, p. 38.) 
On June 23, 2009, Dr. Mena signed a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine 
related to Dr. Mena's training and ability to perform certain medical procedures, including 
obstetrics and treat chronic pain. (Paragraph II.) In Paragraphs VI(b) and VII of the Stipulation 
and Order, Dr. Mena stipulated to a permanent restriction on performing obstetrics and treating 
chronic pain patients. He also agreed to limit his work hours and continue in treatment with a 
Board approved counselor and psychiatrist and agreed to follow their recommendations. 
On September 26, 2011, an Order Terminating Stipulation and Order was signed by the 
Board chair. That Order was mailed to Dr. Mena on September 27, 2011. On October 13, 2011, 
a letter was sent to Dr. Mena reminding him of the permanent restriction on obstetrics. (Exhibit 
3.) The letter did not refer to the permanent restriction on chronic pain treatment but that is 




Within a few days of termination of the Stipulation and Order, on October 3, 2011, the 
Board received a notice from St. Benedicts Family Medical Center that they had taken an adverse 
clinical privilege action involving Dr. Mena. Pursuant to Idaho Code §39-1393, hospitals are 
required to report adverse actions to the Board of Medicine. That letter was admitted as Exhibit 
1 and notes that Dr. Mena had agreed to obtain additional training before he exercised any 
privileges and he failed to receive the training so his medical staff membership was forfeited. 
There is no explanation for why the hospital delayed reporting the adverse action which was 
taken April 15, 2011. 
Upon receipt of that letter from the hospital, the Board staff initiated an investigation and 
wrote to Dr. Mena for an explanation. (Exhibit 2.) The letter noted that the adverse clinical 
privilege action indicated he had not completed required educational training. 
The Board staff received an undated written response from Dr. Mena which was admitted 
as Exhibit 4. A review of that letter indicates that it is disjointed, tangential and irrational. 
During the hearing, Dr. Mena admitted that the letter was concerning and tried to explain that it 
should have never been sent. (Tr., p. 137, ls. 2-18 and p. 138, ls. 14-25.) He acknowledged 
staying up all night to polish the drafts. (Tr., p. 138, ls. 19-20.) 
However, in an email sent later on November 15, 2011, Dr. Mena provided the Board 
investigator with a one page Conclusion to be annexed to his prior response. (Exhibit 5.) That 




The Board reviewed Dr. Mena's responses at the December, 2011 Board meeting. Given 
Dr. Mena's psychiatric history and cognitive difficulties as noted in the prior evaluations, the 
Board was particularly disturbed by and concerned about Dr. Mena's responses. The Board 
instructed the staff to institute Disabled Physician Act proceedings to review Dr. Mena' s ability 
to practice with reasonable skill and safety. 
In an email dated December 29, 2011, Dr. Mena advised the Board attorney that he would 
never be allowed to be Board certified in family practice because of the fact that he agreed to 
permanently restrict obstetrics in 2009. (Exhibit 6.) At the hearing, Dr. Mena testified that the 
American Board of Family Practice mistakenly allowed him to take the Board certification exam 
in April, 2013 and he failed that exam by a very large margin. (Tr., p. 150, ls. 10-19; p. 65, ls. 
21-25; and p. 96, ls. 5-22.) 
In Orders dated May 14, 2012, the Board created an Examining Committee pursuant to 
the Disabled Physician Act and ordered Dr. Mena to appear for an examination. That 
Examination Committee consisted of Dr. Jeffrey Berlant, a psychiatrist; Dr. Martin Gabica, a 
family practice physician; and Dr. Ronald Larsen, a psychiatrist. The Examining Committee 
met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012. 
They issued their report June 29, 2012 which was admitted as Exhibit 8. That report lists 
the records that the Examining Committee reviewed, including Exhibits 11, 12 and 13. The 
report indicates that the Examining Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012 for 90 




Dr. Mena provided a verbal summary of the events that led to 
Board's involvement. He revealed that he has benefitted 
from treatment for Depression and Anxiety. He stated that 
he is under Psychiatric care and plans to continue with that 
care. Treatment for Sleep Apnea has also addressed past 
concerns about "slurred speech" and ''tiredness". 
A review of prior examinations revealed that Robert has been 
found to have Obsessive - Compulsive and Narcissistic 
personality traits. There is also evidence for deficits in 
Cognitive processing speed demonstrated on 
Neuropsychological testing. The PACE evaluation revealed 
deficits in Obstetrics knowledge. These findings, as well as 
past concerns about chart completion, were discussed with 
Dr. Mena. He admitted that he signed and submitted a 
version of the "Undated response to the Board" without 
reading its contents. 
Based upon their review of the reports and their meeting with Dr. Mena, the Examining 
Committee issued the following recommendation: 
The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena 
can continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable 
skill and safety, with required management including: 
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver 
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care 
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board 
oversight 
Consistent with the recommendation of the Examining Committee, on September 10, 
2012, Dr. Mena completed a neuropsychological examination by Dr. Craig Beaver. A detailed 
report prepared by Dr. Beaver was admitted as Exhibit 9. Dr. Beaver conducted a variety of 
psychological tests. His report reviewed the prior Betty Ford evaluation, PACE evaluation and 




continuing in counseling. (Exhibit 9, p. 5.) On Page 7 of his report, Dr. Beaver noted that Dr. 
Mena's memory functioning had significantly dropped from Dr. Beaver's prior testing. (Exhibit 
9, pp. 7 and 8.) Dr. Beaver confirmed the obsessive compulsive disorder and continuing 
narcissistic personality traits together with sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver made the following 
recommendations: 
2. In considering further care and treatment, I would recommend the 
following: 
a. Dr. Mena continues to need to follow medical 
recommendations with regard to his sleep apnea. For 
example, continued use of the CP AP machine if 
indicated. 
b. Dr. Mena is currently on a low dose of Lexapro 
which his psychotherapist and he have noted to be 
beneficial. I would defer to Dr. Albright as to his 
continuing need for medication. 
c. Dr. Mena reports his psychotherapy experiences have 
been positive, and he is dealing well with his 
stressors and has learned much from his experience. 
This occurs within the context of him having a 
significantly reduced level of practice for a variety of 
reasons. I still have concern that if Dr. Mena enters a 
fast-paced clinical practice, for example in a move to 
Kellogg, some of the issues or concerns previously 
involving Dr. Mena could potentially arise again. 
Therefore, I would recommend if Dr. Mena is transfe-
rring to a new work situation, such as the clinic in 
Kellogg, he be required to be involved with 
individual psychotherapy on a regular basis during 
the first six months of entry into that job 
circumstance. Further, that there be good 
communication between prior mental health 
evaluators or treatment professionals that have been 
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involved with Dr. Mena and whoever provides those 
services to him. This would allow continued 
monitoring and support for Dr. Mena as it relates to 
some of the interpersonal and personality dynamics 
that appear to have contributing to his prior 
difficulties. 
3. In regards to fitness-for-duty issues as a family practice physician, I 
would note the following: 
a. Dr. Mena has undergone a substantial amount of 
additional evaluation and other supportive 
interventions with regard to his clinical skills. He is 
currently not allowed to return to his hospital-based 
practice in the Jerome area, and it has been 
specifically recommended that he not engage in OB 
practice. I would defer to the Board of Medicine as 
to the necessity of continuing restrictions in those 
areas. 
b. From a neurocognitive perspective, I did not observe 
any neurocognitive deficits that would interfere with 
his capacity to engage in clinical practice as a family 
practice physician. 
c. Given his prior history and concerns, I would 
recommend he engage in the individual counseling, 
as I described above, to ensure that some of his 
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for 
him. 
At the Board meeting m September, 2012, the Board reviewed the Examining 
Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations and, pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836, 
accepted the recommendations of those evaluators. A draft Stipulation and Order consistent with 




Consequently, Dr. Mena and his attorney were scheduled for and attended a personal 
appearance with the Board on March 1, 2013. The Board reaffirmed their acceptance of the 
Examining Committee's Report and Dr. Beaver's recommendations. When Dr. Mena still 
refused to voluntarily agree to follow those recommendations, a hearing was scheduled. 
The Hearing Officer issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
November 14, 2013. The Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and issued a Final Order on January 7, 2014. The Board's Final Order allowed Dr. Mena 
to continue practicing family practice with the following monitoring and restrictions: 
1. Respondent shall continue in treatment and on medication 
and comply with the recommendations of his treating 
psychiatrist and psychologist and authorize them to provide 
quarterly status reports. 
2. Dr. Mena shall not change his current psychiatrist or 
psychologist without Board approval. 
3. Respondent's psychiatrist and psychologist must 
immediately report to the Board any concerns about Dr. 
Mena's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill 
and safety. 
4. Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea with 
quarterly reports by his treating physician to the Board. 
5. Dr. Mena shall permanently cease practicing obstetrics and 
chronic pain. 
6. Dr. Beaver shall do a complete reevaluation in two (2) 
years. 
7. Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of 





8. Dr. Mena to reimburse the Board for costs and fees. 
Additional Issues on Appeal 
The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
Standard of Review 
The Court's review of the Board's action is governed by Idaho Code §67-5279(3) which 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter 
or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall 
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; 
or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole 
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
It is well established law that the District Court will defer to an agency's findings of fact 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous and as to the weight of the evidence, the District Court 
shall not substitute its judgment for that of any agency. Idaho Code §67-5279(1); Woodfield v. 
Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 744, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1995); Wheeler 




Factual findings are not erroneous when supported by substantial evidence, even though 
conflicting evidence exists. Riverside Development Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 
1271 (S.Ct. 2002). A court shall affirm an agency action "unless substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced." Idaho Code §67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 
575, 577, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996); Wheeler v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 
147 Idaho 257, 260, 207 P.3d 988 (S.Ct. 2009). On questions of law, the Court exercises free 
review. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 (S.Ct. 2008); 
Riverside Development Company v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (S.Ct. 2002). 
Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown by an appellant. 
State v. Crawford, 104 Idaho 840, 841, 663 P.2d 1142 (Ct.App. 1983). An appellate court will 
not search a record for unspecified and unsupported errors. State v. Crawford, supra; Drake v. 
Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 672 P.2d 1064 (Ct.App. 1983-84); Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620 
P.2d 798 (1980); Idaho Appellate Rules 34 and 35. 
In Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (S.Ct. 2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the well established rule that issues on appeal are waived unless supported with 
relevant argument and authority. The Supreme Court stated: 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with 
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, 
those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the 
Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). 
A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is 
insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 




record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof! Discipline, 
138 Idaho 397,400, 64 P.3d 323,326 (2003). Consequently, to the 
extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R. it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. 
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 148 at 790. 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Bach was recently reaffirmed in Bettwieser v. New York 
Irrigation District, 154 Idaho 317,323,297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (S.Ct. February 22, 2013.) 
Idaho Code §54-1833 allows the Board of Medicine to create an Examining Committee if 
there are concerns about a physician's ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to 
mental illness, physical illness or excessive use or abuse of drugs, including alcohol. Idaho Code 
§54-1834 provides that the Examining Committee will personally meet with the physician. The 
Examining Committee then submits a report to the Board pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836. 
That recommendation can include a recommendation on whether the physician is fit to practice 
medicine, either on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee 
may recommend. That recommendation is merely advisory. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1836(b ), the Board may accept or reject the recommendation 
of the Examining Committee. Idaho Code §54-1836( c) provides that if a physician is unwilling 
to execute a voluntary agreement on any restrictions, the physician is entitled to a hearing and 
formal proceedings before the Board and a determination on the evidence as to whether 
restrictions should be imposed. Following the conclusion of the hearing, Idaho Code §54-
1837(c), provides: 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall make a 




to exist, may issue an order imposing one or more of the 
following: 
(1) Make a recommendation that the physician submit to 
the care, counseling, or treatment by physicians 
acceptable to the board; or 
(2) Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to 
practice medicine for the duration of his impairment; 
or 
(3) Revoke the license of the physician to practice 
medicine; and if grounds are not found to exist, the 
board shall enter its order so stating, shall dismiss the 
proceedings and shall provide the respondent a true 
copy thereof. 
The Board fully complied with all of the statutory requirements and procedures. 
II 
Dr. Mena's Brief Fails To Support Issues On Appeal 
In the Board's initial Respondent's Brief filed June 30, 2014, the Board identified various 
procedural defects in the Opening Brief filed by Dr. Mena. In an Order filed July 17, 2014, this 
Court issued an Order determining Dr. Mena had failed to submit a brief that conformed with the 
requirements of Rule 35, I.A.R. That Order noted that Dr. Mena's Brief "does not contain an 
issues section, nor does it clearly delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See 
I.R.C.P. 84(p) and I.A.R. 35(a)(4)". The Court Order also cited Carle v. State, 2013 WL 
5979202 which ruled that an appellant must identify specific issues to be considered on appeal 
and present arguments with citations to the record and transcript on which the arguments rely. 
The Court allowed Dr. Mena an opportunity to submit a conforming brief. 
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On July 25, 2014, Dr, Mena filed Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on Judicial 
Review. A review of that Amended Brief indicates that Dr. Mena added a Table of Contents, 
Table of Authorities, both of which are required by Rule 35(a), I.A.R., and were missing from his 
first brief. On Pages 3 and 4, Dr. Mena added a section entitled "Issues Presented on Appeal" 
and identified five (5) specific alleged issues on appeal. Other than these additions, the entire 
balance of Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief is virtually identical to the original Opening Brief 
with a few minor clerical changes in wording in a few sections of the brief. The argument 
section of the Amended Opening Brief is in no way tied to the alleged issues presented on appeal. 
Rule 35(a)(c), I.A.R., requires that the argument sections be tied to the specific issues presented 
on appeal. That rule further requires that the argument include citations to authorities, statutes 
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief still fails 
to comply with the requirements of this rule. Dr. Mena's Brief and his appeal should be 
dismissed based upon his failure to submit a brief which conforms with the requirements of Rule 
35, I.A.R. 
In reviewing Dr. Mena's Amended Opening Brief, it is interesting that there is virtually 
no reference to the transcript or record on appeal and no citation to a single case showing any 
legal or factual error by the Board. The subsections within Dr. Mena's Brief are merely a 
summary of evidence presented. Dr. Mena has not established a single legal or factual error in 
the Board's Final Order and its proceedings. 
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As noted in the Court's Order issued July 17, 2014, it is not enough to identify issues on 
appeal. Dr. Mena is also required to present arguments which specifically refer to and support 
the issues on appeal with citations to the record and transcript on which the arguments rely. In 
his briefing, Dr. Mena has not tied any of his newly identified issues on appeal with the 
arguments raised in his Brief. 
In an effort to respond to Dr. Mena's unsupported arguments, the Board will generally 
utilize the subsection headings utilized by Dr. Mena even though those subsection headings do 
not meet the requirements of the appellate rules for issues on appeal. 
III 
Essence of Parties' Substantive Dispute 
Beginning on Page 4 of Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief, Dr. Mena has a subheading 
entitled "Parties Disagreement on Interpretation and Application of DPA". Dr. Mena refers to 
the Board's compliance monitor's testimony that the Board accepted the Examining Committee's 
recommendations at its September, 2012, Board meeting and then Dr. Mena erroneously states 
that the Board did not tell Dr. Mena. In fact, in the very next sentence of his Brief, Dr. Mena 
concedes the Board counsel did notify him of the Board's determination and asked Dr. Mena to 
voluntarily agree to comply with the recommendations. 
On Page 5, Dr. Mena complains that none of the proposed Stipulations the Board 
"pushed" on Dr. Mena were admitted as exhibits. Since none of the Stipulations were accepted 
or signed by Dr. Mena, their admission would be improper settlement negotiations. Further, 
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there were no restrictions on Dr. Mena's ability to offer those draft Stipulations as exhibits if he 
felt they were relevant, which he completely failed to do so. 
Dr. Mena then argues without any factual support that the Board staff does not 
differentiate between disciplinary cases and Disabled Physician Act cases. That is absolutely 
incorrect and not supported by the record. The pleadings of record clearly indicate that this entire 
process was conducted under the statutory mandates and in compliance with the Disabled 
Physician Act. Dr. Mena has not pointed to one single place in the record that establishes that 
the Board did not comply with and follow the statutory mandates of the Disabled Physician Act. 
The Board's Filing of Administrative Proceedings Under the DPA 
and Petitioner's Objections to the Board's Post-Examining 
Committee Report Process 
Beginning on Page 6, Dr. Mena erroneously states the DP A case was commenced May 
21, 2012, "almost 11 months after the appointed Examining Committee issued its report to the 
Board". In fact, the Examining Committee Report was issued June 29, 2012. (Exhibit 8.) Dr. 
Mena's factual statement is absolutely incorrect. 
Dr. Mena then makes a bald and unsupported statement that the Board exceeded its 
statutory authority under the Disabled Physician Act, but cites no reference to the record or 
procedure of the Board which in any way violated the Act. In fact, the Board fully complied with 
all of the requirements of the Disabled Physician Act. 
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IV 
Facts Underlying The Board's Ordering a DPA Committee 
Examination and Evaluation 
In this subsection, Dr. Mena makes extensive argument that when the Board reopened an 
investigation of him based upon an adverse action report by the hospital, at the time of the 
hearing, the Board presented no testimony regarding the basis for the hospital action. Dr. Mena's 
argument was correctly overruled by the Hearing Officer. The unrefuted testimony establishes 
that the Disabled Physician Act proceeding was based upon Dr. Mena's prior history with the 
Board, including multiple concerning evaluations, and his disjointed, tangential and irrational 
response to the Board's request for information. (Exhibit 4.) (Tr., p. 15, ls.11-25; p. 16, ls. 1-25; 
p. 17, ls. 1-3.) This action was not based upon anything occurring at the hospital and 
consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were irrelevant and immaterial. In 
this section of his Brief, Dr. Mena makes multiple factual statements which have absolutely no 
reference or citation to the administrative record and must be rejected and not considered. In 
particular, on Page 10, Dr. Mena argues that the Board staff asked him to produce a confidential 
patient chart for care occurring December, 2006. That is absolutely incorrect and unsupported. 
On Pages 10 and 11, Dr. Mena complains that the Board did not offer certain exhibits at 
the hearing and failed to call Board members to testify. Again, there was no restriction on Dr. 
Mena's ability or opportunity to offer whatever evidence or witnesses he wished to and he did not 
do so. The Board staff investigator testified and did testify that the Board had significant 
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concerns at its December, 2011, meeting about Petitioner's written response. (Tr., p. 16, ls. 9-
11.) 
On Page 11, Dr. Mena erroneously argues, without any reference to the transcript or 
record, that the Board was asking him to provide a response to care for a particular patient 
occurring five years earlier. That is not correct. 
V 
Examining Committee Activity and Report 
On Pages 12 and 13, Dr. Mena erroneously argues that the Examining Committee and Dr. 
Beaver all found him fit for practice. In fact, the Examining Committee and Dr. Beaver clearly 
reported that Dr. Mena was safe to practice if he was monitored, continued with psychiatric care 
and was re-evaluated in two years. 
VI 
Evaluation of the Board's Adjudicative Role in this DPA Case 
In its Final Order, the Board did adopt the Recommended Findings of Fact of the Hearing 
Officer. (Final Order, p. 1.) Dr. Mena argues the Hearing Officer misperceived Dr. Mena's 
argument. The Hearing Officer did not misperceive the argument. In fact, Dr. Mena did argue 
that the Examining Committee was required to find a "newly diagnosed issue ... before the Board 
can take action". (Recommended Findings, p. 9.) Dr. Mena's argument also completely ignores 
his prior history of mental health issues with the Board and his disjointed, tangential and 
irrational response to the Board. 
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On Page 14, Dr. Mena again, without any legal or factual support, erroneously contends 
that the Board processed this case as a disciplinary case rather than a Disabled Physician Act 
case. That is absolutely incorrect. 
On Page 15, Dr. Mena agam erroneously argues that the Examining Committee 
recommended no restrictions on Dr. Mena's license. In fact, the Examining Committee did 
recommend that Dr. Mena have required management, including repeat neuropsychological 
testing by Dr. Craig Beaver, continued outpatient psychiatric care, and a re-evaluation in two 
years with continuing Board oversight. 
VII 
The Board did not Ignore the DP A Statutory Process 
On Pages 16 and 17, Dr. Mena adds the first new substantive language to his Amended 
Opening Brief that was not found in his first Opening Brief. He argues that the Board imposed 
obstetric and chronic pain practice restrictions without supporting evidence and then lists seven 
things the Board purportedly did wrong without any reference to the appellate record or the 
citations to the transcript to support any of the arguments. He makes an unsupported argument 
that restrictions on obstetrics and chronic pain are disciplinary restrictions. In fact, Idaho Code 
§54-1837(c)(2) allows the Board, through the Disabled Physician Act, to impose any appropriate 
restrictions on the license of a physician to practice medicine. In this case, the evaluations done 
at Betty Ford found Dr. Mena's test scores showed significantly compromised cognitive 
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functioning. (Exhibit 11, Page 42). The same evaluation found Dr. Mena was currently 
functioning significantly below professional standards. (Exhibit 11, Page 50). 
The evaluation conducted by the Colorado Physician Health Program found the same 
concerns regarding Dr. Mena's cognitive functioning, but found he could work in a clinic based 
setting with supervision and included a recommendation that Dr. Mena refrain from hospital 
work. (Exhibit 11, Page 4 and 6). 
The PACE evaluation found below average performance on processing speed, general 
cognitive proficiency, reasoning/calculation, memory, spatial processing and general cognitive 
functioning. (Exhibit 12, Page 3). The PACE evaluation noted weaknesses and the use of 
opioids and inadequate performance and significant deficiencies on Dr. Mena's approach to 
obstetrics. (Exhibit 12, Page 4 and 8). 
Finally, the CPEP evaluation found Dr. Mena's knowledge in obstetrics with respect to 
clinical judgment and reasoning was varied and concerning and that he should not practice 
obstetrics without supervised additional training and direct supervision of 100% of all cases. 
(Exhibit 13, Page 33, 36 and 38). 
Finally, Dr. Mena agreed m June, 2009, that he would permanently cease treating 
obstetrics and chronic pain. (June 23, 2009, Stipulation and Order, Paragraph VI(b)). 
Consequently, contrary to Dr. Mean's argument in his Amended Opening Brief, there was 
significant substantial evidence to support restrictions on obstetrics and chronic pain through the 
Disabled Physician Act proceeding. 
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On Page 17, Dr. Mena erroneously states the Board did not share the Examining 
Committee Report with Dr. Mena. That is absolutely incorrect. In fact, it was provided to him 
on various occasions, including when it was issued, before his personal appearance before the 
Board and was also served upon him May 21, 2013 as evidenced by the pleading entitled Notice 
of Filing Examining Committee Report. 
Dr. Mena refers to the provision of the Final Order that he permanently cease practice 
obstetrics and chronic pain management. The PACE and CPEP evaluations clearly establish that 
due to deficiencies in clinical judgment and reasoning, Dr. Mena cannot practice obstetrics with 
reasonable skill and safety. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) Further, the July 23, 2009 initial Stipulation 
and Order included a permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain. In fact, Dr. Mena lost 
his family practice Board certification because of that permanent restriction on obstetrics, not 
because of these further proceedings. (Exhibit 6.) The evidence presented at the hearing 
supports that permanent and continuing restriction. 
On Page 18, Dr. Mena erroneously argues he was referred to the Examining Committee 
"not because [sic] his medical history or a clinical report", but because of something he wrote. 
This argument ignores Dr. Mena's extensive prior history with the Board and the numerous, 
extensive prior evaluations which led to the prior Stipulation and Order for similar problems. 
There concerns were supported by multiple examinations and consultations which were obtained 
on Dr. Mena in 2006 or 2007. (See Exhibits 9 through 13.) 
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Dr. Mena concedes, on Page 20, that the Examining Committee shall report to the Board 
on the fitness of a physician to practice "either on a restricted or unrestricted basis and any 
management the committee may recommend." That is exactly what the Examining Committee 
did and those restrictions were adopted and imposed by the Board in its Final Order. 
VIII 
The Board's Ruling Has Not Violated Petitioner's Substantial Rights 
In this section of his Brief, beginning on Page 21, Dr. Mena again makes many 
unsupported factual arguments and statements regarding his Board certification. In fact, the 
record clearly establishes that this proceedings had nothing to do with his loss of his Board 
certification. He lost his Board certification when he signed the Board Stipulation and Order in 
2009 because of the permanent restriction on obstetrics and chronic pain management. (Exhibit 
6.) 
On Page 24, Dr. Mena refers to an Idaho Board of Pharmacy statute, Idaho Code §37-
2718(g). That statute has never cited or relied upon by the Board and is not part of this current 
proceeding. 
IX 
The Hearing Below Was Not Clouded by the Board's Pervasive 
Assertion of Idaho's Peer Review Statute 
Beginning on Page 24 of his Amended Brief, again, virtually all of Dr. Mena's factual 
arguments and statements are unsupported by any reference to the record. Dr. Mena complains 
that because of the peer review privilege he was not entitled to present peer review evidence 
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regarding the clinical events of December, 2006 and early 2007. The Hearing Officer correctly 
ruled that those proceedings were subject to the peer review privilege. Idaho Code §39-l 392(b ). 
They were also irrelevant. 
On Page 25, Dr. Mena argues that after his proposed testimony was denied, the Board 
"moved for admission of three stacks of documents" as rebuttal records. Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 
were admitted after Dr. Mena incorrectly testified none of the prior evaluations found he was not 
fit to practice medicine. (Tr., p. 169, ls. 8-12.) Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 clearly refute Dr. Mena's 
testimony. These evaluations were reviewed by the Examining Committee so they were also 
relevant and admissible. 
X 
The Board is Entitled to Costs and Attorney's Fees 
The Board is entitled to costs and attorney's fees against Dr. Mena based upon his 
frivolous and unsupported appeal. Idaho Code §12-117 provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving 
as adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, 
the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the 
proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, 
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. 
Idaho Code §12-117 was most recently amended in 2012. Consequently, prior decisions which 
determined that attorney's fees could not be awarded on appeal are no longer in force and effect. 
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In the case of Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (S.Ct. 2011), the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Idaho Code §12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking 
attorney's fees against the entities to which it applies. 151 Idaho at 818. The Court noted that 
2010 amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117 by the Idaho Legislature inadvertently prohibited 
awards of fees in petitions for review of administrative decisions. That ruling in Sopatyk has 
now been overturned by the further amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117 occurring in 2012. 
The language of Idaho Code § 12-117 that attorney's fees are allowable on appeal where 
a non-prevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis" in law or fact has not been changed by 
the most recent legislation. Consequently, prior cases on that language are applicable. 
Fees can be awarded to the Board because Dr. Mena has filed an appeal and made 
arguments without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway 
District, 151 Idaho 196, 254 P.3d 497 (S.Ct. 2011). Attorney's fees are properly awarded under 
Idaho Code § 12-117 when a party fails to provide any authority supporting its appeal an.d pursues 
an appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Bonner County v. Bonner County Sheriff 
Search and Rescue, Inc., 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (S.Ct. 2006); See also Castringo v. 
McOuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 419 (S.Ct. 2005); Daw v. School District 91 Board of 
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (S.Ct. 2001). 
In his Brief, Dr. Mena has completely failed to make any arguments supported by any 
legal authority or reference to the record which have established any error by the Board in these 
- 26 -
000148
• I._ ) • 
proceedings. The appeal has absolutely no basis in law or fact and the Board should be awarded 
costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests the District Court to deny Dr. 
Mena's appeal and to grant the Board costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED This ~~ay of August, 2014. 
URANGA & URANGA 
~/cz~~ 
JEAN R. URANGA, Ofthefirm 
Attorneys for the Board 
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This is a case of statutory bait and switch, where the Idaho Board of Medicine ("Board") 
brought Petitioner Robert Michael Mena, M.D. ("Petitioner") before it under the auspices of the 
Idaho Disabled Physician Act ("DPA") and then proceeded to impose physician discipline on 
Petitioner as if acting under an entirely separate statute, the Medical Practice Act ("MPA"). In 
doing so, the Board acted entirely in excess of and in violation of the statutory authority 
conferred on it by the DP A and without substantial and competent evidence, placing an unlawful 
permanent restriction on Petitioner's ability to earn a living in his chosen profession. The 
Board's ultra vires and unsupported decision should be vacated and this case remanded with 
instructions to dismiss. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board's decision should be wholly 
set aside because it was in excess of the Board's statutory authority under the DPA, violated the 
DPA, and made upon unlawful procedure under the DPA. Additionally, although the Board 
accepted the findings of the Examining Committee that Petitioner was fit to practice medicine, 
its decision to permanently restrict Petitioner's practice contradicted those findings and, 
accordingly, was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
A. Standard of Review. 
As the Board accurately states, the Court's review of the Board's action is governed by 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3): 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or 
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm 
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the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; 
or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole 
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
While the Court is deferential to an agency's findings of fact, the Court exercises free 
review over questions of law. Mercy Med'l Center v. Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050 
(2008); Riverside Dev. Co. v. Vandenberg, 137 Idaho 382, 48 P.3d 1271 (2002). Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law. Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570,573,314 P.3d 
625, 628 (2013). 
Additionally, the Court "defers to an agency's findings of fact unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Cooper v. Bd. of Profl 
Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 449,456, 4 P.3d 561,568 (Idaho 2000) 
(emphasis added). "Evidence is substantial and competent only if a reasonable mind might 
accept such evidence as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Accordingly, to establish that a 
decision is based upon substantial and competent evidence, the court must determine that "the 
agency's findings of fact are reasonable." Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (stating that a finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court 
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on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."). 
B. The Board's decision was in excess of the Board's statutory authority under the 
DPA, violated the DPA, and made upon unlawful procedure under the DP A. 
As explained in Petitioner's Amended Brief on Judicial Review and conceded in 
Respondent's Amended Brief, the Board instituted this case under the DPA, a 1976 addition to 
the Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290, codified as Idaho Code§§ 54-1831 through -1838 and 
Idaho Code § 54-1840. While the Board spends a great deal of Respondent's Amended Brief 
arguing that Petitioner fails to cite supporting authority for its arguments regarding the DP A, this 
is because the DPA has never been thoroughly analyzed and has only been passingly cited in 
Idaho case law to date. Tellingly, the Board likewise cites no case law discussing the DPA and, 
in fact, makes little legal argument regarding the statutory authority conferred on the Board by 
the DPA or how the Board acted within that authority in issuing its decision. Indeed, the 
statutory language of the DPA is plain and reveals that the Board's conduct and ultimate decision 
should be set aside. 
1. The DP A is separate and distinct from the MP A. 
Administrative agencies, such as the Board, are creatures that live and die by their 
authorizing statutes. Indeed, it is axiomatic that "[a]n administrative agency ... has only such 
powers as the statute or ordinance confers." Protest v. Transfer of Water Right No. 11-0290 in 
the Name of Agric. Prods. Corp., 610 P.2d 546,550, 101 Idaho 187, 191 (1980). "When 
interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain language. '[l]f the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any 
statutory construction." City of Pocatello v. State (In re SRBA), 145 Idaho 497,508, 180 P.3d 
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1048, 1059 (2008). A review of the plain language of the DPA and MPA reveal that they 
provide separate and distinct powers, duties, and procedures. Thus, the Board is not free to use 
one as means to meet the other's end. 
The DPA narrowly empowers the Board to evaluate whether there is "reasonable cause to 
believe" that a licensed physician is "unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety 
to patients" on the bases of"( a) mental illness," "(b) physical illness" and/or "( c) excessive use 
or abuse of drugs, including alcohol." Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1833. To facilitate this inquiry, 
the Board "shall" appoint a qualified Examining Committee, which is charged with ordering a 
mental or physical examination of the physician if "necessary to its determination of the fitness 
of the physician to practice." Idaho Code § 54-1834(b ). 
The Board may thereafter accept or reject the Examining Committee's recommendation 
or refer the matter back to the Examining Committee. Idaho Code § 54-1836(b ). To proceed 
against a physician, the Board must serve on the physician copies of the Examining Committee's 
report and diagnosis. Idaho Code§ 54-1837(a). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board 
must make a "determination of the merits" and, if grounds exist, enter one of only three specified 
orders to address the physician's "impairment." Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c). These orders 
exclusively may include: (1) "a recommendation that the physician submit to the care, 
counseling, or treatment by physicians acceptable to the board; (2) a suspension or restriction of 
"the license of the physician to practice medicine for the duration of his impairment'; or (3) 
revocation of "the license of the physician to practice medicine." Id. (emphasis added). 
In stark contrast, the MP A sets forth a broad list of 22 grounds for physician discipline, 
all focusing on misconduct or a failure to meet a standard of care. Idaho Code§ 54-1814. See 
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also Haw v. Idaho State Bd. of Med.,140 Idaho 152, 155,90 P.3d 902,905 (2004). None of these 
grounds overlap with the three narrow grounds for a finding of disability under the DP A, and 
none of the DPA procedures apply. No Examining Committee is employed in an MPA 
proceeding, and the inquiry is not restricted to inability to "practice medicine with reasonable 
skill and safety to patients." See Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1833. 
Indeed, the DPA was enacted in 1976 separately from and subsequently to the original 
codification of the MP A, and none of its provisions were written to incorporate or reference 
MPA provisions. Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1976, Ch. 290. Likewise, when the MPA was 
reenacted in 1977, it was not amended to reference the DP A or incorporate it as a segment of its 
broader disciplinary power. Idaho Code, Sess. Law 1977, Ct. 19, Section 2, p. 536. 
In short, the plain language of the DP A and the MP A reveal that the Legislature 
contemplated two entirely separate and distinct purposes and processes under the respective 
statutes. 
2. The Board instituted this proceeding exclusively under the DP A. 
In this case, it is clear and conceded that the Board initiated this proceeding under the 
DP A. The Board referred Petitioner for examination under the "mental illness" prong of the 
DPA, Idaho Code§ 54-1832(a), and two of three appointed examiners were psychiatrists. That 
occurred mid-June 2012, and the committee issued its report dated June 29, 2012 (Board's 
Hearing Exhibit 8), as required by Idaho Code§ 54-1836, which the Board could accept or reject 
and, in this case, accepted. (Tr. p.4, L. 15-20). 
The Board's concern over the form of Petitioner's draft written response was the clear 
focus, while its substantive concerns about patient care issues, if any at all, were never addressed 
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and, in fact, were never related by any witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, when the 
Board later appointed its DP A Examining Committee, as explained by the staff compliance 
employee, "we decided to go with the two psychiatrists because this was predominately a mental 
health issue and not a standard of care issue ... " (Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). Nor was there any other 
evidence suggesting that the Board's referral to an Examining Committee was made under any 
statutory basis except the "mental illness" jurisdictional prong of the DPA, I.C. Section 54-1832 
(c). 
The Examining Committee articulated its statutory charge (Hearing Ex. 8, p. 1) to 
determine Petitioner's "fitness to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients" 
and concluded that he met that statutory test. In reaching their unanimous conclusion, the 
members also observed that a "formal psychiatric evaluation," which the statute allows them to 
request, was then not needed and would not be helpful. (Id.) 
The parties essentially agree that the DPA provisions through the Examining Committee 
process and its report to the Board appropriately and sequentially proceeded as statutorily 
outlined. However, the Board's subsequent conduct and ultimate decision wholly deviated from 
theDPA. 
3. After bringing Petitioner before it under the auspices of the DP A. the Board 
proceeded to impose discipline on Petitioner in excess of its powers under the 
DPA. without following DPA procedures, and in violation of the DPA. 
As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board ultimately abandoned DPA 
purposes and procedures in order to impose discipline on Petitioner as if this case were brought 
under the MPA. Again, the Board "accepted" the Examining Committee's recommendations at 
its September 2012 board meeting, but it didn't then tell Petitioner. (Tr. p. 36, LL. 15 - 25). 
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Instead, the Board had its counsel prepare another stipulation and encouraged the physician 
licensee to sign it; and if he would not, the process, a staff employee testified, was that "we had 
to proceed with this hearing." (Tr. p. 37, LL. 1 - 15, 21 - 23). As described, the Board handled 
this DP A case recommendation like a disciplinary matter: because Petitioner did not sign a 
stipulation, they took it to hearing. However, Petitioner only understood that he was being 
requested to appear before the Board-selected Examining Committee to assess his present fitness 
to safely practice as a mental health referral to a physician committee to review his mental 
health. 
Moreover, the Board wholly failed to recognize the statutory distinction between 
disciplinary sanctions allowed under the MP A and licensing restrictions under the DP A, which 
must be related to a licensee's inability as a result of one of three specific conditions to practice 
with "reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of' the three specific categories of disease 
or aging processes. Idaho Code§§ 54-1832, -1837. Indeed, the Board, in this clear DPA case, 
imposed a restriction on Petitioner's license not allowed under the DP A. As indicated above, the 
Board may "[ s ]uspend or restrict the licence of the physician to practice medicine" only "for the 
duration of his impairment." Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c)(2). In direct contravention of that 
limitation, the Board's principal substantive action was to impose "sanctions to Petitioner's 
license to practice medicine ... ," including that "Respondent shall permanently cease from 
practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management." (Final Order, p. 3, bottom line.) 
There is nothing in the DPA that authorizes the Board to impose "sanctions" for disability 
or impairment. There is nothing in the DPA that empowers the Board to impose restrictions that 
last "permanently," or for life, or for any duration beyond a licensee's "duration of impairment." 
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There is also nothing in the DP A that authorizes the Board to impose restrictions for conditions 
not causally related to those categories specified in the DP A. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
language, the history, the concept, or the spirit of the DPA giving the Board authority in a DPA 
case to impose restrictions for typical standard of care violations, practice deviations, or 
disciplinary transgressions. 
Finally, there is no authority granted or implied in the DPA for the Agency's imposition 
of permanent restrictions on Petitioner's practice of "OB and chronic pain management," which 
were not referred to the Examining Committee under the DP A referral standards, and were not 
addressed by the Examining Committee as relevant to its review. Nor could such a restriction 
have been easily addressed by the Board under DPA criteria and on which the Board did not 
submit evidence at hearing. While the Board is not bound by the Examining Committee's report 
(Idaho Code§ 54-1836(a)), the DPA provides the Board three options in determining its role in 
the proceedings: accept, reject, or order further examination. Idaho Code§ 54-1836(b). In this 
case, the Board chose to accept the Committee's uniquely qualified recommendations, which 
focused solely on Petitioner's mental health. In subsequently ignoring those accepted findings, 
completely deviating from that focus and subject matter, and imposing an entirely unrelated 
restriction, the Board contravened DP A procedure and, as further explained below, acted without 
substantial and competent supporting evidence. 
In all, because the Board clearly instituted these proceedings under the DP A but then 
failed to act within its statutory parameters, its decision should be set aside and the case 
remanded for dismissal. 




C. The Board's decision was not based on substantial and competent evidence. 
The lack of substantial and competent evidence supporting the Board's decision is fully 
explained in Petitioner's opening brief. Most importantly, as indicated above, the Board's 
referral to a DPA Examining Committee was plainly made under the "mental illness" 
jurisdictional prong of the PDA, Idaho Code§ 54-1832(a). (See Tr. p. 32, LL. 22-24). Again, 
this is one of only three statutory grounds for any "restriction, suspension, or revocation ... in 
case of inability of the licensee to practice medicine with reasonable skill or safety. Idaho Code 
§ 54-1832. 
Accordingly, to constitute substantial and competent evidence sufficient to uphold a 
restriction under the DP A, the evidence relied upon by the Board must at least be relevant to 
Petitioner's alleged mental illness. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co.,132 Idaho 513, 515,975 P.2d 
1178, 1180 (1999) ("[Substantial and competent evidence] is relevant evidence that a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion.") (emphasis added). In this regard, the evidence 
before the Board was grossly inadequate. As fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief and 
above, the Examining Committee, whose findings were accepted by the Board, unanimously 
found Petitioner to be "fit" for practice from a mental health/illness perspective and 
recommended only that he continue his current care and be reevaluated in two years. (Hearing 
Ex. 8; Final Order, p. 1). 
Additional evidence presented at the hearing did nothing to contradict that finding, 
leaving the Board with no relevant evidence to support any restriction related to its inquiry under 
the DPA. In short, as fully explained in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board: (1) did not receive 
chemical or evaluative data from the Jerome hospital; (2) did not make its DPA "mental health" 





referral based on any clinical background Petitioner may have submitted with his response; (3) 
raised relevancy and peer review objections to Petitioner's proffered attempts to present clinical 
records and physician testimony concerning the events the Board requested him to address in 
writing; (4) made no DPA referral concerning Petitioner's obstetrical or chronic pain 
management skills, nor tasked its Examining Committee examine skill-set competency issues as 
to which the Board had previously entered into stipulations and orders under MPA-grounded 
processes; (5) accepted its Examining Committee's recommendation of Petitioner's fitness to 
practice; (6) presented no evidence of terms of post-examination tendered stipulations consistent 
with the accepted recommendations; and (7) presented no evidence of Board process by which it 
had the authority to reject the Examining Committee's recommendations, presumably adopt 
alternative factual findings based on available evidence, or refer the DP A case back to its 
Examining Committee with instructions and/or additional evidence to review and consider. 
Accordingly, the Board's decision should also be set aside for lack of substantial and 
competent evidence. 
D. The Board is not entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
The Board makes a bold request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117, arguing 
that this appeal was brough~ entirely without basis in fact and law. However, a court may only 
award attorney fees on such basis ''when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was 
pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Gamer v. 
Povey, 151 Idaho 462,470,259 P.3d 608,616 (2011) (quoting C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 
763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
However, "when a party pursues an action which contains fairly 
debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and 
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without foundation." Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous 
simply because the district court concludes it fails as a matter of 
law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 
Idaho 890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Furthermore, "[a] misperception of the law, or of one's interest 
under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question 
is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so 
plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 
P.2d 262,265 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Garner, 151 Idaho 462,468,259 P.3d at 614. 
As fully argued in Petitioner's opening brief and above, Petitioner has a legally and 
factually founded argument that the Board's conduct and decision were entirely improper under 
the DPA. Even if the Court does not ultimately accept Petitioner's arguments, he at the very 
least has raised "fairly debatable issues" regarding the Board's adherence to the DPA and the 
evidence relied upon in issuing its decision, particularly with regard to the unlawful permanent 
restrictions issued by the Board. 
The Board's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117 should accordingly be 
denied. 






For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court set aside 
the Board's imposition of sanctions against Petitioner under the DPA, and particularly the 
sanction of a permanent license restriction set forth in item 5 of its Final Order. Moreover, the 
Board should be instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings because grounds for other alternative 
findings were not found to exist. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS Jl ~ay of September, 2014. 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF 
MEDICINE, 
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Case No. CV-OC-2014-04321 
OPINION ON APPEAL 
ATIORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER: JOSEPH D. MCCOLLUM, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: JEAN R. URANGA 
Robert Mena, M.D., seeks judicial review of a final order of the Idaho State Board 
of Medicine imposing restrictions on his license to practice medicine. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The following facts and procedural history are derived from the board's brief and 
appear to be undisputed: On May 14, 2012, the Idaho State Board of Medicine instituted 
proceedings involving Dr. Mena under the Disabled Physician Act. The Examining 
Committee met with Dr. Mena on June 23, 2012, and issued a report June 29, 2012, 
which was accepted by the Board at their December, 2012 Board meeting. Dr. Mena 
was invited to personally appear at the March 1, 2013, Board meeting, which he and his 
attorney attended. The Board voted to accept the Examining Committee report. Dr. 
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Mena did not agree to follow the recommendations, and a hearing was scheduled for 
July 10, 2013. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued Recommended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Board issued its Final Order January 7, 2014. 
The hearing officer's "recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law" 
issued November 14, 2014, stated the following: 
The Board presented oral testimony through one (1) witness and 
presented thirteen (13) exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence. 
Dr. Mena presented the testimony of four (4) witnesses and also testified 
on his own behalf. Dr. Mena offered eighteen (18) exhibits, which were 
admitted, and several exhibits which were not admitted based upon Idaho 
statutes pertaining to privilege. 
At the close of the hearing, each party was granted leave to file written 
closing arguments, the last of which was filed on October 21, 2013. 
Upon review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the transcript of the 
hearing, the exhibits, and the arguments of both counsel, the following 
recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are entered. 
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 1-2. 
The hearing officer entered the following findings of fact: 
Dr. Mena is the holder of an Idaho license to practice medicine and 
surgery, license number M-8898, issued by the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine on September 13, 2003. 
Dr. Mena practices medicine in Jerome, Idaho. In 2007, he had privileges 
to practice at St. Benedict's Family Medical Center ('St. Benedict's') in 
Jerome and was also credentialed by the American Board of Family 
Medicine. Although the record is lacking because of the assertion of 
privilege by the Board, it appears that Dr. Mena became involved in a 
controversy of some kind with St. Benedict's in 2007. This apparently led 
to an evaluation at the Betty Ford Center in Rancho Mirage, California, in 
early 2007 and a neuropsychological evaluation performed by Dr. Craig 
Beaver of Boise, Idaho, in August of 2007. By the time Dr. Mena was 
evaluated by Dr. Beaver, he had undergone a comprehensive clinical 
diagnostic evaluation by a psychologist, who noted a diagnosis of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, as well as a personality disorder, in arrest, 
with negativistic and narcissistic traits. Further, Dr. Mena was noted to 
have a history of sleep apnea and had been on a CPAP machine for six 
(6) months by the time he was evaluated by Dr. Beaver. The Betty Ford 
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Center found no evidence of chemical dependency, but the staff was 
concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological status and recommended 
further treatment and evaluation. Further, Dr. Mena had been seen by a 
psychiatrist who concluded that Dr. Mena had an adjustment disorder, 
possible ADHD, possible obsessive-compulsive disorder and 
neuropsychological abnormalities. 
Dr. Mena had also attended the Bridge to Recovery program by the time 
he was evaluated by Dr. Beaver. The program found evidence of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, ADHD and/or a personality disorder. They 
recommended that Dr. Mena limit himself to a forty (40) hour work week 
and continued involvement in a twelve step program. 
In addition, Dr. Doris Gunderson evaluated Dr. Mena and found that he 
showed symptoms of significant depression with an untreated mood 
disorder. Dr. Beaver found little evidence of neurocognitive deficits, but did 
find evidence of obsessive-compulsive disorder with elements of an 
adjustment disorder, as well as narcissistic and self-defeating personality 
traits, in addition to Dr. Mena's sleep apnea. Dr. Beaver noted that Dr. 
Mena was on medication (Lexapro) and recommended continued 
counseling to avoid burnout. 
Subsequent to Dr. Beaver's evaluation, Dr. Mena attended the Physical 
Assessment and Clinical Education Program ('PACE') at the University of 
California - San Diego. The program staff found that Dr. Mena's approach 
to obstetrics contained significant deficiencies and recommended that he 
discontinue his involvement in obstetrics or, in the alternative, pursue an 
intensive hands on training course as a means to update his knowledge 
base. 
Dr. Mena was further assessed by the Center for Personalized Education 
for Physician ('CPEP'). The assessment found that Dr. Mena was deficient 
in some areas of knowledge regarding obstetrics and family practice and 
made a series of educational recommendations. 
Although it is not explicit as to how the Idaho Board of Medicine became 
aware of Dr. Mena's situation, it is clear that as of January 2009 the Board 
had completed an investigation and offered a stipulation to Dr. Mena. The 
more pertinent conditions of the stipulation required Dr. Mena to 
permanently cease performing obstetrics, refrain from the practice of pain 
management, work no more than forty (40) hours per week, continue 
counseling and psychiatric treatment, follow the recommendations of his 
treatment providers and be subject to random monitoring for compliance. 
Dr. Mena accepted and signed the stipulation, upon advice from his 
counsel on July 16, 2009. 
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According to the evidence elicited at the hearing by Dr. Mena, it appears 
that the stipulated settlement was beneficial to both Dr. Mena's emotional 
wellbeing and to that of his family. 
Shortly thereafter, the Board filed with the National Practitioner Databank 
an adverse action report to the effect that Dr. Mena's license to practice 
medicine was subject to 'limitation or restriction.' 
Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it is apparent that the 
adverse action report affected Dr. Mena's ability to be board certified by 
the American Academy of Family Practice. This led to a notification to Dr. 
Mena from St. Benedict's to the effect that he would not be able to return 
to practice at St. Benedict's until he reestablished board certification. 
On September 26, 2011, the Board, through its Chairman, Leo Harf, M.D., 
terminated the July 16, 2009, stipulation and order upon Dr. Mena's 
request. 
On September 26, 2011, Keith Davis, M.D., the Chief of Staff of St. 
Benedict's authored a letter to the Idaho State Board of Medicine to the 
effect that Dr. Mena had forfeited his privileges at St. Benedict's Family 
Medical Center. 
On October 11, 2011, Beverly Kendrick, on behalf of the Board, wrote to 
Dr. Mena, inquiring about his loss of privileges and requesting a response. 
Two days later, Nancy Kerr, on behalf of the Board, informed Dr. Mena in 
writing that while the Board had agreed to terminate the 2009 stipulation, 
the agreement to permanently cease practicing obstetrics was still in force 
and effect. 
Sometime thereafter, on an unstated date, but prior to the Board's 
December 20, 2011, meeting, Darlene Parrott, who replaced Beverly 
Kendrick as an investigator, received a thirteen (13) page response from 
Dr. Mena in reply to the adverse action by St. Benedict's, which by then 
had become St. Luke's Hospital in Jerome. 
Ms. Parrott shared the response with the Board, which had concerns 
about the disjointed and rambling nature of the document. Id., at 2-5. 
The hearing officer concluded: 
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Given the past history involving Dr. Mena, the Board's actions in requiring 
an examination were both reasonable and prudent. The document in 
response to the Board's inquiry is more than rambling and disjointed. The 
document contains many obscure references, contains many grammatical 
and syntax errors, and contains sentences which are nearly impenetrable 
as to Dr. Mena's point. Moreover, the document appears to be a defense 
of the doctor's conduct which led to the 2009 stipulation. 
At the hearing, Dr. Mena seemingly conceded that the document would be 
concerning to the Board. He explained that the document was a draft that 
had been erroneously sent to the Board. This testimony was not 
particularly compelling for two reasons. First, as Board counsel correctly 
pointed out, Dr. Mena later sent a conclusion page which contains much 
the same style of writing as the prior document. Second, no document has 
been produced by Dr. Mena regarding the 'correct' response that should 
have been sent. 
In any event, given the nature of the two documents, the Board could 
easily have entertained an honest and strong suspicion that Dr. Mena was 
suffering from one of the three conditions listed as grounds for restriction 
of a license in Idaho Code§ 54-1832. 
Once that determination was made, Dr. Mena was ordered to undergo an 
examination before three physicians, including two psychiatrists. This 
order was in accordance with Idaho Code § 54-1834. The committee's 
charge was to determine Dr. Mena's fitness to practice medicine with 
reasonable skill and safety to patients, either on a restricted or 
unrestricted basis, and report its recommendations to the Board. 
The examination occurred on June 19, 2012. Among the information 
disclosed by the committee were the facts that Dr. Mena was under 
continuing psychiatric care with plans to continue in that care, and that he 
had sent the first document to the Board without reading its contents. The 
committee concluded that Dr. Mena could continue to practice medicine. It 
recommended repeat neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver, 
continued psychiatric care and reevaluation in two years, with continuing 
Board oversight. 
The examining committee has fulfilled its duties in accordance with Idaho 
Code § 54-1834. In so doing, the examining committee took into account 
Dr. Mena's psychiatric care, including his prior examinations revealing 
obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits. 
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A voluntary agreement regarding the examining committee's findings was 
offered to Dr. Mena who has rejected that proposed agreement and has 
sought formal proceedings in accordance with Idaho Code § 54-1836. 1 
Prior to this matter being noticed for hearing, Dr. Mena was evaluated by 
Dr. Beaver. Interestingly, he describes his perception of the reason for the 
repeat neurological examination as his low performance scores that he 
had on a 'microCog' test he completed some time in the past. He 
apparently did not relate his repeat neuropsychological examination to the 
recommendations of the examining committee. Dr. Beaver found that Dr. 
Mena had maintained on a low dose of an antidepressant, and that Dr. 
Mena exhibited a level of defensiveness that was atypical of persons 
submitting to psychological tests. Dr. Beaver noted that while Dr. Mena 
was having no significant psychological difficulties, Dr. Mena was on a low 
dose of Lexapro and that his probable obsessive-compulsive disorder was 
in partial remission. Dr. Beaver also found that Dr. Mena had a continuing 
narcissistic personality trait and moderate occupational stressors. 
Dr. Beaver recommended that Dr. Mena follow medical recommendations 
regarding his sleep apnea, that he continue on a low dose of Lexapro as 
recommended by his psychiatrist and that if transferring to a new work 
situation, he be required to be involved in individual psychotherapy on a 
regular basis during the first six months. Finally, Dr. Beaver recommended 
that Dr. Mena engage in individual counseling to ensure that some of his 
personal dynamics do not again create difficulties for him. 
At the hearing, Dr. Mena produced a letter date June 14, 2012, sent by his 
psychiatrist, Dr. Albright, to two of the examining committee members. 
This letter states, in pertinent part, that it was Dr. Albright's understanding 
that the reason that Dr. Mena was appearing before the examining 
committee was because he 'mistakenly sent 'rough draft' that was 
accidentally printed in place of a 'proof read' completed letter. Yet, for 
11.c. § 54-1836: 
(a) The examining committee shall report to the board its findings on the examination of the 
physician under section 54-1834, the determination of the committee as to the fitness of the 
physician to engage in the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients, either 
on a restricted or unrestricted basis, and any management that the committee may recommend. 
Such recommendation by the committee shall be advisory only and shall not be binding 
on the board. (b) The board may accept or reject the recommendation of the examining 
committee to permit a physician to continue to practice with or without any restriction on his 
license to practice medicine, or may refer the matter back to the examining committee for further 
examination and report thereon. (c) In the absence of a voluntary agreement by a physician 
under section 54-1835 for restriction of the licensure of such physician to practice medicine, any 
physician shall be entitled to a hearing in formal proceedings before the board and a 
determination on the evidence as to whether or not restriction, suspension, or revocation of 
licensure shall be imposed. (Emphasis added). 
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whatever reason, I believe it has been construed by IBOM staff as some 
clue to Dr. Mena as being potentially disorganized and therefore unable to 
practice medicine safely.' It is unclear whether Dr. Albright saw the letter, 
but given his comments to Dr. Beaver, Dr. Albright does not appear to 
have formally assessed or evaluated Dr. Mena as of the writing of the 
June 14, 2012, letter. Dr. Albright also noted 'a large portion of his issues 
have been related to adjustment anxiety over his once restricted family 
practice board certification and diplomat status.' Dr. Albright further stated 
that Dr. Mena had clinically improved 'now that his board certification 
privilege has been reinstated.' Dr. Albright's letter is not compelling. It is 
based on year old information and is based on a misunderstanding of the 
facts regarding Dr. Mena's privileges. 
At the conclusion of a hearing under the statutory scheme pertaining to 
impaired physicians, the Board is tasked with making a 'determination of 
the merits and, if grounds therefore are found to exist' the Board may 
issue an order imposing one or more of the following: 
1. Make a recommendation that the physician submit to the care, 
counseling or treatments by physicians acceptable to the Board; or, 
2. Suspend or restrict the license of the physician to practice 
medicine for the duration of the impairment; or, 
3. Revoke the license of the physician to practice medicine. 
If no grounds exist, the Board shall enter its order so stating and dismiss 
the proceedings. Dr. Mena argues that there was no reason for the Board 
to seek an agreement and no reason for the Board to require a formal 
hearing. In other words, Dr. Mena seems to argue that the examining 
committee's findings, on their face, preclude a hearing in this matter. 
There is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Dr. Mena's history 
was reviewed by the examining committee. That committee noted that, 
while Dr. Mena had benefited from treatment for depression and anxiety, 
he stated he was under psychiatric care and planned to continue with that 
care.2 Further, the committee reviewed findings regarding Dr. Mena's 
2"The Examination committee concluded that Dr. Robert Mena can continue his present practice of 
medicine with reasonable skill and safety, with required management including: 
Repeat Neuropsychological testing by Dr. Craig Beaver 
Continued outpatient Psychiatric care 
Reevaluation in two years, with continuing Board oversight 
We do not feel that requiring a formal Psychiatric evaluation at this time would be helpful. 
We are unable to make any recommendations concerning restrictions on his practice of Obstetrics.· 
Exhibit 8, at 2 ("Report of Findings and Recommendations Examination Committee for the Board of 
Medicine, State of Idaho June 29, 2012."). 
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obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits, and 
recommended repeated continuing psychiatric care and reevaluation with 
continuing Board oversight. Under these conditions, the Board fulfilled its 
duties in seeking a voluntary agreement and in lieu of that, setting a formal 
proceeding. 
Dr. Mena also argues that there is an absence of a causal psychiatric 
diagnosis. In other words, Dr. Mena appears to argue that no evidence 
was put before the examining committee that would lead it to conclude 
that there is a newly diagnosed issue. There is nothing found in the 
statutory scheme to suggest that there need to be a 'new' psychological 
issue found before the Board can take action. On the contrary, the Board 
must find a psychological or physical impairment. There is ample evidence 
from the documents produced at hearing that Dr. Mena is currently 
undergoing some level of psychological impairment, even if that 
impairment is milder than it was in 2007. The most pertinent recent 
information regarding Dr. Mena's impairment is the report of the examining 
committee and Dr. Beaver's 2012 evaluation. Further, Dr. Mena told the 
examining committee that he intended to continue his psychiatric care, 
and that he was going to continue taking Lexapro. Therefore, the 
examining committee and Dr. Beaver's recommendations were both 
reasonable and prudent. Indeed, both recommendations amount to little 
more than continuing medication as needed and continued counseling.3 
It appears from the hearing that the main reason Dr. Mena has resisted 
the recommendations of the examining committee and Dr. Beaver is not 
because he believes that they are unwarranted. Rather, he does not wish 
to be mandated by the Board, which he deems a restriction on his license. 
This appears to be his position because it would (at least in theory) 
disqualify him from seeking certification again. While it may or not be true 
that Dr. Mena will be prevented from seeking board certification, a hearing 
under the Disabled Physician Act is not the forum to test the legality or 
reasonableness of the credentialing agency or St. Benedict's actions. The 
only question here is whether there is information to determine that 
grounds exist to find some level of disability or impairment. Those grounds 
do exist. 
While the level of impairment may be debatable, it is clear and convincing 
that some level of impairment exists. Therefore, the Board is in a proper 
position, in its discretion, to issue an order imposing one or more of the 
three (3) potential orders found in Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c). Id., at 5-10. 
In its final order, the board noted "[a]fter consideration and upon COPD 
(Committee on Professional Discipline] recommendation, the Board acted to adopt the 
3Emphasis added. 
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Recommended Findings in toto after determining the principal issues in this contested 
case hearing were appropriately adjudicated." Final Order, at 1. 
The board "ordered the following sanctions" to Dr. Mena's license to practice 
medicine: 
Respondent shall continue ongoing treatment/medication and shall comply 
with recommendations of his current and future treating psychiatrist and 
psychologist. Respondent shall authorize them to issue regular quarterly 
status reports regarding his continuing treatment and condition to the 
Board. Such reports shall include, but are not limited to, Respondent's 
commitment to ongoing psychiatric treatment/medication, compliance, 
response to treatment, recommended care and treatment issues. 
Respondent shall provide the Board with written proof of compliance with 
this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of the date of the last signature 
below ... 
Respondent shall not change his current psychiatrist or psychologist 
without approval of the Board. All requests for changes of his current 
psychiatrist or psychologist must be in writing and approved, prior to any 
change ... 
Respondent shall authorize his current and future psychiatrist and 
psychologist to immediately report to the Board any concerns with his 
· ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety ... 
Respondent shall continue in treatment for sleep apnea and shall comply 
with the recommendations of his current and future treating physician with 
respect to sleep apnea. Respondent shall authorize his current and future 
treating physician to issue written quarterly status reports regarding his 
continuing treatment and condition to the Board. Such reports shall 
include, but are not limited to, Respondent's commitment to ongoing 
treatment/medication, compliance, response to treatment, recommended 
care and treatment issues. Respondent shall provide the Board with 
written proof of compliance with this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of 
the date of the last signature below ... 
Respondent shall permanently cease from practicing obstetrics and 
chronic pain management ... 
Respondent shall undergo a complete reevaluation by Dr. Craig Beaver 
two (2) years from the date of the last signature below. Respondent shall 
authorize Dr. Beaver to issue a written report with-in one (1) month after .. 
. the complete reevaluation to the Board ... 
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Respondent shall provide all employers and the Chief of Staff at each 
hospital where he ... applies for or obtain privileges, with a copy of this 
Final Order. Respondent shall provide the Board with written proof of 
compliance with this paragraph within fifteen (15) days of the date his 
employment application for or obtaining of hospital privileges ... 
Within six (6) months of the date of the last signature below, Respondent 
shall facilitate and fully cooperate with a medical record review by Board 
staff ... 
Respondent shall execute the Release . . . authorizing any person or 
entity having information relevant to Respondent's compliance with the 
provisions of this Final Order to release such information to the Board ... 
Respondent shall obey all federal, state and local laws, and all rules 
governing the practice of medicine in Idaho ... 
This Final Order shall be considered a public record as that term is used in 
the Idaho Code. Final Order, at 3-4. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The procedures concerning judicial review of Idaho state agency determinations 
are set forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: 
(1) Judicial review of agency action shall be governed by the provisions of 
this chapter unless other provision of law is applicable to the particular 
matter. 
(2) A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a 
contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person 
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, 
Idaho Code. 
(3) A party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case decided by an 
agency other than the industrial commission or the public utilities 
commission is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person 
complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279. I. C. 
§ 67-5270. 
An appellate court may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). The court 
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must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Price v. 
Payette County Board of County Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 
586 (1998); Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141,142,206 P.3d 505, 506 (Ct. App. 2009). 
"An agency's actions are afforded a strong presumption of validity." Maclay v. 
Idaho Real Estate Commission, 154 Idaho 540, 544, 300 P.3d 616,620 (2012). Agency 
action must be affirmed on appeal unless the court determines that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon 
unlawful procedure; (d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-
5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The party attacking the agency's 
decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency erred in a manner specified 
in section 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131 Idaho 
at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. 
ANALYSIS 
Near the outset of their case, this Court determined that the Petitioner's opening 
brief failed to comply with I.AR. 35. It did not contain an issues section or clearly 
delineate the issues asserted in the body of the briefing. See I.R.C.P. 84(p} and I.AR. 
35(a)(4). See also Carle v. State, 2013 WL 5979202, *1 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requires that an appellant identify the specific 
issues to be considered on appeal and present arguments with citations to 
the record and transcript on which the arguments rely. I.AR. 35(a)(4), (6). 
The failure of an appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues 
required by I.AR. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of the issue on 
appeal. This rule may be relaxed, however, where the issue is argued in 
the briefing.") (citing State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111, 952 P.2d 1245, 
1247 (1998). 
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The court afforded the Petitioner an opportunity to submit a conforming brief. The 
Petitioner submitted an amended brief which contains a "statement of issues." However, 
the issues specified in the issues statement of the amended brief are not supported by 
corresponding argument and citation to authority in the body of the brief. 
There is an attempt to rectify this in the reply brief but it is not appropriate to 
present argument supported by citation to authority for the first time in a reply brief. See 
Liponis, infra, 149 Idaho at 375, 234 P.3d at 699. "'We refused to consider the 
arguments unsupported by authority, even when authority was later presented in the 
reply brief." See also Indian Springs, LLC v. Andersen, 154 Idaho 708, 302 P.3d 333, 
341 (2012) "'(T)his Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the 
appellant's reply brief. 'A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the 
issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the 
respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief."' 
This Court will analyze the issues that are sufficiently defined in the briefing. 
Dr. Mena asserts the following issues in this petition for judicial review: (1) the 
agency exceeded its statutory authority, or acted in violation of statute, or used unlawful 
procedure to use the Disabled Physician Act physician examination referral process 
when its purpose was to impose permanent license restrictions which is outside the 
purview of the DPA; (2) the agency erred in issuing a Final Order imposing license 
restrictions on grounds beyond those permitted by the DPA and/or in excess of its 
statutory authority; (3) the agency erred in extending and making permanent license 
restrictions in an earlier MPA stipulation and order after Dr. Mena was referred to a 
Physician Examining Committee for evaluation under the much narrower statutory 
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provisions of the DPA; (4) the Final Order should be vacated and the case dismissed 
because it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (5) 
the agency prejudiced Dr. Mena's rights and erred in initiating a DPA case based on 
invited communication and prevented him from introducing evidence respecting his 
health and mental/psychological condition by asserting Idaho's Peer Review statutes 
and persuading the hearing officer to admit on rebuttal, over objection, the agency's 
similarly historic evidence arising out of the same peer review process. Petitioner's 
Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 3. 
Substantial Evidence 
Dr. Mena contends that the agency's Final Order should be vacated and the case 
dismissed because it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
However, substantial evidence supports the board's requirements. The board 
essentially required Dr. Mena to continue his "ongoing" psychiatric/psychological 
treatment and medication and comply with the recommendations of his treating 
psychiatrist and psychologist. He was also required to continue his sleep apnea 
treatment. Finally, he was directed to permanently cease practicing obstetrics and 
chronic pain management. 
The hearing officer found that Dr. Mena had been diagnosed with various 
psychological disorders including an adjustment disorder, ADHD, personality disorder, 
untreated mood disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, narcissistic personality 
disorder, and neuropsychological abnormalities. Dr. Beaver's most recent examination 
of Dr. Mena specifically noted that he was continuing to benefit from his medication and 
OPINION ON APPEAL - 13 
000180
he also noted the prior recommendation of continued psychological counseling and 
"continued use of medication and CPAP." Exhibit 9, at 2. 
The board's requirement that Dr. Mena continue with his ongoing medication and 
treatment, as recommended by his treating psychiatrist and psychologist, is supported 
by substantial evidence. There is evidence that Dr. Mena suffers from mental conditions 
that adversely impact his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill or patient 
safety and which require ongoing psychiatric and/or psychiatric monitoring. Dr. Mena 
himself argued before the board that he was accepting of continued recommended 
treatment. 
The board prohibited Dr. Mena from practicing obstetrics and chronic pain 
management permanently. He contends that this was done without supporting 
evidence. However, the court notes the evidence in the record concerning Dr. Mena's 
deficiencies in practicing obstetrics and in chronic pain medication. See Exhibits 13 and 
18 (PACE and CPEP Evaluations).4 
4See, e.g., Exhibit 12 (PACE Evaluation, at 3 ("He had areas of relative weakness on the use of opioids" 
and scored "in the lowest 10%" in testing concerning knowledge of pharmacotherapeutics.); 7 - ("[S]ome 
of Dr. Mena's management decisions put patients at risk for poor outcomes. The oral examination 
administered by Dr. Gia revealed significant deficiencies in Dr. Mena's approach to obstetrics. Due to 
these deficiencies, Dr. Mena should either discontinue his involvement in obstetrics or pursue an 
intensive hands-on training course or fellowship program as a means to update his knowledge base ."); 
Exhibit 13 (CPEP Evaluation, at 22 Dr. Mena "[s]tated that he does not do chronic pain management ... 
stated that he follows labs in his chronic pain patients ... However, there were no labs results in this 
chart and no notes that labs were ordered."); 29 - ("During this Assessment, Dr. Mena demonstrated 
medical knowledge that varied from adequate to poor. While overall he appeared to have a broad base of 
knowledge, in some areas that knowledge was shallow or inaccurate. Additionally, in some areas it was 
not current. His knowledge for obstetrical topics lacked adequate depth overall."). 
OPINION ON APPEAL - 14 
000181
Dr. Beaver, in his most recent examination of Dr. Mena, specifically noted that 
Dr. Mena is prone to having more confidence in his abilities than he actually possesses, 
and he also appeared concerned about Dr. Mena's psychological condition in the event 
that he increased his job responsibilities, noting that he was doing better with reduced 
work responsibilities. See Exhibit 9. 
Substantial evidence supports the board's conclusion that Dr. Mena should be, 
for reasons of patient safety, restricted from engaging in obstetrics and chronic pain 
management. 5 
The problem created by the order is that it seems to deviate from the structure of 
Idaho Code § 54-1837(c)(3). Subsection (c)(3) allows revocation of the physician's 
license to practice medicine. Subsection (c)(3) does not appear to contemplate a 
continuing practice with restrictions on the license. The remedy short of revocation of 
the license appears to fall under subsection (c)(2) which allows the board to "suspend or 
restrict the license of the physician to practice medicine for the duration of his 
impairment ... " _Acting under subsection (c)(2) the suspension or restriction continues 
"for the duration of his impairment," rather than as a permanent suspension or 
restriction as provided in the board's order. Such a suspension may in fact be 
permanent if the impairment continues. On the other hand, a revocation of the license 
may not be permanent, because a physician may seek reinstatement pursuant to I.C. § 
54-1838. Nonetheless, the two subsections are not the same. In any event, it appears 
that the board was applying section 54-1837(c)(2) which allows restrictions rather than 
the full revocation of the license authorized by section 54-1837(c)(3). Operating under 
5while Dr. Mena characterizes these restrictions as "permanent," pursuant to I.C. § 54-1838, he has "a 
right," "at reasonable intervals," to petition for removal of these restrictions. 
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(c)(2) the restrictions should be for the duration of the impairment, not designated as 
permanent. 
Evidence/Peer Review Records 
Dr. Mena contends the agency prejudiced his rights and erred "in initiating a DPA 
case based on [his] invited communication, then prevent[ed] him from introducing 
evidence regarding his health and mental/psychological condition by successfully 
asserting Idaho's Peer Review statutes .... " Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on 
Judicial Review, at 3. In the body of his brief, he asserts "the hearing below was 
clouded by the board's pervasive assertion of Idaho's peer review statute." Id., at 24.6 
The petitioner bears the burden of showing error was committed. He has not 
demonstrated that he was not permitted to introduce evidence that was relevant to the 
proceeding or was otherwise permitted to be introduced pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392b.7 
6As previously noted, "[t)he Board presented oral testimony through one (1) witness and presented (13) 
exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence. Dr. Mena presented the testimony of four (4) witnesses 
and also testified on his own behalf. Dr. Mena offered eighteen (18) exhibits, which were admitted, and 
several exhibits which were not admitted based upon Idaho statutes pertaining to privilege." 
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 1. 
7 
RECORDS CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED. Except as provided in section 39-
1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged, and shall 
not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted 
as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be admitted in evidence, or in any action 
of any kind in any court or before any administrative body, agency or person for any 
purpose whatsoever. No order of censure, suspension or revocation of licensure, or of a 
certification in the case of emergency medical services personnel, or health care 
organization privilege of any physician licensed to practice medicine in Idaho shall be 
admissible in any civil proceeding seeking damages or other civil relief against the 
physician, emergency medical services personnel, or health care organization which may 
be a defendant in said cause. However, this section shall not prohibit or otherwise affect 
the use of documents, materials or testimony in health care organization proceedings, 
nor shall it prohibit or otherwise affect the dissemination, for medical purposes, of 
information contained in such documents or materials or the conclusions and findings of 
such health care organization. This section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence in 
any action or proceeding of the patient care records of any patient. 
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In his August 22, 2013, memorandum Dr. Mena argued "Respondent's Exhibits 
101, 102 and 103" should be admitted into evidence. Memorandum Review of Idaho's 
Peer Review Statute, at 10. However, this section of the memorandum does not explain 
or substantiate the relevance of these records. Dr. Mena also does not specify how he 
was prejudiced by the exclusion of these materials. 
Dr. Mena also cites the "rejected ... proffered testimony of Richard Lally, M.D." 
Id., at 12. He cites this testimony in reference to the "2007 Fair Hearing," as he does 
Respondent's Exhibits 101, 102, and 103. See, id., at 10. However, the relevance of this 
information is unclear, particularly considering his agreement in 2009, by stipulation, to 
permanently cease performing obstetrics, refrain from the practice of pain management, 
work no more than forty (40) hours per week, continue counseling and psychiatric 
treatment, follow the recommendations of his treatment providers and be subject to 
random monitoring for compliance. Dr. Mena accepted and signed the stipulation, upon 
advice from his counsel on July 16, 2009. Recommended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, at 3-4. It is unclear why Dr. Mena, who assented to the stipulation, 
would want to revisit the issue of the propriety of his prior conduct with the board or how 
this would have impacted the proceedings before the board given that the 2007 conduct 
was not at issue. It was the subsequently occurring evaluations and actions that caused 
the board concern. 
As noted by the board, "[t]his action was not based upon anything occurring at 
the hospital and consequently any evidence of cases occurring at the hospital were 
irrelevant and immaterial." Respondent's Amended Brief, at 19. The board also correctly 
notes that materials that Dr. Mena contends were improperly admitted (Petitioner's 
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Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 25) were records introduced to refute his 
testimony that no prior evaluation had found him unfit for duty as a physician. See 
August 12, 2013 Hearing Transcript, at 169-73. 
Dr. Mena has failed to demonstrate that the board erred and that a substantial 
right was prejudiced by its failure to consider the materials cited by him as improperly 
excluded or included.8 
Sanctions 
A problem in this case is the board's use of the term "sanctions" in the order. 
There are multiple meanings that can be attached to this word. In the context of this 
case, it certainly does not mean approval. Examining traditional dictionary definitions, 
e.g., the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, several of the 
definitions begin with the word "penalty." That is, punishment for non-compliance with a 
law or decree or moral standard. That is perplexing language in the context of a 
disability case, particularly when the doctor has accepted many of the limitations. It 
appears to brand the doctor as being morally worthy of punishment. The impression that 
this is the case is the use of a permanent revocation, rather than a revocation so long 
as the conditions leading to the limitations exist. There may be no difference in effect. A 
doctor may move to have a permanent suspension vacated. A limitation so long as the 
8Dr. Mena references "the Idaho Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Section 37-2718(9) which allows the 
Idaho Board of Pharmacy to issue without a hearing a restriction upon a physician registrant's controlled 
substance registration consistent with that of a state licensing board for that registrant. Petitioner 
represents that his controlled substance registration was restricted to not allow him to prescribe to OB 
patients or chronic pain patients." Petitioner's Amended Opening Brief on Judicial Review, at 24. 
However, Dr. Mena concedes this "is one matter not covered by the record of this case below" and, 
again, this court does not consider issues asserted for the first time on appeal. 
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disability exists may be permanent. Nonetheless, tying the language of sanctions to the 
language of a permanent revocation gives the appearance that the doctor should be 
punished. That is not the language of section 54-1837(c)(2) of the Doctors with 
Disability Act. There is nothing in the hearing officer's findings that indicates the doctor's 
practice should be limited as a punishment, though it should be limited as a protection 
to the patient public and in the doctor's own interest. 
The sum of this discussion is that the record in this case supports the limitations 
upon the doctor's practice under I.C. § 54-1837(c)(2). The record does not justify those 
limitations upon the doctor's practice as a punishment for his disabilities or for 
contesting the proceedings. 
Board's Request for Attorney Fees 
The board has requested an award of attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
I.C. § 12-117(1) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the 
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, 
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's 
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(emphasis added). 
The board is the prevailing party so far as the determination that Dr. Mena's 
license should be restricted and that he must continue to take rehabilitative steps. 
However, there was a reasonable basis for this proceeding arising from the board's 
mixing of statutory remedies and the board's use of the language of sanctions which in 
this context moves the case from protection of the public and rehabilitative to 
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punishment, which implies moral deficiency or intentional bad conduct. Attorney fees 
are denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Mena has failed to demonstrate that the board's license restrictions and 
requirements were in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; in excess of 
statutory authority of the agency; made upon unlawful procedure; not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion; or that a substantial right has been prejudiced. He has demonstrated that the 
restrictions and requirements should be pursuant to I.C. § 54-1837(c)(2) so long as the 
impairments continue, not as permanent revocation of his license. Further, the 
restrictions on Dr. Mena's license should be characterized in the language of section 
54-1837(c)(2), not as "sanctions." 
The restrictions and conditions imposed by the board are affirmed pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 54-1837(c)(2). The case is remanded for entry of an order consistent with 
this opinion. 
Neither party is awarded attorney fees. 
Dated this _L!:::. day of February 2015. 
OPINION ON APPEAL - 20 
000187
.. .. e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the OPINION ON APPEAL as notice 
pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
JOSEPH D. MCCOLLUM, JR. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 MAIN STREET, SUITE 1000 
PO BOX 1617 
BOISE, ID 83707-1617 
JEAN URANGA 
URANGA & URANGA 
714 NORTH 5TH STREET 
PO BOX 1678 
BOISE, ID 83701-1678 
Date: 7&J.: 11 I 2-0 IS-
OPINION ON APPEAL - 21 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, lda:..:..ah~r--+'rt:'rl~ 
000188
Joseph D. McCollum, Jr., ISB No. 1299 
Daniel E. Mooney, ISB No. 8723 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 





Attorneys for Petitioner 
e No. ___ . Pif.fo h\:YV ·: 
A.M., ___ __,P,M .. _r -~-to----· 
MAR 2 5 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY fJ'IERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROBERT MICHAEL MENA, M.D., ) 
) 









TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
Case No. CV OC 1404321 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: I 
Filing Fee: $129.00 
RESPONDENT AND ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD, JEAN URANGA 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN: 
1. Petitioner/Appellant Robert Michael Mena, M.D. ("Mena"), appeals against 
Respondent Idaho State Board of Medicine ("Board") to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
45996.0001. 7328964.1 
000189
Opinion on Appeal ("Opinion") entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court of Idaho, Senior 
District Judge Gerald F. Schroeder, on February 12, 2015. 
2. Mena has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Opinion is 
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3. The issues on appeal include but, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(f), are not 
limited to whether the District Court erred in its Opinion on Appeal by failing to find that, in 
issuing its Final Order on January 7, 2014 in Case No. 2007-BOM-5888 before the Idaho Board 
of Medicine ("IBOM"), the IBOM: 
a. Violated substantial rights of Petitioner to his legal detriment and 
prejudice; 
b. Acted in violation and in excess of its statutory authority under the 
Disabled Physicians Act ("DPA") (Idaho Code§§ 54-1831 et seq.); 
c. Based its decision upon unlawful procedure; 
d. Failed to support its decision with substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; and 
e. Acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused its discretion. 
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b. Petition for Judicial Review filed 3/4/2014; 
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whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below: 
Tiffany Fisher 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
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